News that the Israeli occupation has issued new permits for residents of three areas north-west of Jerusalem—inside West Bank territory—has not received the media attention it deserves.
That may be because Palestinians in these three areas already held Israeli permits allowing them to enter their lands and homes, or because the nature of the change—and its future legal impact—was not clearly understood.
Which areas?
The areas in question are Al-Khalaileh neighbourhood in the town of Al-Jib, the town of Beit Iksa, and the town of Nabi Samwil. They lie roughly 9 km north-west of Jerusalem, yet they are not part of the city: they fall outside the Israeli “Greater Jerusalem Municipality” and are considered West Bank territory.
- Al-Khalaileh (Al-Jib): ~200 dunums
- Beit Iksa: ~9,000 dunums
- Nabi Samwil: ~1,000 dunums
In total: 10,200 dunums (around 10 km²). Most of these lands fall under Area (C) according to the Oslo framework.
As for population (per the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics): about 700 residents in Al-Khalaileh (Al-Jib), 2,100 in Beit Iksa, and 270 in Nabi Samwil—roughly 3,000 Palestinians in all. These are therefore low-density localities.
A unique situation
Although these towns have always been part of the occupied West Bank (since 1967), Israel’s construction of the separation wall encircling Jerusalem in 2003—what the Israeli government calls the “Jerusalem Envelope”—bent the route eastwards so that the wall ended up behind these three localities.
As a result, they became trapped between the wall on one side and the Green Line/armistice line (separating the 1948 and 1967 territories) on the other. Residents were effectively cut off from the broader West Bank, from the areas beyond the Green Line, and from Jerusalem itself.
Movement has since depended on special gates controlled by the occupation and on special permits issued by the Israeli army that allow residents to travel between their towns and other West Bank areas.
What just changed?
A few days ago, the occupation’s Civil Administration made a subtle modification to residents’ permits—specifically to clause three of the permit conditions. That clause now reads:
“The holder of this permit is allowed to enter Israel, but only to the designated place and for the designated purpose.”
Crucially, the permit in question relates only to accessing these towns, not to entering areas inside the Green Line that Israel considers “state territory”.
What does that mean?
This seemingly simple sentence carries serious political and legal implications. It signals that Beit Iksa, Nabi Samwil, and Al-Khalaileh (Al-Jib) are now being treated as part of Israel—practically annexed to the state—viewed by the occupation authorities in the same way as Haifa, Akka, or Jaffa (occupied in 1948), and administratively akin to Jerusalem neighbourhoods annexed in 1967.
In other words, land has been annexed without the people: residents are treated like “foreigners” merely residing inside Israel due to specific political circumstances. Israel has, in effect, annexed these three areas without an official declaration.
The gravity is real, and the move carries far-reaching consequences, short- and long-term—especially if it passes quietly, without a proportionate local and international response.
A live rehearsal for wider annexation
This looks like a pilot project for future West Bank annexation—a key demand of the ruling religious-Zionist current in Israel, touted as a practical riposte to recent Western recognitions of the State of Palestine.
Here, Israel has quietly annexed the land of these three localities and is now watching: first, how Palestinians in the West Bank react; second, how global public opinion responds.
If there is no meaningful, practical pushback, Israel’s appetite will grow to replicate the move across the West Bank at a similar or wider scale.
Why Area (C)?
The first target would logically be Area (C)—under full Israeli administrative and security control—because it is low-density despite covering most of the West Bank.
- Area (C) accounts for over 60% of the West Bank.
- Its Palestinian population is no more than ~300,000 out of 3.4 million West Bank Palestinians.
Low density is partly because much of it is agricultural land, with portions in the West Bank desert and the Jordan Valley. One can imagine Israel’s appetite to annex over 60% of the land where less than 10% of the people live.
Opening the door to incremental annexation
We are witnessing a practical Israeli test of annexing West Bank territory and gauging the domestic and external costs. With this step, Israel has opened a dangerous door toward incremental annexation as a proclaimed response to international recognition of Palestine.
Netanyahu has even hinted at such a path—before leaving for the UN General Assembly—in what appears to be groundwork to coordinate the response with the U.S. administration, seeking to avoid a clash with a global public that is visibly shifting against Israel.
Why a proportionate response matters
The appropriate response must match the true scale of this move—not ignore or downplay it.
The occupation often makes small moves, then waits. If there is no response, it reads the silence as a green light for further steps toward its strategic agenda.
Right now, annexing the West Bank is a strategic file for the Netanyahu government—one it seeks to advance without short-term losses (e.g., derailing normalisation, complicating the Abraham Accords, or provoking further states to recognise Palestine, as happened recently with ten countries).
If the Israeli political echelon feels this step incurs serious immediate costs, it will be forced at least to delay annexation and open other fronts to hold the coalition together.
In all cases, any Israeli back-pedalling on files of confrontation with Palestinians—or on regional fronts—will shift the confrontation inwards, into a deeply divided Israeli society. This is precisely what Netanyahu seeks to avoid.
Israel is internally fractured and senses that time is not on its side. Forcing a retreat—particularly on the strategic file of West Bank annexation—would intensify internal Israeli contradictions, clearly favouring the Palestinian side.
The optimal path is to compel the occupation to retreat across multiple files and win the time battle.
Answering firmly to the annexation of these three localities near Jerusalem fits squarely within this equation.
Do Arab policymakers recognise this?
