The recent United Nations Security Council resolution concerning the Gaza Strip opens the door to the second phase of “Trump’s Peace Plan”, a development carrying severe risks for the Palestinian cause. These risks have prompted Palestinian factions to warn of its consequences, while numerous questions remain regarding implementation and the likelihood of success.
Why Now?
In an early Tuesday session, the UN Security Council adopted United States President Donald Trump’s Gaza plan by approving the American draft resolution supporting “Trump’s Peace Plan”. Thirteen members voted in favour, while Russia and China abstained.
Contrary to expectations, the resolution passed quickly and smoothly with broad approval. Many had predicted delays and obstacles, especially given the presence of a Russian counterproposal.
Two primary factors stood behind this outcome: strong pressure from the United States administration to secure approval, and the prior agreement of the eight Arab and Islamic states supporting Trump’s plan.
It is not an exaggeration to describe the resolution as catastrophic, both in content and implications. The text manipulates the narrative of the war and the current reality, portraying “Israel” as the victim while avoiding any reference to occupation or genocide, shifting focus instead to “terrorism”.
Russia and China had numerous reasons to oppose it, foremost among them the draft’s avoidance of explicit reference to the “two-state solution” and its reliance on vague, generalised language. Both states were wary of renewed American unilateralism in the region.
However, the support of the “eight states” and the endorsement of the Palestinian Authority created the impression of a consensus, limiting Moscow and Beijing’s ability to challenge the proposal. As a result, the Russian draft ceased to be a real obstacle, and neither Russia nor China exercised a veto, merely warning that the resolution “could worsen the crisis”.
Many observers attribute the supportive votes to a desire to avoid confrontation with the American president, a belief that the ceasefire must be stabilised, and an effort to prevent a return to genocidal escalation. Others point to American assurances regarding implementation or bilateral and multilateral understandings with Washington.
Nonetheless, the long-term risks remain immense if the resolution is applied as written. The balance of power overwhelmingly favours the occupation, backed unconditionally by Washington. Trump has repeatedly signalled that Netanyahu retains the green light to resume the war at any stage.
Risks
It is no exaggeration to call the resolution disastrous. The text reshapes the war narrative to depict “Israel” as the attacked party, ignoring occupation and genocide while centring the language of “terrorism”.
Palestinians become implicitly cast as the accused, required to disarm, end “terrorism”, and enact reforms. Meanwhile “Israel” becomes an active partner in every process: from selecting the Palestinian committee to shaping the security force and other mechanisms.
Politically, the resolution represents a clear retreat from the recognised contours of the two-state solution. Instead, it introduces a vague path toward self-determination that may eventually lead to a “Palestinian state”, but only after the Palestinian Authority completes an “honest” reform program and after significant progress in Gaza’s redevelopment. This transformation would be conditional and defined by American and Israeli judgement.
Furthermore, the resolution separates Gaza from the West Bank and treats it as an isolated entity under internationalisation and external guardianship. Decisions will be made by a “Peace Council” described as temporary but likely to become permanent.
In terms of security, the international stabilisation force is tasked with “stabilising the security environment” in Gaza by “clearing it of weapons, including destroying and preventing the rebuilding of military, terrorist, and offensive infrastructure”, and by removing the weapons of the Palestinian factions.
This means the force will pursue objectives that the occupation itself failed to achieve. Lacking clear criteria and without naming participating states, the proposal resembles an expansion of the U.S. Coordination Centre more than a United Nations force.
On the ground, there is a real fear that the resolution will legitimise the permanent occupation of Gaza. No timeline or maps were included; instead, implementation is left to agreements between “Israel”, the international force, the guarantor states, and the United States. These arrangements are explicitly tied to “disarmament”, preserving a security cordon until “Gaza is fully protected from any potential terrorist threat”.
Leaving withdrawal to Israeli and American discretion regarding “threat assessments” and “disarmament” could entrench occupation and fragment the Strip. Trump’s plan previously stipulated that humanitarian aid and reconstruction would occur only in areas under Israeli military control, implying a long-term division of Gaza along the “yellow line”.
Outcomes
Palestinian factions understood that agreeing to the first phase of Trump’s plan placed them on a difficult and near-compulsory path. According to the plan’s text, Washington would rapidly push toward phase two. This means the war has not ended; it has merely shifted from one phase to another.
In their response to the Security Council resolution, Palestinian factions—led by Hamas—rejected it, stating that it entrenches “international guardianship” over Gaza and prepares for long-term arrangements outside the Palestinian national framework.
Still, their statements did not carry tones of escalation or direct confrontation. The likely strategy of the Palestinian resistance rests on several pillars: stabilising the ceasefire, preventing a return to genocide, prioritising humanitarian needs such as aid access, housing, and reconstruction, and avoiding threat-based language to prevent blame for any collapse of the ceasefire. They will then address the new reality with different tools as needed.
At the core of this approach is an implicit expectation that the plan will ultimately fail in both political and security dimensions. Decades of Palestinian experience show that UN resolutions are neither sacred texts nor inevitable destinies. The complexity of the conflict, the competing interests of multiple actors, and the volatile regional landscape often lead to altered or selectively implemented resolutions.
Regarding the international stabilisation force, several states have expressed reluctance to send troops into an area where hostilities have not truly ended, citing the potential for heavy losses that would be difficult to justify domestically. Moreover, the idea of disarmament and dismantling the factions is neither realistic nor acceptable historically or presently in Palestine, whether among factions, elites, or the broader public.
This means that once the resolution moves from text to implementation, it will inevitably require negotiation with the Palestinian side—labelled “terrorists” according to the Israeli narrative.
It may be no coincidence that American media have reported a possible meeting between U.S. envoy Wietkoff and the leadership of Hamas, which is supposedly targeted by the resolution itself. It also remains unclear whether the eight Arab and Islamic states received any American guarantees regarding implementation, something that may become clearer in the coming period.
In conclusion, no previous UN resolution has resolved the Palestinian question, and the current one is unlikely to do so. Yet its dangers—and indeed its catastrophic potential—remain real, affecting the future of resistance, the fate of the Gaza Strip, and the Palestinian right to statehood and self-determination.
Once again, international resolutions are not destiny. Power imbalances alone do not determine the outcome of a deeply rooted and complex cause. With this resolution, the Palestinian struggle has entered a new phase—one that demands new strategies, stronger tools, and a renewed capacity to confront the rapidly shifting realities on the ground.
