Israeli media yesterday quoted a “senior military official” saying that “the army is prepared for days of fighting in Lebanon. It’s only a matter of time.” The statement is part of what appears to be a deliberate Israeli effort to reinforce a narrative of imminent confrontation, particularly after a full year of continuous post-war strikes failed to dismantle or weaken Hezbollah’s military capacity.
As part of this psychological and political groundwork—aimed both at domestic audiences and foreign observers—Israel has begun leaking information suggesting that “Hezbollah’s warehouses in Lebanon still contain thousands of rockets and large stockpiles of weapons which the group is attempting to conceal and reorganize.”
This strategic media messaging coincides with growing concern inside Israel itself. Commentators have begun to openly question the uncertainty surrounding Hezbollah’s possible response. Some Israeli outlets wonder whether “Hezbollah might decide—contrary to the current status quo—to resume direct fire on Israel, a move that could escalate the situation into an all-out regional war.”
According to these same sources, Israel’s political, security, and military leadership has refrained from publicly clarifying how it envisions the “endgame” of such a confrontation, or how it plans to prevent the situation from spiralling out of control once fighting begins.
Rebuilding the Narrative of War
In the Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth, Micha’el Milshtein, a researcher at the Dayan Center, wrote that beyond the reactivation of Israel’s military-industrial production lines, “the more significant development is that Hezbollah has reorganized itself, including appointing new commanders and recruiting new members, signalling that it will not indefinitely tolerate the rules imposed by Israel.”
Milshtein argued that Israel is “nearing the point where it will seek a new political and public consensus for another war against Lebanon.” Yet he warned that the government must define “clear, realistic objectives” supported by a coordinated political effort, rather than repeating the chaotic model of the Gaza war.
He urged that any confrontation be limited in scope and duration, with achievable goals—chiefly, “clearing the area south of the Litani River of any threat.” He also cautioned against politically motivated rhetoric, such as the resurgent slogans calling for “the destruction of Hezbollah.”
Milshtein concluded by acknowledging a central truth often ignored in Israeli discourse:
“In this region, there is no such thing as a total or eternal victory. Every military achievement demands continuous effort to preserve it. Without that, Israel will remain trapped in illusions instead of adopting a coherent and sustainable strategy.”
Strategic Reading and Implications
While Israeli media seeks to project readiness and inevitability, the subtext reveals anxiety rather than confidence. The focus on pre-emptive justification, the leaking of selective intelligence, and the rhetoric of containment suggest that Israel is preparing its domestic opinion for a possible escalation it cannot fully control.
For the Arab and Islamic world, such signals highlight the fragility of the Israeli deterrence narrative. A year of sustained aggression across multiple fronts—particularly in Gaza and southern Lebanon—has not achieved strategic depth or security. Instead, it has underscored the endurance of the resistance axis and the limits of military coercion in the face of movements deeply rooted in their societies and causes.
Israel’s insistence on reviving the “threat from Lebanon” serves not only to distract from its own internal fractures but also to test the international tolerance for another war in the region—one that would likely have devastating humanitarian and political consequences.
The message from Tel Aviv is clear: it is ready for “days of fighting.”
But the question that remains unanswered—even within Israel—is whether it can withstand the consequences of what those days would unleash.
