In the period leading up to the ceasefire agreement in Gaza, Turkey deepened its involvement as a mediator in the war on the Gaza Strip. Ankara was among the eight Arab and Islamic countries that met with U.S. President Donald Trump in New York before he announced his plan, and later supported it. Turkey subsequently became one of the guarantor states of the ceasefire agreement reached at the Sharm El-Sheikh summit.
Before the agreement was finalised, Ankara reportedly played a key role in persuading Hamas to accept Trump’s plan — or at least to refrain from publicly opposing it. Both Trump and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan confirmed this understanding, with Trump notably praising Erdoğan’s role during the summit in Sharm El-Sheikh.
From this point, Turkey’s name emerged among the countries proposed to join the “International Stabilisation Force” that is expected to be stationed in Gaza under Trump’s plan. Several Turkish officials, including Erdoğan himself, expressed readiness to assume responsibilities or roles in Gaza within the framework of the agreement.
However, Israeli media reported that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared a “red line” regarding any Turkish security presence in Gaza, reportedly during a meeting with U.S. Vice President JD Vance.
Israel’s Vision: Control Through Foreign Forces
This stance reflects Israel’s broader vision for the agreement’s current phase — to gain politically what it failed to achieve militarily, by sustaining pressure on Hamas and other Palestinian resistance factions.
Israel has publicly evaded many of its commitments under the ceasefire while continuing violations through airstrikes and assassinations, often without justification. According to this view, Tel Aviv wants any foreign forces deployed in Gaza to act as a tool of pressure against the Palestinians — tasked with disarmament, tunnel detection, and weakening of resistance networks.
Such expectations make the participation of states with friendly or neutral relations with Hamas — like Turkey — unwelcome from Israel’s perspective.
Turkish-Israeli Tensions Deepen
Adding to this tension is Turkey’s strong stance against the genocide in Gaza, its decision to suspend trade with Israel, and its participation in the genocide case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
The rivalry between Ankara and Tel Aviv has also extended into Syria, where both sides’ interests and alliances collide. Israeli leaders, including Netanyahu, have publicly admitted that some Israeli airstrikes in Syria targeted Turkish assets or positions, while also signalling readiness to support the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) — a move perceived as directly hostile to Ankara.
Taken together, these factors make Israel’s “red line” regarding Turkish military presence in Gaza seem genuine. Yet, the question remains: is it absolute?
The U.S. Holds the Final Say
Since the unveiling of Trump’s plan, it has been clear that the United States maintains the final authority over its implementation — albeit with a strong inclination toward protecting Israeli interests.
Some Israeli opposition figures have even mocked Netanyahu’s government, suggesting that Israel has become a “state of limited sovereignty” under Washington’s dominance.
In its initial response, U.S. Vice President JD Vance stated that Israel’s consent would be “essential for the entry of any foreign forces into Gaza,” adding that Washington would not impose any troops Israel disapproves of. Similarly, Secretary of State Mark Rubio emphasised that the U.S. would give Israel a “central role in shaping the peacekeeping force”, noting that it should include countries “Israel feels comfortable with.”
These statements suggest U.S. support for the Israeli veto against Turkey’s participation. Yet, comments by U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and Special Envoy for Syria and Lebanon, Tom Barrack, hinted at a more flexible stance.
Speaking at the Manama Forum 2025, Barrack downplayed the likelihood of war between Turkey and Israel and suggested that a new trade agreement could soon emerge if the current diplomatic momentum continues.
This implies that Washington — while backing Israel’s objections — might be pressuring both sides to improve relations as a precondition for reconsidering Ankara’s potential role in Gaza. The mention of a possible trade deal aligns with this interpretation, especially given Turkey’s previous suspension of trade with Israel.
The Core Obstacle: Nature of the Force Itself
Beyond political tensions, the greater obstacle lies in the nature and mandate of the international force proposed for Gaza.
Trump’s plan referred vaguely to an “International Stabilisation Force” without defining its composition, duties, or participating countries — leaving the matter open to various interpretations and agendas.
Israel envisions this force as a mechanism to suppress Palestinian resistance, while Palestinian factions argue that its role should be limited to monitoring the ceasefire and maintaining separation between the two sides.
Figures close to the resistance have even proposed that the force should be a UN-mandated mission, not merely an “international coalition” formed under U.S. coordination — ensuring accountability through the UN Security Council.
This perspective aligns with the position of several Arab and Western states, including Egypt, Jordan, and Germany, which have emphasised the need for a Security Council resolution defining the force’s structure, responsibilities, and operational framework.
Such an arrangement could, in theory, help Turkey bypass the Israeli veto, though it might also open the door for a new American-led mediation to bridge the gap between Ankara and Tel Aviv.
Outlook: The Israeli Veto Still Dominant
Despite these potential diplomatic openings, it appears that the Israeli veto remains stronger — at least in the current phase — than any American mediation or Turkish flexibility.
For now, Israel continues to view Turkey through a lens of rivalry and mistrust, not cooperation. And unless this perception changes, the idea of Turkish military deployment in Gaza is likely to remain blocked, despite Ankara’s stated willingness and Washington’s tactical balancing act.
