In a world shifting from unipolar dominance to a genuinely multipolar order, one war barely cools before another ignites. As global attention fixed on Egypt’s talks to end the genocide in Gaza, reports emerged of a new confrontation between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
On 8 October, Pakistan’s army announced that 11 soldiers were killed in an exchange with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) fighters in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, near the Afghan border, adding that 19 TTP members were killed.
Islamabad claims militants are using neighbouring Afghanistan as a training and staging ground for attacks on Pakistan — and alleges Indian financing and support.
On Friday, 10 October, the Afghan government stated that Pakistan violated Afghan airspace and bombed an area near the border, adding that Kabul itself was also struck. The Afghan Ministry of Defence condemned the strikes as “unprecedented, violent and provocative,” asserting: “Defending our territory is our legitimate right.”
Notably, on 9 October — the day the clashes began — Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi was on a high-profile visit to India, described as “unprecedented.”
The Taliban said 58 Pakistani soldiers were killed “in retaliation.” They also accused Pakistan of violating Afghan airspace the previous week and striking a market in the southeast.
Pakistan disputed the Taliban’s toll, saying 23 Pakistani personnel were killed while Pakistan “neutralised 200” Taliban and allied militants.
Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi called the Afghan attacks “unjustified” and targeting civilians, warning of a Pakistani response. Defence Minister Khawaja Asif added: “If Afghan soil is used against Pakistan, we reserve the right to act.” From New Delhi, Muttaqi warned Pakistan “not to test Afghans’ patience.”
Historical Roots of the Tension
Reducing today’s crisis to TTP operations and accusations of Afghan support misreads the core issue. The conflict is anchored in border problems dating back to 1893.
At the end of the 19th century — amid British–Russian rivalry — Britain drew the line between Afghanistan and British India under the Durand Agreement signed 12 November 1893 by British diplomat Mortimer Durand and Amir Abdur Rahman Khan.
This Durand Line partitioned Pashtun tribes, leaving some in Afghanistan and others in British India, creating permanent instability.
After India’s 1947 independence and partition, Afghanistan argued the 2,600-km Durand Line had lost validity and should be renegotiated. Pakistan, invoking continuity of treaties concluded by British India, insisted on the 1893 boundary, citing international law principles later codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Article 62 referenced in Islamabad’s position).
Kabul, for its part, has long considered the line imposed and unjust.
India–Afghanistan Rapprochement
Armed incidents between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan (7–10 May 2025) were described as among the most alarming in three decades, with India perceived internationally as the weaker party in that episode. In response, New Delhi pursued a strategy to encircle Pakistan diplomatically and strategically — most notably building ties with the Taliban administration in Kabul, despite the lack of formal recognition.
As the Pakistan–Afghanistan border clashes erupted, Muttaqi arrived in New Delhi for a week-long visit (9–16 October). India pledged health and other assistance; Afghanistan invited Indian investment, particularly in high-value mineral resources.
During the visit, India announced it would upgrade diplomatic engagement to embassy level. In their joint communiqué, both sides emphasised “countering terrorism originating from regional states” — a phrase widely read as a clear message of an emerging India–Afghanistan alignment against Pakistan.
Pakistan has hosted millions of Afghan refugees through the Soviet invasion, the U.S. occupation, and after 2021. In recent years, driven by security concerns and economic pressure, Islamabad has sought to repatriate many Afghans. Within Pakistan reside large Afghan communities shaped by the Deobandi scholarly tradition — also influential inside Afghanistan — which historically informed the Taliban’s religious orientation.
This religious and social overlap raises concerns about Indian attempts to influence Afghan dynamics via Deobandi circles, a possibility echoed in 2016 remarks by Indian National Security Adviser Ajit Doval (as quoted), signalling a hard-nosed approach to using Taliban actors as leverage. For Islamabad — which accuses India of backing the TTP and other groups inside Pakistan alongside the Kashmir dispute — a strategic India–Afghanistan axis is seen as a direct threat to national security.
Scenarios Ahead
- Indian defence aid to Afghanistan remains unlikely in the immediate term, even as political and economic ties deepen.
- Air strikes and cross-border skirmishes are unsustainable for Pakistan as a long-term strategy.
- The most probable near-term outcome is de-escalation at the frontier and a shift from a hot conflict to a cold one.
Pakistan may support anti-Taliban factions inside Afghanistan, but such a move could blow back against Pakistan’s own security.
Given China’s significant investments in Pakistan and growing stakes in Afghanistan, Beijing is expected to push for diplomacy to prevent escalation. China has already voiced deep concern and highlighted an existing trilateral forum to foster dialogue among China–Pakistan–Afghanistan.
In September 2025, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a mutual defence pact stating that an attack on one would be considered an attack on both. Riyadh could therefore pressure Kabul to act against the TTP.
Bottom Line
Today’s Pakistan–Afghanistan flare-up is rooted in historic border disputes and the evolving Pakistan–India–Afghanistan triangle.
A full-scale war would magnify India’s influence in Asia — and that expansion of Indian reach would open space for Israel to pursue its interests more freely in the region.
Former U.S. President Donald Trump has said the American departure from Bagram was a mistake and that the U.S. would return. Washington’s desire to re-enter Afghanistan within the broader U.S.–China rivalry is plain; renewed Pakistan–Afghanistan hostilities strengthen Washington’s pretext to come back.
Still, the likelihood is strong that clashes will subside under pressure from states maintaining good ties with both sides.
Countries that could play active roles in ending the fighting include China, Qatar, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.
Yet, with a 150-year border problem unresolved, no ceasefire is likely to be permanent.
