Beirut – Between an eroding truce and a new reality taking shape on the ground, southern Lebanon is witnessing a shift in the rules of engagement. The ceasefire agreement and UN Security Council Resolution 1701 have transformed from an international umbrella for de escalation into a pressure tool managed according to the Israeli vision, which treats the agreement as a flexible framework that enables re engineering the southern environment and altering the balance of power on the ground without the need for an open war.
Israeli violations began after the end of the recent war in a limited manner, before gradually expanding into a systematic pattern. Israel has manipulated the text of the ceasefire agreement to serve what it calls “freedom of movement”, relying on a unilateral, broad interpretation of what constitutes a threat to its security.
Over time, Israel moved beyond traditional deterrence policies toward an on ground strategy of imposing new realities. It expanded its targeting scope to include southern villages, their surroundings and even parts of the Bekaa Valley, striking locations it classifies as “potential sources of threat”.
Attempts at Containment
Alongside the on ground escalation, Israel has threatened to return to large scale military operations unless Hezbollah is disarmed according to its own conditions and criteria.
The most significant turning point came last Sunday, when Israel targeted a patrol belonging to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), keeping its personnel pinned under fire for more than half an hour. According to observers, this attack marked a qualitative shift not only in military behaviour but also in Israel’s approach to the ceasefire agreement and Resolution 1701.
With no military response on the opposite side, the violations accumulated and effectively turned into a new reality that redraws borders and balances on the ground. This comes amid Lebanese internal paralysis and international reluctance to enforce the agreement, while Israel continues to occupy five Lebanese hills and other areas it has held for decades.
Politically, Lebanese attempts emerged to contain the escalation through diplomatic channels led by President Joseph Aoun, who received the new US ambassador, Michel Issa, at the presidential palace on Monday. Issa then began a protocol tour of senior officials without any public statements.
The new ambassador has become responsible for following the Lebanese file politically, while Morgan Ortagus remains limited to the “mechanism committee” associated with monitoring the implementation of the ceasefire agreement.
As tensions intensified, President Aoun announced Lebanon’s readiness to enter negotiations with Israel to reinforce the ceasefire and halt the strikes. However, the initiative received no Israeli response, particularly after the government’s decision in August to launch a five stage plan to disarm Hezbollah. The group strongly rejected the plan, describing it as a “grave mistake” that strikes at the core of Lebanon’s internal equilibrium.
In this context, Hezbollah’s Secretary General, Naim Qassem, called on the Lebanese government to stop what he described as “free concessions”. He stressed that all initiatives—including the army’s plan to restrict weapons, readiness for negotiations and the principles of the US paper—were not met with any Israeli or American guarantees. He asserted that what is taking place is “a systematic aggression targeting the elements of Lebanon’s strength militarily, economically and politically, sparing no one—not the state, not the army, and not even UNIFIL forces”.
Under these conditions, the ceasefire agreement technically remains in place but is fundamentally threatened, awaiting a decisive moment: either its reinforcement through clear international guarantees or its surpassing towards new rules of engagement written not by text but by fire.
Open Scenarios
Political analyst and journalist George Aaqouri notes that the rate, type and geographic scope of Israeli targets have expanded noticeably in recent weeks. He says the time factor is no longer in Lebanon’s favour and that developments are escalating toward the brink of collapse.
Speaking to Al Jazeera Net, Aaqouri said: “We are now in the phase of ‘deadly time’, not ‘lost time’.” He explained that the atmosphere unsettling Israel—from strikes and manoeuvres to political positions—reflects instability and increases the likelihood of sliding into a wide scale war that goes beyond the limited strikes we see today.
He adds that this pattern is not new; it occurred previously before the “Bajer” attack in 2023, when events accumulated gradually until war erupted. Israel’s declared aim today is to eliminate any fighting capability of Hezbollah north and south of the Litani River, removing what it considers risks—even minimal ones—an objective Israel makes no effort to conceal.
He believes that the persistence of Hezbollah’s armament, along with fluctuating discourse at times speaking of areas north of the Litani and at other times both north and south, contributes to the current state of confusion. These threats carry clear political dimensions: even in the event of military escalation, the ultimate objective is expected to be political, utilising any on ground development to gain diplomatic advantages.
Aaqouri concludes that all scenarios remain open in the near term, raising concerns among Lebanese citizens, the international community and Lebanon’s friendly states. These states have intensified their diplomatic activity through multiple delegations visiting Beirut, delivering clear warning messages that addressing the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons is progressing too slowly compared to the pace of regional developments.
Hezbollah’s Preparedness
Political analyst Qassem Qassir believes the situation in Lebanon remains open to every possibility. He notes that Hezbollah adopts a policy of ambiguity and silence, while preparing for all scenarios, especially if Israel launches a wide assault or escalates its military operations against Lebanon.
He told Al Jazeera Net: “Everything is possible from the Israeli enemy.” He stressed that the region is going through continuous escalation, as Israel carries out periodic airstrikes. He pointed to indicators suggesting that Israel may postpone any major escalation until after the Vatican Pope Leo XIV’s visit to Lebanon, to avoid affecting the visit—although he emphasised these calculations remain hypothetical.
Qassir added that all possibilities remain on the table, especially in the absence of any clear deterrence from the United States or any American objection to current Israeli actions.
He explained that Israeli operations continue, whether limited or wide, as happened two weeks ago when several southern villages were bombed. He affirmed that it is difficult to predict whether Israel will move toward a full scale assault, given the lack of any restrictions on its movements at present.
Expanding the Target Bank
From a military perspective, retired brigadier general and strategic expert Hisham Jaber says that talk of a “wide scale assault” on Lebanon requires precise definition. In his assessment, Israel will not launch a full ground invasion due to the heavy human and field cost and because such a move could push Hezbollah to use its remaining missile and drone capabilities to strike the depth of northern Israel.
Jaber told Al Jazeera Net that roughly 60,000 settlers who previously fled towns in the Upper Galilee have recently returned to their homes. But any new Hezbollah missile strike on Metula, Kiryat Shmona and surrounding areas could cause renewed displacement—possibly permanent departures from settlements—representing a major setback and political and security failure for the Israeli government.
He noted that debate within Israel’s military and political establishment shows clear division: one camp pushes for a multi day wide operation without a ground invasion, while another prefers expanding the target bank to include economic and military sites in the north, the Bekaa and even Beirut’s southern suburb. This would occur through selective, calculated strikes, avoiding official Lebanese infrastructure such as airports, bridges and power stations.
Jaber believes that once the official visit of the “Supreme Pontiff” to Lebanon concludes, Israel will face the necessity of making an operational decision. He argues that repeated threats have lost part of their credibility unless translated into action. Based on this, Israel may carry out a limited military operation to re establish deterrence without sliding into a full scale confrontation of the type it has been threatening for months.
