Iran has entered a new phase in which nationalism has surged following a 12 day war with Israel. This phase became more evident when Ayatollah Khamenei, in his first public appearance after the Iranian Israeli war, asked the eulogist (reciter) Mahmoud Karimi during the Ashura ceremony on 5 July 2025 to recite the anthem “O Iran”.
Israel had drawn up a two stage plan to topple the regime in Iran. The first phase, implemented simultaneously on several fronts, focused on destroying Iranian military targets through operations carried out by agents inside the country and air raids by Israeli fighter jets.
The second phase aimed to expose the weakness of Tehran’s management in order to incite opposition forces inside Iran and create internal chaos that would pit the people against the army, ensuring that this process would ultimately lead to regime change in Iran.
The war revealed that Israel’s studies of Iranian society were incomplete and flawed. Israel built its entire strategy on the assumption that Iranian society would see the military attacks as an opportunity and rise up against the regime.
However, the Iranian people chose to put aside all their criticisms and opposition to the system and instead stood by it, adopting a national stance and preferring this option to seeing their country end up like Syria, Iraq, Yemen, or Lebanon.
During the war, the Iranian leadership realised that its real strength in the face of Israeli and American attacks lay in social unity. Within this framework, it decided to bring to the fore a nationalist discourse that had been marginalised after the 1979 Revolution on the grounds that it evoked the era of the Shah (the Pahlavi monarchy), and chose to highlight symbols of ancient Iran.
With Ayatollah Khamenei requesting that Mahmoud Karimi recite the anthem “O Iran”, it became clear that moving toward a nationalist line is the preferred option.
The discourses of “Islamic awakening” and “Islamic ummah” (Pan-Islamist), which had shaped Iranian policy since 1979, receded into the background and began to be replaced by the discourse of “Iranian nationalism” and by statues of heroes from ancient Iranian history.
The process through which the nationalist discourse emerged, and which began with Khamenei’s order to recite “O Iran”, now has the potential to influence not only Iran’s domestic politics but also its foreign policy.
Nationalism in Iran
Different approaches and currents of nationalism exist in Iran, shaped by historical events, social developments, and religious and sectarian beliefs. Broadly, nationalism in Iran can be grouped under three main headings:
1. Persian nationalism
This nationalist current bases itself on the pre Islamic era in Iran and defends Iranian nationalism through the values of the ancient Iranian period before Islam.
Zia-Ebrahimi, a professor at King’s College London, writes in his book “The Emergence of Iranian Nationalism: Race and the Politics of Dislocation” that the dominant nationalism in Iran is “Dislocative Nationalism”. He lists its main characteristics as follows:
- The Iranian nation possesses a continuous history of no less than 2500 years.
- The pre Islamic period is Iran’s golden age.
- Arabs and Islam are responsible for Iran’s backwardness.
- Iranians belong to the Aryan race and are related to Europeans.
Persian nationalism carries an inherent hostility toward Turks and Arabs. It regards the Islamisation of Iran as the result of Arab influence on Iranian culture. It identifies engagement with Western countries as the more correct and suitable policy for Iranian history, rather than developing strong relations with neighbouring states. It also defends the necessity of Iran’s return to its former power over the region stretching from the Indian subcontinent to the Mediterranean.
2. Nationalism that does not prioritise ethnic identity
The cadre that led the Islamic Revolution in Iran, headed by Ayatollah Khomeini, defended after the revolution the idea that no nation or people enjoys preference in Islam. They distanced themselves from the heroes and myths of ancient Iran because they evoked the Shah’s era, and instead promoted the discourse of “Islamic awakening” and “Islamic ummah”. Although this line reached radical points in the early years of the revolution, it softened over time.
An attempt was made to build Iranian identity through a political discourse that pits “the oppressed” against “the arrogant”. Inviting representatives of armed organisations from across the world to Tehran in the 1980s, and the absence of the word “Iran” in the name of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, are striking examples in this regard.
For those who adopt this approach, nationalism is not the glorification of ethnic identity but the strengthening and advancement of Iran in all fields.
Iran chose to achieve internal unity through its ancient myths rather than allow itself to fragment under external pressure.
3. Unifying nationalism
This current can be seen as a form of nationalism that brings together and reconciles the other two types. It is often described as “religious national” or “national religious” nationalism and seeks to unite pre Islamic Iran with post Islamic Iran.
In the assessment of prominent Iranian thinker and sociologist Ali Shariati, race, blood, and land are not important. He treats nationalism as a religious personality and identity, and considers pre Islamic and post Islamic Iran as a single whole. Shariati elaborated his views on nationalism in detail in his book “Discovering the Iranian Islamic Identity”.
According to Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari, one of the main theoreticians of the Islamic Revolution, pre Islamic and post Islamic Iran together constitute Iranian nationalism and national identity.
Motahhari argues that Islam opposes the negative aspects of nationalism. In his book “Mutual Services of Islam and Iran”, which addresses Iranian identity and the relationship between Iran and Islam and offers a different perspective on national identity, he writes:
“Because the Iranian nation is intelligent and possesses a civilisational tradition, it inclined toward Islam and served it more than other nations. And because Iranians are close to the spirit and meaning of Islam, they have shown greater affinity toward Ahl al Bayt than others.”
Likewise, the nationalism defended by the Freedom Movement of Iran, founded by Mehdi Bazargan, although it showed some differences after 1997, is essentially a nationalism remote from racism and views pre Islamic and post Islamic Iran together.
The turn toward nationalism
During the 12 day war with Israel, Iran realised that the real power of the state does not lie in tanks, cannons, or rifles, but in a society that has achieved unity and cohesion.
With Ayatollah Khamenei’s request that Mahmoud Karimi recite “O Iran”, it became clear that the shift toward a nationalist line was the preferred choice.
But which nationalism?
The anthem “O Iran” that Khamenei requested was written at the beginning of the Iran Iraq war and performed by the well known Iranian singer Mohammad Nouri. It was composed to keep national sentiments alive among the Iranian people and raise the morale of soldiers. Therefore, Khamenei did not randomly choose this anthem, nor did he request its recitation without purpose.
Following this step, a statue was erected in Enghelab Square, a symbolically important square in Iran where many official ceremonies are held, including celebrations of the Islamic Revolution. The statue depicts the Roman emperor Valerian kneeling before the Sasanian king Shapur I.
In 260 CE, Roman emperor Licinius Valerianus led a large army eastward to halt Shapur’s advance in Syria and Mesopotamia. However, an outbreak of plague in the Roman army before the battle killed thousands of soldiers. The weakened Roman army then faced the Sasanian forces near Edessa (Urfa) and Harran and suffered a heavy defeat, especially due to the impact of the Sasanian heavy cavalry. In an attempt to save what remained of his army, Valerianus went with a small delegation to Shapur’s camp to negotiate peace. Roman sources say he was captured there by “trick” or “ambush”, while Sasanian sources record that Shapur personally captured him with his own hands.
Valerianus, the first and only Roman emperor ever captured by an enemy, spent the rest of his life in Sasanian territory. The scene of his kneeling before Shapur on horseback was immortalised in the rock reliefs at Naqsh-e Rustam.
The statue erected in Enghelab Square in Tehran refers to this historic event. After it was installed, images were produced showing Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and US President Trump kneeling before Ayatollah Khamenei, and these images circulated on social media.
Shortly before that, a huge statue depicting the struggle of Rostam, one of the most important heroes in Iranian mythology, against a dragon was unveiled in Shahin Shahr near Isfahan in a festive ceremony.
And while clashes were still ongoing, a statue of the archer Arash, another prominent mythological hero, was installed in Vanak Square, another key area in Tehran.
These developments, which occurred specifically during and after the Iranian Israeli war, are seen as an attempt by Ayatollah Khamenei and the Iranian state to rally the Iranian public around both the Islamic Revolution and Iranian history.
On this basis, by highlighting pre Islamic Iranian myths that the state had originally distanced itself from in the early years of the revolution on the grounds that they evoked the Shah’s era, Iran now seeks to unify its people around a “unifying nationalism” that brings together pre Islamic and post Islamic Iran.
Conclusion
Under difficult and exceptional conditions, such as war, sabotage, and intelligence penetrations, Iran has been compelled to choose a nationalist line that unites pre Islamic and post Islamic Iran.
Although Iran’s new nationalist policy brings certain gains, it also entails risks and threats.
The state’s official orientation toward “unifying nationalism” may open a wide and dangerous space for the expansion and consolidation of “Persian nationalism”, which is not reconciled with the principles of the Islamic Revolution and the history of post Islamic Iran.
There has already been a noticeable increase in the influence of those who embrace Persian nationalism within sensitive ministries and institutions such as the Foreign Ministry, the Iranian army, the Revolutionary Guard, and the Ministry of Defence during Hassan Rouhani’s presidency.
The impact of diplomats and bureaucrats who espouse Persian nationalism on the emergence of tensions with Turkey and the Arab world, particularly the deterioration of relations with Azerbaijan, is reported to have been greater than expected.
If this process is not well managed, structures such as monarchist supporters of the Shah and the Mujahideen-e Khalq Organisation inside Iran may also gain strength through their links with Persian nationalism.
However, if the process is handled with sound steps and discourse, it may achieve the unity and cohesion that Iran needs in this difficult period.
In addition, the new nationalist orientation will reduce Iran’s previous level of attention and support for structures such as Hezbollah, the Popular Mobilisation Forces, and Ansar Allah. Indeed, since June there has been a visible decline in Iran’s engagement with Hezbollah and other such actors and a more moderate tone in its regional statements.
Due to the difficult process it is experiencing, Iran will also halt the external expansion it began after the US occupation of Iraq in 2003 and will direct its full strength and energy inward.
By redirecting its energy at home, and in line with its new political orientation, Iran is likely to enter more positive interaction with regional states in order to increase its allies and secure the support of its neighbours during this challenging phase.
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