The war that erupted between Israel and Iran in June 2025 drew intense attention in Ankara. For Turkish decision-makers, it was the first real-world test of the post–7 October 2023 balance of power in the Middle East—and a live model of modern warfare where cyber operations are fused with air power, psychological warfare, and diplomacy.
What makes this conflict especially instructive for Türkiye is that it serves as an advance warning of scenarios that could unfold in its volatile neighbourhood. Turkish analysts have therefore examined the war in depth to extract lessons that strengthen national defence and resilience against similar crises.
The conflict’s significance lies in its outcomes, management methods, weapon mixes, allied support, and civil-defence systems—all benchmarks of a state’s readiness for strategic shocks. Israel opened the war with precision airstrikes, paired with cyber and psychological operations, and it concluded with direct U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities—turning the campaign into a cutting-edge laboratory for multi-domain warfare.
Ankara read the war less as a duel between two familiar rivals and more as a warning siren. Türkiye’s position on a combustible arc stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Caucasus, the Balkans and the Middle East means it could face the same operational pattern: surprise raids, leadership decapitation, and infrastructure attacks.
Accordingly, Turkey’s military and security institutions followed the war minute by minute, producing detailed assessments. Within this context, the National Intelligence Academy published a long Turkish study, “The 12-Day War and Lessons for Türkiye,” whose main insights are outlined below.
Israel Tests a Multi-Domain Superiority Model
The paper offers a strategic reading of the war that began on 13 June 2025 with a wide Israeli air offensive against nuclear facilities, command centres, military leaders, and nuclear scientists in Iran. The strikes were synchronised with complex cyber and intelligence operations, while agents on the ground used Spike missiles to hit air-defence radars and batteries at the outset—complicating Iran’s ability to form a coordinated defence.
On day one, Israel employed more than 200 strike fighters—F-35s, F-15s and F-16s—demonstrating a high level of readiness that enabled it to destroy numerous targets over 1,500 km away.
Israel also used special units inside Iran and loitering/attack drones to destroy air-defence sites, leading to a near-collapse of Iran’s air-defence network within 72 hours. Air superiority then facilitated U.S. strategic strikes by B-2 Spirit aircraft against underground nuclear facilities in Isfahan and Qom.
Iran’s response came as swarms of drones and ballistic missiles, some hypersonic-class, though most were intercepted by Israeli missile defence—with support from the United States and other regional states. Some missiles, however, penetrated defences and struck Tel Aviv, Haifa and Beersheba.
Psychological warfare was extensive. Israel penetrated Iranian communications, sent false warning messages to civilians, and directly contacted senior officials urging them to flee to avoid assassination. Iran countered with deception, deep-fake techniques, and bot-driven propaganda.
Cyber operations ran alongside, targeting Iran’s financial and media infrastructure to sow panic. Examples included bank system intrusions that triggered widespread disruptions, blocking customers’ access to accounts, halting ATM and card services, and the theft of US$81.7 million from the Iranian crypto platform Nobitex.
Fusing Air, Cyber and Diplomacy
The war showcased an integrated multi-domain model pairing battlefield operations with air, cyber, information and diplomatic arms.
Israel displayed long-range strike power with advanced U.S.-made aircraft equipped with additional fuel tanks. F-35s spearheaded precision attacks, supported by reconnaissance and electronic-warfare (EW) platforms (such as Oron and Shavit), securing near-total air dominance in the opening hours. The campaign underlined the decisive role of air power in high-intensity conflicts, especially for states lacking land borders with their primary adversaries.
A key point for Turkish reflection is how these air assets were integrated with local Israeli systems—including Elisra SPS-3000 EW, PAWS missile-warning, Elta SATCOM, Rafael-developed precision-navigation, smart munitions, and real-time tactical cueing.
Airborne EW platforms—Eitam AEW&C, plus Shavit and Oron for electronic intelligence—enabled eavesdropping on Iranian communications, monitoring radar emissions, geolocating air-defence and C2 nodes as they switched on, and tracking missile launchers for subsequent destruction. They also transmitted deceptive signals that masked aircraft positions or created false targets, acting as silent force multipliers.
Fighter and EW units deployed high-power jamming to disrupt radio communications. Reports indicated suicide drones were used to destroy antennae and relay stations, isolating units from headquarters and forcing ad-hoc field decisions.
From the first hours, cyber warfare was pivotal: degrading Iran’s command-and-control, breaching financial networks, and pushing disinformation to mobile phones as part of a coordinated assault. Units such as 8200 and Battalion 5114 conducted composite attacks that caused widespread disruption inside Iran.
The study concludes that the first strike matters, and success hinges on multi-domain orchestration—air, land, sea, space and cyber. Long-range manned fighters remain indispensable reference points for future joint-force planning. Israel’s operational model blends advanced technology, skilled human capital, a flexible command structure, and intelligence integration. By contrast, Iran’s fixed, centralised and less flexible air-defence network reduced its effectiveness against Israeli attacks.
The Diplomatic Layer and Power Coalitions
The war highlighted Israel’s reliance on Western political cover. The United States participated in strikes on Iranian nuclear sites and supplied weapons and munitions; Britain, France and Germany provided intelligence and logistical support.
Iran, despite expectations of backing from China and Russia, found itself isolated, with no concrete diplomatic, security or military cover—underscoring that China–Russia–Iran cooperation is still far from a coherent security mechanism.
Regionally, the study notes the importance of recognising alliance geographies, such as Cyprus as strategic depth for Israel—a point that, from Ankara’s perspective, requires close monitoring of Israeli penetration in its near environment, especially in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, as a matter of national security.
Accordingly, the study urges Türkiye to view national security holistically—beyond defence-industry upgrades or military partnerships—to include stronger alliances with other states (foremost the United States, as well as Pakistan, Syria, Qatar and Azerbaijan) and to fortify the home front and social cohesion. In this spirit, initiatives like “Terror-Free Türkiye” acquire new relevance as tools to harden the state against external exploitation in any future conflict.
Strategic Assessment
1) Need for a Multi-Arm Air Force
The 12-Day War showed that air dominance requires not just numbers and technology but integration—smart sensors, networked platforms and intelligence-led targeting. Türkiye, despite progress in uncrewed aerial systems, must accelerate modernisation of its conventional fighter fleet, expand airborne EW, and build long-range operational flexibility.
2) Cyber Defence as a National Priority
Cyber attacks that hit the core of Iran’s economy and media were a wake-up call to Ankara. Crippling the financial system proved a pathway to victory. Türkiye should build civilian and military cyber shields, develop offensive cyber capabilities, run counter-intelligence programmes, and conduct regular security audits of firms in strategic tech—particularly defence industries.
3) Protecting Critical Sites and Senior Leadership
A striking feature was Israel’s ability to assassinate key leaders while hitting strategic locations. Protecting senior officials, sovereign sites, and C2 centres can no longer be secondary. The study prioritises low-altitude air-defence for strategic facilities—especially security headquarters—against drones and ground agents, with tightened site protocols and updated VIP security for civil and military figures tasked with crisis management.
4) Civil Defence—the Forgotten Front
Despite the war’s strategic nature, civilian losses shaped both the Iranian and Israeli scenes. Israel’s early-warning network and hardened shelters limited casualties (31 dead), while Iran’s lack of advanced civil defence led to hundreds of civilian deaths in Tehran and major cities. Ankara must ask whether its own civil defence can absorb a surprise first strike.
Recommendations include nationwide early-warning systems, air-raid alerts for major cities, shelters with technical requirements at vital government facilities, accessible public shelters, using metro stations for emergencies, public awareness campaigns, integrating civil defence into military planning as a pillar of state continuity, and preparing media and security institutions to counter rumours, manage information flows, and maintain effective public communication in crises.
5) Economic, Technological and Societal Readiness
The war shows that advanced weapons alone do not ensure resilience without economic flexibility and political-social endurance. Israel’s technological edge is offset by geographic vulnerability, heavy dependence on international trade, and casualty sensitivity—real weaknesses that undermine strategic toughness.
Conversely, despite Iran’s deteriorating economy, the regime’s ability to sustain political and security control in a turbulent, sanctioned environment highlights the decisive role of non-military factors in national resilience. The study urges Türkiye to build a composite deterrent: stronger air and air-defence capabilities, indigenised security and intelligence technologies, and domestic policies that reinforce social solidarity and economic stability—reducing adversary penetration and hardening state immunity.
6) The Imperative of Strategic Vigilance
Ankara views the 12-Day War as part of a web of scenarios that cause concern. Having lived through the collapse of neighbours like Iraq and Syria, Türkiye understands that an Iranian collapse or slide into state failure would have disastrous effects—from eastern border insecurity to potential migration waves and militia movements across neighbouring states.
By contrast, a stable Iran—provided it reins in regional interventions and controls its nuclear activities—is the least costly outcome for Türkiye, opening space for economic and energy cooperation and deeper political dialogue.
Amid three possible trajectories in Iran–U.S. relations—diplomatic settlement, open crisis, or full-scale conflict—the study advises Ankara to prepare for the worst and work for the best. That means sustaining mediation between Tehran and Washington to preserve Türkiye’s role in great-power balances; raising security readiness on the eastern border; hardening the defence industry and sensitive facilities against espionage and infiltration; and enhancing cooperation with the governments of Iraq, Azerbaijan and Syria to contain spillovers from any escalation over Iran.
The study stresses that strategic vigilance and multi-front planning are what will safeguard Türkiye’s security and regional standing—and keep it from being pulled into a conflagration it does not seek but cannot ignore.
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