In tracing the current dynamics between Lebanon and the enemy, several points demand careful scrutiny: first, the source of claims about Hezbollah rebuilding its capabilities; second, the trajectory of Israeli threats and the messages conveyed by the United States; and third, the diplomatic initiatives emerging from Arab and regional actors.
It began with Israeli leaks to Saudi- and Emirati-funded satellite channels, alleging that Israel is observing renewed efforts by Hezbollah to rebuild its military power. Israeli media then took over directly, publishing a stream of reports, op-eds, and statements, accompanied by an initial wave of threats. Meanwhile, the Israeli army’s representative within the “mechanism committee” accused the Lebanese Army’s delegate of doing nothing to curb Hezbollah’s activity—an accusation the US delegate echoed, saying he “understands Israel’s concerns” about developments in Lebanon, before adding that the Lebanese Army could do much more.
During this period, Morgan Ortagus relayed messages partly reflecting her camp’s view that Lebanon’s leaders need not accommodate Hezbollah on the files of weapons and negotiations. She also cited what she said were Israeli details about Hezbollah’s efforts to rebuild its capabilities, concluding that “Israel will not wait long and is ready at any time to undertake the task of disarmament if Lebanon refuses to do so.”
At the same time, political envoy Tom Barrack publicly reprimanded Lebanese officials for their “inaction,” urging steps toward a comprehensive settlement with Israel. He later advanced his position: Lebanon, he said, has one chance to prevent a return to war—formally agreeing to direct negotiations with Israel and granting expanded powers to the Lebanese Army to disarm Hezbollah across all of Lebanon. Though not particularly fond of Ortagus, Barrack repeated her point about Israel’s “wide range of options,” adding for emphasis that “it is unrealistic for Lebanon to expect the United States to prevent Israel from doing what it deems necessary for its security.”
A common thread runs through these episodes: Israel offers no guarantees to halt its aggression against Lebanon. It does not assume that the mere act of negotiating obliges it to any practical steps. Indeed, despite the public rhetoric of Israeli leaders containing no reference to negotiations, Israel has told mediation channels that it awaits an official Lebanese declaration of readiness to enter direct talks.
Over time, Israel moved quickly—via foreign and regional envoys—to clarify that talks alone are not sufficient for security guarantees or gestures of goodwill. Israeli leaders reiterated that Lebanon must prove during negotiations that it has the mechanisms to implement any security agreement. Only after testing those mechanisms, Israel says, would it discuss what it is prepared to do.
Most importantly, Israel asked the Americans to tell the Lebanese side, one last time, that negotiations are not about implementing the 27 November 2024 agreement nor about following through on UNSCR 1701. Rather, the talks would be for a new, full security agreement. Lebanon, they insist, should forget the ceasefire agreement and understand that 1701 is no longer on the table, and that within months a programme will begin to draw down UNIFIL in Lebanon.
The Egyptian “Drop-In”
Amid this climate, Lebanon received various messages about the “opportunity opened by the Gaza agreement.” The Americans whispered as much in some meetings, but—according to multiple informed sources—Washington discussed the matter with Egypt, a track led by US mediator Steve Witkoff, who advised Cairo to send an envoy to consult with Israel and prepare an Egyptian-born initiative. Accordingly, Egyptian intelligence chief Lt. Gen. Hassan Rashad visited Tel Aviv, meeting Israeli political, military, and security officials. He came away understanding that Washington’s interest extends beyond merely “protecting the Gaza agreement” and its linkage to the Lebanon file.
From the briefings Rashad carried to Beirut, and from remarks heard on the sidelines of Egypt’s Grand Museum event, it appears he was told—candidly—that Israel perceives a present threat. A senior Israeli official reportedly told him directly that Israel does not consider the account settled with Hezbollah, Iran, Yemen, or even Iraq. Rashad thus concluded that Israel seems poised for a round of new wars and may strike what it sees as Iran’s proxies first, to later deliver a decisive blow to Iran itself. Israel views the fronts of Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Iran, and even Hamas as deeply interconnected. Setting aside Rashad’s clear irritation with Israel’s arrogant tone and conduct, he then discussed the matter with the Americans before Egypt took a step that does not appear detached from unfolding events.
It is difficult to believe that Cairo, buoyed by its renewed prominence through the Gaza track, is merely filling regional gaps it is unwilling to leave to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, or Turkey. More importantly, Egypt’s current good standing with Washington enables productive coordination—particularly between Rashad and Witkoff.
Upon arriving in Beirut, Rashad held a series of public meetings and others off the record. Their substance can be summarised as follows:
- Israel is actively engaged in security and intelligence preparations to deliver a severe, painful blow to Hezbollah, with assassinations of senior leaders—political and military—on the table for both intelligence services and the army.
- Israel believes itself superior and capable of waging an air campaign that would break Hezbollah’s back and extend similar action to Iraq and against the Houthis.
- The counter-strategy should rely on Washington’s willingness to pressure Israel (especially Benjamin Netanyahu), provided Lebanon takes concrete steps—steps that must be coordinated with Hezbollah.
- Cairo believes it has blocked the forced displacement of Gaza’s population; it does not call for erasing Hamas, and sees no Arab national interest in crushing Hezbollah. Still, it thinks the party should reassess the situation differently than before.
- Egypt has proposed an operational formula convincing to the Americans: not just Lebanon’s readiness for talks (direct or indirect), but a public declaration by Hezbollah of steps such as handing over all its weapons south of the Litani and a clear commitment not to target Israel. In exchange, discussion of Hezbollah’s weapons north of the Litani would be frozen. Only then would the climate be right to launch negotiations aimed at the main goals: full Israeli withdrawal, land border demarcation, prisoner releases, and opening the door to reconstruction.
Hezbollah and the “Unknown”
For its part, Hezbollah did not hesitate to state its position plainly: all current initiatives are designed to force Lebanon to abandon the 27 November agreement. The Egyptians—like the Americans and others—cannot even secure a mere truce from Israel; how, then, would they guarantee Israel’s commitment to any agreement? The Syrian experience is there for all to see; nothing in it encourages proceeding with new initiatives. And, needless to say, Hezbollah reminded interlocutors that even the United States did not ensure Qatar’s safety from Israeli aggression—so how would Washington, Cairo, or anyone else guarantee Israel’s behaviour in Lebanon?
Practically, Hezbollah deemed it necessary to issue a clear, calibrated stance, making the following points:
- The party abides by the ceasefire and is not in offensive posture. It reads the 27 November agreement carefully and will not announce any additional commitments merely to appease Israel.
- As a partner in the maritime border demarcation talks, Hezbollah does not oppose expanding the “mechanism”, provided it remains within a framework that does not push Lebanon toward a peace treaty or normalisation with Israel.
- The Resistance does not speak about its operations. It has made a deliberate decision to move into “the unknown.” No one inside Hezbollah discusses military details; the party disowns all chatter—friendly or hostile—about its military affairs, and is annoyed by much of it.
- Most importantly, the Resistance reaffirmed its right to defensive action. This, it seems, is what triggered the US–Saudi–Israeli anger translated yesterday into the launch of a new escalation phase.
