The strategy of “as if nothing happened” falls under crisis management theory and is classified within the strategies aimed at “minimising the impact of crises”, in order to preserve plans and business operations as they were before the crisis, as though it never occurred.
From this standpoint, the Israeli occupation seeks to restore the momentum of its relationships, activities, and influence to what they were before the genocide war, aiming to avoid the costs and consequences of the war on the future of its operations in all fields, both internally and externally.
There is no doubt that the Israeli occupation has suffered significant losses on internal levels, such as public trust in governmental, military, and security institutions, along with other issues. Its image and standing have also deteriorated in the eyes of many states and societies, including some of its allies. These repercussions have placed many of the plans the occupation sought to implement across political, economic, and security tracks at serious risk, forcing all parties that were involved or invested in these plans to reassess them.
Even if we acknowledge the difficulty of “zeroing out the impact” of what has happened both domestically and internationally, it is clear that the Israeli occupation is striving to emerge from the events of the past two years with the least possible damage, seeking a form of recovery that minimises the long term consequences on future operations.
As stated by Robert Singer, an Israeli writer, head of the Jewish Impact Center, and former CEO of the World Jewish Congress, in an article titled “Retelling Our Story: The Challenge Israel Faces After the Gaza Agreement”: “The belief of 40 percent of American Jews that Israel committed genocide should sound the alarm”.
What is important is that Singer did not frame the severity of the issue as merely an image problem, but rather as a crisis threatening the unity of the Jewish people itself. He believes that rebuilding trust will take time and requires a cohesive national strategy and a clear vision.
In this context, Singer who acknowledges Israel’s loss of public opinion suggested that to change the course of this crisis, “investment is needed in a new type of diplomacy that does not rely on press halls, but on wider public spaces”. He argues that isolation is not an option, since the world’s attention will inevitably shift to countless new crises. Singer points to the importance of reshaping the narrative, not through slogans or talking points, but through people themselves.
Another significant point Singer raised is that there is an ongoing attempt to wager on the world’s attention shifting elsewhere whether through manufactured distractions or natural developments. This careless disregard for the suffering of an entire people and for global public opinion cannot be left to achieve its intended outcome.
A return to the pre war routine
Internally, the strategy of “as if nothing happened” is tied to a society’s ability to quickly return to its normal routine after a crisis, disaster, or war without visible long term repercussions. This requires a strong focus on rebuilding internal and external relationships and trust.
There is no need to elaborate on the fact that 7 October caused a massive societal shock within the Israeli occupation, destabilising personal and social security. The possibility of the event being repeated, whether from Gaza or elsewhere, remains a major concern even within security circles. Multiple Israeli military officials have acknowledged this, and training exercises have been conducted in preparation.
Studies indicate that around 51 percent of Israelis fear a repeat of an event similar to 7 October. Meanwhile, 37 percent express high confidence in the army’s investigative processes and lessons learned, while 60 percent express low or no confidence at all.
Even Benjamin Netanyahu, the occupation’s Prime Minister, said in November that he is “determined to prevent the repeat of 7 October from any border, including Syria, and that he visited the buffer zone to ensure this”.
Regarding the erosion of trust in state institutions, particularly the army once treated as an untouchable sacred entity, trust in the military has fallen to unprecedented levels. Within the army itself, disturbing phenomena have emerged: dozens of soldiers and officers have taken their own lives, and a new issue has surfaced with over 600 officers submitting early retirement requests. All of this indicates that the army no longer holds the same trust it once commanded.
A study by the Institute for National Security Studies reported that 31 percent of Israelis have lost confidence in the army, although some polls attempt to portray an improvement.
Israel was already fractured before the war. It is a political entity known for its inability to form a government without a coalition of numerous parties. Now, after the war, discontent with the government’s performance exceeds 70 percent, and trust in it has declined among more than 63 percent. This internal fragmentation is not limited to the political level but extends into social and identity based divisions.
Certainly, such internal identity based fragmentation weakens Israel’s ability to manage external threats and interests. Therefore, there is a need to project a façade of cohesion even if that cohesion does not exist.
Directed surveys
To support the strategy of “as if nothing happened” internally, opinion polls appear to be attempting to portray Israeli society as resilient and capable of rapid recovery.
In this context, opinion polls show that the unprecedented levels of tension, sadness, and anger that dominated Israeli society over the past two years have fallen back to pre 2023 levels. Two surveys in July and August 2025 indicate that Israelis rate their life satisfaction at 7.5 out of 10, a full point higher than the 6.8 recorded in late 2023. Observers view this sudden rise with puzzlement given the continued effects of the war.
According to a study by Gallup, negative emotions such as severe anxiety among Israeli adults had reached 67 percent, tension 62 percent, sadness 51 percent after 7 October, representing the largest annual increase in these indicators anywhere in the world in nearly two decades.
These figures later dropped to 33 percent for anxiety, 25 percent for tension, 18 percent for sadness, and 15 percent for anger. Gallup noted that the speed of Israel’s emotional recovery contradicts prevailing global patterns, where negative emotions typically remain elevated for long periods after major shocks and instability.
The discrepancy between these numbers and global norms points to deliberate attempts to give the impression that stability has returned “as if nothing happened”.
The external level
Externally, the Israeli occupation aims to preserve its standing in the West by mitigating the consequences of recent events, maintaining its influence and dominance in the region under what it calls reshaping the Middle East, and continuing to expand normalisation projects with Arab and Islamic states.
Recently, it announced Kazakhstan’s inclusion. In reality, Kazakhstan’s example indicates that this is a performative gesture. Relations between the two governments are longstanding, and the core of normalisation already exists. Kazakhstan has supplied Israel with 25 percent of its oil needs. The narrative that Kazakhstan has “joined the Abraham Accords” simply serves the Israeli message that the normalisation track continues to expand, and that the train is still moving forward.
Israel also seeks to maintain its military, security, and technological superiority, broaden and diversify its defence and economic partnerships with as many countries as possible, and, above all, continue its project of liquidating the Palestinian cause through various means while disregarding the events of the past two years.
Netanyahu reiterated this when he said he would not allow the establishment of a Palestinian state, and continues to push, alongside the United States and others, for security and administrative arrangements that offer no horizon for Palestinian statehood.
In conclusion, Israel must not be allowed to impose its narrative. The global human and Palestinian narrative that exposes occupation crimes and affirms Palestinian rights must remain dominant. What happened cannot be buried under flimsy narratives without holding Israel accountable. This makes the legal and media battle for accountability more critical than ever.
Pressure on the Israeli occupation must persist everywhere, across all dimensions, from boycotts to divestment to rejecting normalisation. Global discussions on how to hold Israel accountable and how to increase support for Palestinians who have endured decades of this horrific injustice must continue.
Israel, which will face immense difficulty in presenting internal and institutional cohesion after what it has experienced, must be deprived of rebuilding external support networks and must be denied the ability to erase events from memory, whether through time, impression management, or manufactured distractions.
In short, Israel must not be allowed to bury the Palestinian wound alive. Accepting the strategy of “as if nothing happened” in dealing with Israel and its plans is a contribution to erasing human conscience and will open the door to even greater unchecked Israeli aggression.
