As the war between Israel and the Axis of Resistance led by Iran enters its 23rd month, the traditional pillars of Middle Eastern politics and security have collapsed—ranging from the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, to the Taif Accord of 1989, and even the 1974 Disengagement Agreement between Syria and Israel.
At the same time, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in coordination with Washington, is pursuing an agenda to reshape the prevailing order in the Levant.
After suffering one of the most severe intelligence and military defeats in Israel’s history during the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation on October 7, 2023, Netanyahu declared what he called an “existential battle” with Iran and its allies, vowing to “change the face of the Middle East” in his speech before the UN General Assembly.
The central aim of Israel’s military campaign is to restructure the regional order by weakening or dismantling the Axis of Resistance, expanding the Abraham Accords, and advancing the “Imek Corridor” project to connect the Eastern Mediterranean with the southern Gulf.
But after the “modern war” of June 2025 between Tehran and Tel Aviv, Iran abandoned its previous strategy of avoiding direct entrapment and instead began restructuring its political and military command to face new Israeli threats.
It was in this context that Ali Larijani was appointed as the new Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and the Supreme Defense Council was created—two clear signals of Iran’s determination to restore deterrence. Larijani’s visits to Iraq and Lebanon underscored this policy, aimed at reviving and reinforcing the Axis of Resistance, as confirmed by Iranian officials, resistance leaders, and recent battlefield developments.
Reviving the “Ring of Fire” Around Israel
The U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Israel’s nuclear arsenal, and Washington’s strategic partnership with Tel Aviv all pushed Iran to seek balance through building and organising anti-hegemony forces under the Axis of Resistance, using the strategy of “asymmetric warfare.”
In the early years of this policy, Jordan’s King Abdullah II in 2004 warned of the emergence of a “Shia Crescent.” Israeli officials and think tanks instead labelled it the “Ring of Fire.”
This approach sought to keep the battlefield away from Iranian soil by exhausting U.S. forces on eastern and western fronts, while encircling Israel in a state of siege—using grey-zone attrition to prevent the Israeli war machine from advancing eastward towards the Levant and eventually Iran.
The 2006 Lebanon War (the 33-Day War) became a pivotal moment, as Hezbollah successfully halted Israeli advances and prevented the full occupation of Beirut, marking Israel’s first major setback. This proved Iran and the Axis could enforce a balance of deterrence and limit Israel’s ability to redraw borders at will.
Yet the Arab Spring complicated regional security. Arab states began to perceive Iran’s role—and even non-Arab actors like Turkey—as destabilising. This sense of threat crystallised in the 2020s through the Abraham Accords.
Resetting Resistance Ties with Local States
The “Ring of Fire” reached its peak during the Al-Aqsa Flood operation and the activation of the “Unity of Fronts” strategy:
- First Ring: Gaza and the West Bank.
- Second Ring: Lebanon and Yemen.
- Third Ring: Iran and Iraq.
From October 2023 to September 2024, the goal was to pressure Israel into halting the war on Gaza and securing a ceasefire. But the outbreak of the “Third Lebanon War” shifted the equation.
Netanyahu escalated with a high-stakes campaign of assassinations and massive airstrikes, inflicting heavy losses on Hezbollah’s political and military leadership. The fall of the Assad regime and disrupted logistical routes between Iran and Hezbollah further reshaped the northern front. Consequently, Hezbollah—after accepting the ceasefire and implementing UN Resolution 1701—found itself on the defensive, facing the challenge of disarmament within a Lebanese state-led settlement.
It was against this backdrop that Ali Larijani visited Baghdad and Beirut. His meetings with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam drew wide public attention. In a press conference, Larijani declared:
“I am Iran’s national security official, and I affirm that Iran does not seek to interfere in the affairs of other states, especially Lebanon. It is for the Lebanese state to engage all communities in dialogue to reach an agreement. Those interfering in your affairs are the ones who come from thousands of kilometres away to impose plans and timetables. We have not imposed any blueprint on you. Do not confuse friend with foe. The resistance is a national asset for you and for all Islamic nations.”
This statement marks a new phase in Iran’s relationship with the resistance axis—seeking to reduce the demonisation of its allies by portraying itself as a mediator that empowers Baghdad and Beirut to manage these forces.
In this framework, the Popular Mobilization Forces become part of Iraq’s official state structure, while Hezbollah is recast as a disciplined security-military arm under the Lebanese state, tasked with defending against external threats. The goal is not full integration or disarmament but to institutionalise these groups as vanguard forces working under state supervision while retaining readiness against Israeli aggression.
This approach builds on the spirit of the Beijing Agreement (March 2023) between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which fostered a new regional climate.
Will the Next War Ignite the Entire Region?
Iran’s allies had only limited involvement in the recent 12-day war, restricting Tehran’s ability to fully mobilise and preventing U.S. entanglement in another regional war. Yet the lessons of June 2025 pushed Iran to increase support for Hezbollah as a frontline force against Israel’s “existential threat,” while also supplying Yemen’s Ansar Allah with new missiles—reshaping the balance once again.
With the European troika activating the snapback mechanism to restore UN sanctions on Iran, the likelihood of a new round of Iran-Israel confrontation has risen sharply.
If Netanyahu embarks on another military adventure, the conflict could widen dangerously close to the nightmare of a full-scale regional war. Israel and its allies may try to pre-empt this by striking the Axis of Resistance’s arms in Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq before any direct clash with Iran begins.
Yet in the current phase of rebuilding and consolidation, time appears to favour Iran and its allies. Israel, sooner or later, will face a critical decision on whether to initiate the “second round” of this war.
