A detailed report by The New Humanitarian alleges that senior United Nations officials facilitated Israel’s militarisation of humanitarian aid bound for the Gaza Strip. The piece centres on Susanna Tkalec, the UN Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator (DHC) for the Occupied Palestinian Territory — the highest-ranking UN official in Gaza — and documents claims that she allowed Israeli manipulation of the aid response, echoed Israeli talking points used to restrict aid, demeaned Palestinian staff and communities, and blamed them for shortages.
Multiple aid workers also say Tkalec negotiated with Israeli authorities to bring dog food into Gaza and to transfer dogs to a safe location in Khan Younis at a time when Palestinians were starving and dying from hunger.
A UN staff member said: “She cares more about dogs than people here.”
Another aid worker called the dog-food negotiations deeply insensitive to Palestinian colleagues.
Appointment and Core Concerns
Tkalec was appointed in early 2025 as DHC for the OPT, tasked with negotiating access with Israeli authorities on behalf of UN agencies and the wider humanitarian community.
Eleven aid workers (five in senior roles), speaking currently or recently involved in the Gaza response, told The New Humanitarian that she:
- Permitted Israeli authorities to steer the aid response,
- Failed to confront escalating restrictions,
- Repeated Israeli narratives without critique, and
- Insulted Palestinian staff and communities by blaming them for aid shortfalls.
Many also said she was often absent from Gaza far more than previous senior UN officials, adding avoidable strain on already stretched UN resources. Several noted she increasingly sidestepped UNRWA, the agency Israel has long sought to dismantle.
A senior aid worker summarised:
“She appears to acquiesce — or serve Israeli interests — in multiple ways… silence and compliance.”
“Under COGAT’s Influence”
The DHC role represents the UN in Gaza and oversees humanitarian operations. Previous three deputies had been senior UNRWA officials. After Israel banned UNRWA in January and refused visas for its international staff, Tkalec was appointed and confirmed permanently in May.
All interviewed aid workers voiced concern over Tkalec’s relationship with COGAT (Israel’s military liaison office with humanitarians).
A senior aid worker said:
“She has been consistently manipulated by COGAT… I’m amazed she hasn’t been removed.”
The Gaza City Offensive & the Tent Deal
In late August, Israel announced a major offensive on Gaza City, already hit by famine. Days before the assault — which displaced around 780,000 people — Tkalec negotiated permission to distribute tents in southern Gaza, far from Gaza City. Three aid workers said this was widely seen as accepting mass displacement of an estimated one million residents.
A UN official recounted a colleague telling Tkalec:
“I will not participate in the ethnic cleansing of these people.”
Complaints were reportedly raised with Tom Fletcher, the top UN humanitarian official. OCHA declined to comment on personnel matters, saying only: “We stand behind our team in the field working under extremely difficult conditions.”
The May Flour Arrangement: Centralised to Bakeries Only
Four aid workers described another incident in late May — the first flour delivery after Israel’s full blockade in early March. Previously, flour was distributed directly to families via UNRWA. Under the new arrangement, the flour was approved only for bakeries, a shift several responders say Tkalec failed to transparently disclose to UN staff and Palestinian community leaders.
A UN official said negotiations occurred behind closed doors between Tkalec’s office and the Israeli military, excluding OCHA. The bakery-only plan:
- Bypassed community input,
- Increased Israeli control (Israel ordered population transfers and kept only four WFP-supported bakeries open in Deir al-Balah; none in the north), and
- Risked chaos and restricted access.
Initially, communities protected the convoys. But when people realised no direct flour would reach families — and they were told to “go and fight for bread” — trust collapsed and looting began. A WFP-supplied bakery closed a day after opening; others shut by 25 May. On 28 May, crowds stormed WFP’s warehouse in Deir al-Balah, seeking flour; four people died (trampling or gunfire) and UN equipment was destroyed.
OCHA later reported that much of the flour entering afterwards was intercepted en route to UN warehouses by civilians or armed groups. Israeli airstrikes also hit at least two bakeries and civil police guarding a flour convoy to Gaza City, killing or injuring about 100 people.
According to two aid workers, Tkalec blamed Palestinian community leaders for not preventing looting — giving Israel a pretext to reject household distribution.
A UN staffer said:
“She blamed people for the lack of household distribution — even though the Israelis banned it from the start.”
“Silence and Compliance”
Previous deputy coordinators publicly condemned Israeli atrocities in official statements. Several aid workers said Tkalec has not done the same. One described her approach as “obedient” and “submissive.”
Responders said Tkalec praised small approvals (e.g., limited consignments) from the same authorities blocking aid, telling colleagues negotiations with the Israeli military were “going very well.” A UN staffer countered:
“This is a state apparatus carrying out genocide.”
Tkalec maintains her engagement with COGAT is principled and consistent, focused solely on securing aid for Palestinians. Some colleagues believe she truly thinks softening Israel’s stance improves access — but they call the approach misguided:
“She repeatedly relayed COGAT ‘assurances’ to the humanitarian community — none ever materialised,” said a senior responder.
At a late-August meeting with INGO leaders, Tkalec and her superior, Ramesh Rajasingham (Ramiz Alakbarov), reportedly presented an optimistic picture of the Gaza response, which field staff said contradicted reality — days before UN-backed experts concluded over half a million people were facing famine in Gaza City and its environs.
INGO heads raised catastrophic access failures: bans on tents and shelter materials, fuel shortages, and threats to deregister non-compliant organisations under Israel’s new rules. Instead of addressing those threats, Tkalec listed minor “successes,” including permission to bring in animal fodder — grim in a context where Palestinians had already been forced to eat fodder to survive.
Tkalec has argued her talks delivered “important gains”: more food, fuel, chlorine for water treatment, and reopening crossings. She says they remain insufficient and that she will keep advocating for safe access, civilian protection, and adherence to humanitarian principles.
Aid workers dispute her assessment; UN reporting paints a starker picture.
- Israel ended a near three-month total aid blockade in late May, only after UN-backed famine warnings and daily images of starving children.
- As the blockade eased, deprivation worsened in the north, where almost no aid entered after the mid-September assault on Gaza City. By end-September, only eight community kitchens were operating in the north, serving 70% fewer meals than the previous month; most bakeries had closed or moved south.
- Across Gaza, vegetables, meat, and dairy were largely unavailable. Since famine was declared in Gaza City on 22 August, 175 people died of hunger. Few convoys reached destinations without looting by starving civilians or armed groups.
- While average daily meals rose from one to nearly two between July and September (WFP), aid volumes fell ~60% in late September (OCHA) amid frequent Israeli crossing closures and chlorine shortages fuelling diarrhoeal disease.
A senior responder said portraying these as “gains” relieves pressure on COGAT.
Withholding Briefings & Repeated Absences
Multiple aid workers said Tkalec’s office repeatedly refused to share written summaries of meetings with COGAT, leaving agencies blindsided by unknown deals. Tkalec says her meeting information is widely shared.
Several responders also fear she miscommunicates between field teams and senior leadership, prompting colleagues to cross-check information she relays. Others criticised her frequent trips out of Gaza to meet Israeli officials in person — movements that require extensive security packages (armoured vehicles, convoy leaders, staff), diverting scarce resources from core operations.
“UN leadership being physically present in Gaza matters — it reassures agencies the leadership is here, not treating Gaza as an abstraction.”
A Fragmented Response & the Sideling of UNRWA
Responders said Tkalec’s leadership encouraged a more fragmented approach, with agencies cutting bilateral deals with Israeli officials — a long-standing Israeli objective since the start of the war.
Multiple sources also said she increasingly excluded UNRWA from key meetings and pushed to reassign its roles to other agencies. Israel has:
- Killed 300+ UNRWA staff,
- Sought to defund and isolate the agency through unsubstantiated allegations, and
- Treated UNRWA as a central symbol of the Palestinian cause.
Despite WFP moving significant supplies, responders note WFP lacks UNRWA’s distribution network, built over decades (registries, clinics, and schools turned shelters). WFP said it could reach 1.6 million of Gaza’s 2.1 million people. “What about the rest?” one worker asked. “Who feeds them?”
A UN official and another responder said Tkalec favoured WFP for food distribution while marginalising UNRWA, even though every segment of society calls for UNRWA to lead. Publicly, other UN agencies tried to present a united front in support of UNRWA, warning that yielding to Israeli pressure enables a warring party to weaponise aid and reduce the response to minimal food drops.
“An Insult Without Limits”: The Dog-Food Episode
During the mid-2025 Israeli attack on Deir al-Balah, several aid workers say Tkalec attempted to use UN resources to bring dog food for strays near her guesthouse and to evacuate the dogs. A senior responder said she negotiated with COGAT to bring in large quantities of dog food while food for UN staff was blocked.
By August, 39% of Gaza’s population reportedly went days without eating; parents skipped meals so children could eat; aid and health workers fainted from hunger on duty.
A worker framed it as duty of care to Palestinian colleagues:
“Our relief staff are doing everything — and we are not feeding them.”
During the same period, an Israeli strike hit a WHO guesthouse, and Israeli troops reportedly raided, detained, and strip-searched Palestinian UN staff. Responders say that amid attacks and evacuation orders in parts of Deir al-Balah, Tkalec asked for a UN vehicle to move the dogs to Khan Younis; staff refused.
In June, Tkalec held a press briefing with Gaza journalists, advising them not to encourage communities to loot aid. In a subsequent statement to the UN (seen by The New Humanitarian), journalists rebuked the briefing for omitting any mention of Israel:
“You cannot discuss looting without pointing to the crimes of the occupation… Each of us is hungry, has lost family members. To scold us, blame us, and ask us to police our communities while organised crime remains Israel’s responsibility — is an insult without limits.”
Leadership Signals Beyond Tkalec
Several aid workers voiced similar concerns about other senior UN figures, including Ramiz (Ramesh) Alakbarov, newly appointed and also Deputy UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process. Four workers criticised an August statement describing Gaza’s famine as “entirely man-made” without naming Israel, calling the omission “utterly shameful.” A senior worker recalled him saying, “Why doesn’t Hamas just return all the hostages,” as if that alone would end the crisis.
They also criticised the August photo-op and joint statement between WFP Executive Director Cindy McCain and Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu. One senior worker said:
“I don’t know any other context where a UN agency would issue a joint statement with someone wanted by the ICC.”
(Alakbarov’s office maintains he has been consistent and firm, publicly and privately, in calling for the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages, unrestricted aid access, and adherence to humanitarian principles.)
A Question of Context, Experience, and Power
To many Gaza responders, Tkalec appears inexperienced in the Palestinian context, where Israel’s decades-long military occupation — deemed illegal by the International Court of Justice and described as apartheid by leading human rights organisations — shapes all humanitarian dynamics. Before Gaza, Tkalec served as deputy humanitarian coordinator in the DRC, worked over a decade with Catholic Relief Services, and later with the International Rescue Committee in Yemen, Syria, Jordan, and elsewhere.
A senior responder recalled her saying: “I’ve seen worse in Goma.” New leaders often believe they have a “special touch” with Israeli authorities, responders said, but encounter a vast bureaucracy adept at manipulation or outright force to bend humanitarian systems toward political and military aims.
“They send the nicest person to meet you, to make you feel heard… You keep pursuing it; in the end, the impact is nil or negligible.”
These tactics repeat. A year before Tkalec’s tent talks for southern Gaza, a similar scenario emerged ahead of Israel’s assault on Rafah. After months of blocking shelter materials — forcing Palestinians to endure a freezing, wet winter in the open — Israeli authorities approached NGOs offering tens of thousands of tents to be brought into the south before the planned operation that displaced nearly a million people and collapsed the humanitarian system. Most groups refused, calling it a clear manipulation that risked complicity in ethnic cleansing.
Two senior sources said that prior to Tkalec’s arrival, UN leaders in Palestine understood this playbook and maintained a more adversarial stance with Israeli authorities — closer to humanitarian principles.
Now, they fear leadership has grown aligned with Israel’s goals.
A UN official: “I feel the DHC has marginalised anyone with a moral compass.”
A senior aid worker: “We are not here to befriend warring parties — certainly not those accused of genocide. A strained relationship is not failure; it shows we’re doing our job.”
