For the second week running, the Israeli political and media machine has continued mobilising public opinion inside the entity and conditioning regional and international diplomatic circles — a clear prelude, in all but name, to a new aggression against Lebanon. The stated pretext: that Hezbollah is allegedly restoring its military capabilities and once again poses a threat to Israel’s security.
Israeli outlets quoted military sources claiming that “Hezbollah is now only months away from the red line Israel has drawn for its offensive capabilities.” They added that “the army fears a Hezbollah attempt to hit one of Israel’s five positions in southern Lebanon to pressure the Lebanese government, which seeks to dismantle the Party’s weapons.” According to these sources, “if Hezbollah carries out any attack, the Israeli military’s response will strike the southern suburbs and the Bekaa — and the price will not be borne by Hezbollah alone but will affect its entire bases.”
The Israeli newspaper Maariv reiterated military leaders’ assertions that “the Air Force currently enjoys freedom of manoeuvre across the entire Middle East, with a focus on Lebanese airspace.” Maariv quoted unnamed army sources saying that “the army and the Air Force are ready to deploy Israel’s full offensive capabilities against Hezbollah.” The paper further reported claims from Israeli military sources that “Hezbollah is trying to evade our blockade on arms smuggling via traffickers,” and warned that “Hezbollah should remember we are in a different situation than a year ago. We are conducting a gradual attrition of Hezbollah’s capabilities, and soon there may be no escape from a decapitation operation against Hezbollah.”
Reports in Israeli media outlets (Haaretz, i24, Channel 13) describing growing concern within Israel’s security establishment about Hezbollah’s reconstruction of its military strength are part of a broader intelligence-led narrative promoted by the Military Intelligence Directorate (Aman). According to these leaks, Aman informed the United States, international forces and European capitals that Israel believes Hezbollah is exploiting the cautious quiet on the northern front to recover losses and strengthen its logistics. The intelligence leaks further suggested that Iranian supply lines through Iraq and Syria have partly resumed after repeated Israeli air strikes, allowing the transfer of medium- and precision-capable weapons into Hezbollah stockpiles — fuelling Israeli fears of a restored “united front” from Tehran to the Mediterranean. These warnings were reportedly reiterated during a briefing to Knesset defence and foreign affairs committee members, who were told that “Hezbollah’s rate of growth is faster than the Israeli army’s capacity to confront it.”
It appears that Israel is deliberately cultivating an atmosphere of alarm, worried that limited air strikes have failed to prevent Hezbollah’s reconstruction. Israel is also concerned that, while its forces remain tied up in Gaza and seek to reposition amid domestic political-military crisis, the army’s ability to wage a multi-front war could be eroded. The primary Israeli objective behind this campaign is to cast doubt on the effectiveness of the Lebanese army and UNIFIL in disarming Hezbollah.
Although some Israeli reports note U.S. pressure on Israel to avoid a full-scale confrontation, messages from Tel Aviv to Washington also clearly seek prior political cover for any escalation — particularly as the second Trump administration has so far shown reluctance to back a wide war on Lebanon before ensuring stability on the Gaza front.
In the same vein, N12 ran a piece on the border situation with Lebanon in which commentator Korey Marom echoed the central message: despite the Lebanese government setting the end of the year as a target to implement disarmament, “a large gap remains between decisions and declarations on the one hand, and field implementation by the Lebanese Army on the other.” To bolster the narrative that Hezbollah is violating the ceasefire by reorganising, the writer argued that “Israeli pressure and firm U.S. demands call for the Lebanese Army and government to take further measures, because there is a dramatic rise in Hezbollah’s efforts to restore its capabilities — including attempts to continue smuggling weapons from Syria, taking advantage of President Ahmad al-Shar’ah’s incomplete control over parts of Syria.” The article claimed the Bekaa has become a focal point for Hezbollah, where attempts are underway to resume missile and drone production and to develop additional capacities.
Asked whether a large-scale Israeli attack on Lebanon is inevitable, the writer argued that “what is required from Lebanon is the dismantling of more of Hezbollah’s infrastructure, and this could generate direct clashes and possibly a deterioration that leads to civil war in Lebanon. The decisive factor will be the parliamentary elections scheduled for May 2026, which will test whether the Lebanese people support President Joseph Aoun and his government’s line against Hezbollah, including full backing for its dismantling and weakening within Parliament — thereby creating an opening for a possible Israel-Lebanon accommodation.”
According to the piece, Israel’s dilemma — should diplomatic pressure fail — is whether to act in a wide offensive, particularly in the Bekaa, accepting the risks of escalation and Hezbollah’s retaliatory strikes against Israeli territory, at a time when northern residents are only just returning home and attempting to rebuild their border communities amid lingering shock and displacement.
Editorial context
The current Israeli media and political signalling reads as systematic preparation for escalation. Israeli security claims are being amplified to secure diplomatic support and to precondition public acceptance of military action against Lebanon. From a SunnaFiles standpoint, it is crucial to treat these narratives as claims and preparations rather than settled facts, while recognising the real danger they pose to Lebanese civilians and regional stability. The coming weeks may prove decisive: diplomatic pressure, internal Lebanese politics and regional deterrents will shape whether this atmosphere of manufactured alarm turns into open aggression.
