The issue of disarming the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and the resistance factions in the Gaza Strip represents a major point of concern for the Israeli occupation and the states supporting it, particularly the United States, especially after the UN Security Council adopted the American proposal regarding ending the Israeli assault on the Gaza Strip.
The American proposal includes, among its most significant clauses, the establishment of a temporary international stabilisation force in Gaza under unified leadership, tasked with disarming the Strip, protecting civilians, and training the Palestinian police, in coordination with Egypt and Israel.
The Israeli occupation insists on the necessity of disarming the resistance, while Hamas affirms the right of Palestinians to preserve their weapons until the establishment of their independent state.
Amid this divergence, a stark contradiction appears on the ground; while international law recognises the right of occupied peoples to resist, practical implementation reveals double standards, as resistance is criminalised while the occupation is granted cover to expand its military power.
The Law That Took Sides
The legal framework regulating resistance remains limited due to prevailing security interpretations, reducing legal protection for armed movements. The First Additional Protocol to the 1977 Geneva Conventions acknowledges the legitimacy of resistance to occupation within armed conflicts, yet the practical application of this acknowledgment remains subject to political and security considerations.
Researcher Adam Roberts, in his study “Resistance to Military Occupation” published by the Center for Arab Unity Studies, notes that “legal legitimacy does not always translate into actual protection when major powers’ security considerations compete with international law”.
The International Committee of the Red Cross stated in its official report on current disarmament and arms control that “disarmament measures must be carried out within strict humanitarian principles grounded in the rules of international humanitarian law, and their impact directly influences the protection of civilians and the stability of post conflict environments”.
The committee added that “any disarmament program must be implemented under the supervision of recognised legal and humanitarian institutions, with oversight and accountability mechanisms that ensure humanitarian outcomes and strengthen institutional stability rather than simply reducing the level of armament”.
Double Standards… Palestinian Arms vs. the Occupation’s Arsenal
Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute indicates that Israel ranked fifteenth globally in arms imports during 2020–2024, accounting for roughly 1.9 percent of global imports.
According to the same sources, the United States supplied about 66 percent of Israel’s imports during that period, followed by Germany at approximately 33 percent.
Meanwhile, Palestinian factions are demanded to dismantle their armed structures and disarm under external conditions. This contrast highlights a clear imbalance, as requirements are imposed on the weaker party while the stronger party continues to be supplied with international weaponry.
Addressing this disparity requires three interconnected elements:
First: An independent international mechanism to monitor arms flows, ensuring the implementation of the “source verification” standard under the Arms Trade Treaty.
Second: Preserving the capacity to protect civilians so that the weaker party does not lose the means to defend its population under any security arrangement.
Third: Linking security arrangements or disarmament measures to a clear political roadmap that ensures balance of power and accountability, instead of using disarmament as a standalone condition to dismantle the defensive capacity of one side.
No Ready Made Models
Modern studies indicate that the models frequently cited in international discussions on post conflict disarmament, such as Germany and Japan after the Second World War, cannot be treated as ready made templates applicable to other contexts, including Gaza.
These experiences were tied to exceptional conditions that imposed heavy sovereign, political, and economic costs. Germany was subjected to strict occupation oversight that reshaped its political and military infrastructure, while the American occupation imposed a new constitution on Japan.
The new constitution explicitly stated that Japan “renounces war as a sovereign right and the maintenance of offensive armed forces”, preserving only limited defence capabilities. These conditions restricted national sovereignty for decades.
To clarify the fundamental differences in post conflict disarmament outcomes, international experiences can be divided into three paths based on the political mandate and level of national sovereignty accompanying each case:
First Path: Disarmament Under External Supervision and State Restructuring
Experiences in Germany and Japan after the Second World War, as well as Iraq after the US occupation, show that externally imposed disarmament carries heavy sovereign costs and restricts national decision making for decades.
Germany: Underwent denazification, including dismantling governing institutions and redesigning the political and legal structure under direct occupation oversight, alongside long term strict limits on armament before being allowed to rebuild a limited army under NATO arrangements.
Japan: The American occupation imposed a new constitution in 1947 including Article 9, which obligates the state to renounce war as a sovereign right and prohibits forming independent offensive forces, forcing reliance on the American security umbrella.
Iraq: Experienced comprehensive disarmament after the 2003 occupation under external supervision, resulting in the restructuring of security and political institutions with weakened national decision making.
Second Path: Disarmament After Achieving a Political Goal and National Sovereignty
Algeria: According to Ministry of Defence data, disarmament began only after the declaration of independence in 1962 and the transfer of authority to a legitimate national body. Forces of the National Liberation Front were integrated into the national army, indicating that disarmament must be linked to national sovereignty and legitimate institutions.
Northern Ireland: Chatham House affirms that disarmament took place within a balanced political settlement ensuring broad representation and legitimate local institutions, with success dependent on national institutions rather than external tutelage.
South Africa: According to the Peace Research Institute Oslo, the African National Congress ended armed struggle only after the fall of the apartheid regime and the establishment of a sovereign democratic government, with its forces integrated into official state security structures.
The study notes that in this path, disarmament was a direct result of achieving full political goals, reinforcing national institutions rather than acting as a technical or externally imposed procedure.
Third Path: Technical Disarmament Without a Prior Political Horizon Resulting in Institutional Fragility
Angola: African Union reports show that disarmament programs implemented before establishing full national authority faced partial security collapses and reintegration challenges, resulting in institutional fragility.
Namibia: A 2019 University of Windhoek study found that disarmament without a comprehensive political agreement produced institutional gaps and economic reintegration obstacles.
Bosnia: The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) reported in 2009 that “post war disarmament lacked an integrated political and institutional framework, leading to security vacuums and significant fragility in building stable security institutions”.
As for the West Bank and the Palestinian Authority, studies by the Palestinian Center for Political and Social Research (2025) note that “concentrating weapons in the hands of bodies tied to security coordination with the occupation reflects institutional fragility and weak control over military capabilities”.
The study affirms that about 68 percent of Palestinians oppose any external armed force intervening to dismantle Hamas’ weapons, indicating public rejection of repeating an externally authorised security model that compromises national rights.
Despite this, the Palestinian Authority welcomed the UN Security Council vote approving the American plan and expressed readiness to operate within the framework defined by the resolution, urging immediate implementation on the ground.
The Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a statement on X saying: “The State of Palestine welcomes the adoption of the US draft resolution on Gaza, which confirms the establishment of a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire in the Gaza Strip”.
Palestinian Factions and the Implications of the Resolution
The Palestinian resistance factions rejected Security Council Resolution 2803, warning that it represents international guardianship over the Gaza Strip and stressing the Palestinian people’s right to resist and defend themselves.
The factions reiterated that the right of the Palestinian people to resist the occupation is guaranteed by international law and that the resistance’s weapons constitute a safeguard for this right.
Institutionally, according to the 2023 study by Josephine and Ricardo at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), any disarmament outside a comprehensive political project leads to institutional fragility and security vacuums, reinforcing resistance leaders’ position that weapons must remain within a political and institutional framework.
These statements and studies indicate that any external intervention to dismantle Palestinian factions without a political framework mirrors other countries’ disarmament experiences that resulted in fragility and instability.
The conclusion they collectively affirm is that maintaining weapons within a legitimate political context is essential for institutional stability and for safeguarding the people’s right to resist occupation.
