After a war that stretched for two years and only halted after a forceful US intervention by President Donald Trump — framed as “saving Israel from itself” before the world — Israelis now face rising prospects of early elections at the start of next year.
The cause is not only the war and its social and political aftermath, but a deep crisis of confidence — not only between the public and the government, but between the army and the government, inside the governing coalition, and across the wider political arena.
Netanyahu’s campaign for early elections
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — who is wanted by the International Criminal Court — appears to be moving on a clear programme toward early elections, and has effectively begun his campaign. Among the consequences of that strategy was the forced acceptance of the Sharm el-Sheikh agreement, which ended the war and established the basis for negotiating more lasting solutions.
Yet the success of the Sharm el-Sheikh talks under Trump’s plan, important though it was, is not the sole reason for the rush to elections. The political reality created by the long war — and its social, political and economic repercussions, as well as Israel’s standing in the world and among Jews in the diaspora — has been a decisive factor.
Former prime minister and ex-defence minister Ehud Barak acknowledged that Netanyahu’s government acted recklessly, casting doubt on Israel’s very existence in the eyes of the world and shaking trust — even among Jews — in the state.
Deadlines, budgets and an uncertain road
The approval of the national budget sets a timeline that cannot be ignored, particularly amid the absence of a broad consensus on the political course. This election cycle is different from previous ones, not only because of the war but because of the existential struggle over the character of the state between the right and the centre — and over Israel’s image abroad.
As in many countries, standing at a decisive crossroads does not guarantee that internal conflicts will be settled in a single ballot. Several rounds may be required, and time may be needed before a clear picture emerges and disputes over the identity of the polity are resolved. Indeed, the last government itself was formed only after repeated elections had failed to produce a stable result and paralysis had taken hold across political institutions.
From the moment the current right-wing coalition took shape, its leaders began implementing what critics called a “constitutional coup” — reshaping the rules of governance to their advantage — sparking major protests that persisted even after the eruption of the 7 October war.
Historic stakes and wartime campaigning
Some observers say the forthcoming early elections will be historic, at least because they occur less than three years after the January 2023 poll — itself preceded by the November 2022 election. Campaigning under conditions of war or fragile ceasefire is never easy, especially when signs of political fracture and disregard for democratic norms are visible. For example, ministers such as Itamar Ben-Gvir have shown a tendency to flout the law in a range of matters, including prayer at the Al-Aqsa compound — actions prohibited under Israeli law and opposed by many rabbinical authorities.
Following the Sharm el-Sheikh deal, Netanyahu entered a sensitive political and diplomatic phase. The agreement will shape the political timetable for the coming months and alter the balance of power within the governing table.
Although parties such as Otzma Yehudit (led by Ben-Gvir) and the Religious Zionism bloc (led by Bezalel Smotrich) have remained publicly silent about the deal to avoid spoiling a US-backed ceremony that many Israelis celebrated, that silence is unlikely to endure.
Trump’s visit and the race to preserve unity
It is plausible that President Trump’s visit and his speech to the Knesset were primarily intended to prevent a rapid collapse of Israel’s political scene. Trump has an interest in keeping the momentum of the agreement alive for as long as possible, which requires preventing Israel’s slide into a spiral of internal conflict.
Otzma Yehudit has drawn a clear red line: if Hamas remains after the war, the party threatens to withdraw from government. While Religious Zionism avoids public threats, it too will find it difficult to support any agreement that goes beyond a prisoner exchange — essentially the first phase of the Sharm el-Sheikh agreement — unless no major concessions are made.
A high-stakes balancing act for Netanyahu
Israeli political analysts believe Netanyahu faces a complex equation: a significant diplomatic move against Hamas might secure international backing, but it could also unravel the political alliances that keep his government intact. His test is not only whether the deal succeeds, but whether he can remain dominant in the political arena afterwards.
One of Netanyahu’s closest former advisers, Natan Eshel, said that by the time elections arrive “everyone will have forgotten the catastrophe of 7 October.” According to reports, this remark reflects a deliberate strategy Netanyahu has pursued for two years: prolong the war, weather the storms, and then claim ultimate success — to be seen as the saviour rather than held accountable for failure.
This explains repeated attempts to keep the memory of 7 October off the public agenda and to recast the conflict in different names — such as “the Renaissance War” or “the War of Seven Fronts.” In the run-up to elections Netanyahu appears determined to tell the public he alone saved Israel during the last two years and deserves gratitude, not punishment.
Coalition shock, manoeuvres and legal preparations
Netanyahu’s coalition reportedly felt stunned by Trump’s rapid moves and statements, and chose silence — partly at Netanyahu’s clear direction and partly because of the political moment. But coalition members understand what lies beneath.
According to Maariv, Netanyahu asked a Likud minister to examine institutional and legal steps required to open a rapid electoral process and to see how party-machinery and the Central Elections Committee might be mobilised quickly. Among options discussed was combining Likud’s primary election with its party conference on 24 November — a move that could renew Netanyahu’s internal leadership and shore up party unity, neutralising any internal challenge.
Likud officials say these preparations are “an on-the-ground rehearsal for calling national elections” against the backdrop of the prisoner-exchange deal and the broader Trump plan for Middle East “peace.” Netanyahu wants to secure his position before the system becomes embroiled in a political maelstrom and to capitalise on any surge in Likud support following a deal that might return hostages home.
Polls, coalition shifts and the price of the deal
Recent polls published in Maariv suggested that the Sharm el-Sheikh agreement improved Netanyahu’s standing while hurting opponents of the deal. Pollster Dr Menahem Lazar noted that those perceived as opponents — notably Otzma Yehudit — saw support decline, while Religious Zionism repeatedly failed to pass the electoral threshold.
Yet the picture is mixed: Likud gained two seats, apparently at the expense of other right-wing lists. The big question remains what happens after the deal is implemented. On one hand, Likud could strengthen thanks to international accords that may follow with other Muslim-majority states; on the other hand, the heavy political price of the deal — including the release of prisoners accused of serious crimes and the continued role of Hamas in Gaza — could weaken Likud in practice.
Netanyahu’s public persona and the countdown to elections
Netanyahu today presents himself not only as “Mr Security” and “Mr Economy” but as a paternal figure who can reach out to rivals, unite the people through new conscription legislation, revive the economy and restore domestic and international confidence in the Jewish state.
He promises to pass the national budget by the end of March; if he cannot, he says he will dissolve the Knesset and call early elections. Observers believe Netanyahu will postpone dissolution until the last possible moment, preferring to retain the option of dissolving the Knesset himself rather than being forced into it.
The winter session of the Knesset opens on 19 October, and the coalition — aware of the early-election possibility — intends to “clean the table” swiftly and accelerate laws that serve coalition interests, hoping to go to the ballot box in better conditions.
