The recent developments in Sudan—particularly the humanitarian catastrophe that struck the city of Al-Fashir, capital of West Darfur—have reopened questions about the foreign agendas fuelling instability in the country and dragging it into a vicious cycle of violence, division, and social fragmentation.
Among the most prominent of these agendas stands the Israeli one. Tel Aviv today is viewed as one of the key external players shaping Sudan’s internal scene, directly or indirectly manipulating its course to serve a long list of strategic objectives that extend far beyond Sudan’s borders.
Israel’s interest in Sudan is no secret. For years, the country has been treated by Israeli strategists as a critical geopolitical and logistical file—a gateway into Africa and the Red Sea basin. This has naturally raised questions about Tel Aviv’s possible role in worsening the current crisis and the faction it may favour amid Sudan’s internal conflict.
It is worth recalling that in 2020 Sudan and “Israel” announced their readiness to normalise relations, opening channels of economic and trade cooperation. The move, however, provoked wide public and political opposition inside Sudan, forcing both sides to delay the formal announcement—especially after the blood-soaked turning point the country later entered.
Why Does Sudan Matter to Israel?
Sudan occupies a strategic position in Israel’s regional calculus. Tel Aviv views Khartoum as a vital gateway for deepening its African presence and securing a foothold on the Red Sea, both of which reinforce its regional influence and logistical power.
From a security perspective, “Israel” considers Sudan a crucial station for monitoring al-Qaeda activities and tracking Iranian weapons routes. It also sees the country as a potential corridor for arms smuggling—toward Palestinian resistance factions in Gaza or across to Libya, where Turkish influence and foreign investments continue to expand.
In Tel Aviv’s view, tightening its grip over Sudan would open broader horizons across Africa and the Maghreb region. Unlike its Gulf partnerships, which yield direct economic benefits, Sudan represents for Israel a strategic asset because of its location on the Nile and its long Red Sea coastline—making it a pivotal link between the Middle East and Africa.
Ultimately, Israel pursues several overlapping goals through its Sudan file:
- Expanding the normalisation network by anchoring Sudan within the so-called Abraham Accords, despite the country’s historic stance of “no peace, no recognition, no negotiations with Israel.”
- Boosting its regional leverage as a mediator, including efforts to host ceasefire talks between Sudan’s rival generals—Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti).
- Securing intelligence and operational interests, ensuring Sudan’s chaos does not become a safe haven for resistance-aligned groups or a hub for weapons smuggling that could strengthen the Axis of Resistance and threaten the occupation’s security.
- Advancing broader geopolitical ambitions—chiefly, weakening Sudan to prevent the rise of a unified, independent state, while exerting pressure on Egypt through the Nile Waters file, using Khartoum as a southern lever against Cairo’s political autonomy.
Israel and al-Burhan: Staying in the “Warm Zone”
Over recent years, Tel Aviv has kept close yet cautious ties with Sudan’s official government and the army led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan—the figure who represented Sudan in early normalisation talks. After the fall of Omar al-Bashir’s regime, both sides exchanged official visits and public statements, including the well-known meeting between Burhan and Netanyahu in Uganda, signalling what seemed like a “positive atmosphere” for future relations.
That climate, however, did not last. Relations cooled as differences emerged over how to manage Sudan’s internal landscape, particularly after Khartoum later restored ties with Tehran, raising Israeli fears of growing Iranian influence in the Red Sea region.
At the same time, the intelligence rapprochement between Tel Aviv and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti)—widened the gap between Israel and Burhan’s camp.
In July 2025, The Jerusalem Post published a striking report describing al-Burhan as an existential threat to Israel, urging immediate action to halt his rule. The paper claimed Sudan had become a “new front” in Iran’s campaign against Israeli and Western interests, with Burhan positioned at its core. It alleged that his leadership provided Tehran with daily opportunities to encircle and weaken Tel Aviv, even hinting at a “plan to destroy it.”
The newspaper went so far as to label Burhan “Sudan’s guardian of terrorism”, citing his ties with Iran and alleged support for the Islamic movement and Hamas. In Israeli eyes, this rendered him a strategic asset of Tehran—placing Sudan squarely within the regional struggle between the Axis of Resistance and Western-Israeli influence.
Mossad and Hemedti: Partnership Through the Back Door
Relations between Israel and Hemedti’s Rapid Support Forces have grown steadily since the 2019 ouster of al-Bashir, spanning political, intelligence, and even military cooperation. Several notable indicators reveal this trajectory:
- June 26 2021: The Hebrew outlet Walla reported that a private jet from Tel Aviv landed in Khartoum, the same aircraft once used by former Mossad chief Yossi Cohen for covert visits. Sources confirmed the passengers were Mossad officials who met pro-Hemedti generals—possibly Hemedti himself—signalling his early attempts to build independent channels with Israel, bypassing both al-Burhan and former PM Abdalla Hamdok.
- The incident provoked angry reactions from Sudanese leaders, who accused Mossad of conspiring against the country’s legitimate authorities despite Khartoum’s formal involvement in the normalisation process.
- November 2021: The US outlet Axios confirmed secret visits by Mossad officials meeting Hemedti, strengthening direct intelligence cooperation between the two.
- November 30 2022: Haaretz revealed that RSF units had received advanced Israeli surveillance equipment, smuggled into Khartoum by a plane linked to a former Mossad operative and later transferred to Darfur. The gear, reportedly capable of hacking smartphones and communication networks, shifted the power balance in Hemedti’s favour.
- April 24 2024: In an interview with Israel’s Kan channel, Hemedti’s adviser Youssef Izzat likened al-Burhan’s forces to “the Palestinian terrorist factions fighting Israel,” appealing to Tel Aviv to back the RSF while accusing Burhan of colluding with the Islamic movement against civilians.
Playing All Sides
Although both Burhan and Hemedti publicly committed to normalisation, Israel appears to lean subtly toward Hemedti, who has shown greater enthusiasm for cultivating ties with Tel Aviv. He initiated direct contact with Mossad, bypassing Sudan’s Sovereign Council, and later entrusted his brother Abdul Rahim Dagalo, RSF deputy commander, with managing Israeli relations. The latter even visited Tel Aviv publicly, meeting senior Israeli military and intelligence officials to solidify cooperation.
Nevertheless, Israel seeks to keep every card in its hand. Rather than fully backing one side, Tel Aviv has adopted a dual-track strategy:
- The Israeli Foreign Ministry, under Director-General Ronen Levy, maintains official communication with Burhan’s camp as Sudan’s recognised authority.
- The Mossad, meanwhile, handles unofficial and field-level coordination with Hemedti’s forces, including covert intelligence exchanges.
Despite widespread accusations that Israel has supplied the RSF with intelligence, technology, and weaponry, Tel Aviv continues to present itself diplomatically as a neutral mediator. Foreign Minister Eli Cohen has even invited both generals to reconciliation talks in Tel Aviv, in an effort to salvage the stalled normalisation track.
Israel’s main concern is that the prolonged war will derail its final normalisation deal with Khartoum. Both factions have at times expressed willingness to proceed, though Hemedti remains more open and eager, hoping for foreign backing to strengthen his political and military position.
Tel Aviv’s current caution also stems from its past disappointment in South Sudan, where close ties failed to yield the strategic returns it expected. Repeated internal conflicts there undermined Israel’s influence in Africa—an experience it is determined not to repeat in Sudan.
Hence, Israel today navigates the Sudan file with greater restraint, keeping all channels open and adjusting to field developments to maintain its regional foothold across the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea corridor.
Managing Balance Among Rivals
Through a calculated, multi-layered strategy, Israel has successfully entrenched itself inside Sudan—not by overt intervention, but through quiet infiltration and indirect influence. For Tel Aviv, the key to long-term dominance lies not in who wins the war, but in how effectively it can manipulate both sides to serve its security and geopolitical agenda.
Sudan, therefore, is not merely a postponed normalisation file. It is an open theatre of intersecting interests and proxy conflicts, where Israel strives to prevent any power vacuum that could benefit Iran or the Resistance Axis, while maintaining its own strategic foothold on the Red Sea and deep within Africa.
As Khartoum sinks deeper into civil war, Tel Aviv continues its cynical game—speaking to Burhan in the name of political legitimacy, while simultaneously arming and advising Hemedti as a battlefield lever. In the end, Israel ensures that it alone emerges the winner, regardless of who prevails on the ground.
What ultimately matters to the occupation is not who governs Sudan, but who controls its decisions. Both generals, in Israel’s calculus, are expendable—as long as Tel Aviv’s influence remains anchored within Sudan’s political and military institutions.
And so, while Sudan bleeds under war, famine, and foreign meddling, Israel plays its familiar tune—manipulating every string with cold pragmatism, securing its geopolitical and intelligence gains atop the ruins of a nation torn apart by Zionist, international, and regional agendas.
