Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continues to widen military operations in Gaza, leaving the enclave in ruins as the United Nations formally declares famine. Yet questions remain: has the escalation eroded Hamas’ battlefield strength, or has it hardened it?
In a feature published by Foreign Affairs, researcher Leila Stewart of the Arab Centre for Studies and Research in Paris — and author of Hamas’ Foreign Policy: Ideology, Decision-Making, and Political Superiority — argued that the besieged movement in Gaza has dragged Israel deeper into a war it cannot win.
Ceasefire Acceptance Misread?
On 18 August 2025, Hamas accepted a ceasefire deal brokered by Egypt and Qatar. The proposal closely resembled earlier U.S.-drafted frameworks, which Israel supported but Hamas had previously rejected. It included the release of 10 out of 20 remaining Israeli captives in exchange for a 60-day truce. Unlike past negotiations, Hamas accepted the terms within hours, without demanding amendments.
Observers rushed to interpret this as weakness — or even desperation. But Stewart contends Hamas’ swift acceptance may be a tactical maneuver rather than a concession under pressure.
Despite nearly two years of devastating war, the movement has shown surprising battlefield resilience. While its political governance in Gaza has been severely weakened, its fighters have escalated attacks, targeting Israeli forces with increasing sophistication.
Rising Attacks in 2025
Since early 2025, Hamas fighters have launched intensified operations across Gaza. These included a large-scale assault on an Israeli base on 20 August, alongside deadly raids in June and July that killed multiple Israeli soldiers.
Hamas has also strengthened coordination with other Palestinian factions, even amid famine ravaging the population. This evolution in military approach, Stewart notes, raises the risk that Israel’s controversial plan to seize Gaza City could devolve into both a military disaster and a humanitarian catastrophe.
Strategic Vision and Regional Context
To understand Hamas’ survival strategy, Stewart emphasises examining how its goals have evolved since 7 October 2023. Hamas had initially expected its offensive to trigger broad regional uprisings, mirroring the mass mobilisations of May 2021 when Palestinians across the West Bank, Jerusalem, and within Israel rose up, and rockets were fired from Lebanon and Syria.
But nearly 700 days into war, that strategy collapsed. Hezbollah chose to contain, not expand, the conflict. By September 2024, it accepted an Israeli operation; by December, the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime cut off critical supply lines.
Meanwhile, Israel intensified airstrikes and limited ground incursions, depriving Hamas of opportunities to lead from the battlefield. Israel reoccupied swathes of Gaza, cut off aid, and unrest spread among the starving population — some directing anger toward Hamas.
Guerrilla Warfare Resurgence
In response, Hamas shifted tactics. On 20 April 2025, a small unit emerged from a tunnel in Beit Hanoun — a so-called “buffer zone” under Israeli control — ambushing a military vehicle with roadside bombs and rockets, killing one soldier and wounding others.
Similar guerrilla-style ambushes followed:
- 24 June (Khan Younis): Seven Israeli soldiers killed.
- 7 July (Beit Hanoun): Five killed, 14 wounded in a tank convoy ambush.
- 15 July (Jabalia): Three soldiers killed in an attack on an Israeli engineering unit.
- 22 July (Deir al-Balah): A Merkava tank and convoy were targeted.
By mid-August, as Israel resumed urban incursions, Hamas doubled operations in eastern Gaza neighbourhoods — al-Tuffah, al-Zaytoun, and Shuja’iyya. On 20 August, al-Qassam Brigades stormed a base in Khan Younis with at least 18 fighters using rockets and machine guns at close range — a rare, large-scale raid possibly aimed at capturing soldiers.
These operations, Stewart argues, reflect a tactical recalibration: exploiting Israel’s overstretched campaign while leveraging asymmetric warfare and intimate knowledge of Gaza’s terrain.
Israel’s Failures Above and Below Ground
Despite its overwhelming arsenal, Israel has struggled against Hamas’ adaptability. Fighters regroup in areas previously “cleared” by the Israeli army, launching ambushes in zones declared secure.
The vast tunnel network remains a decisive factor. Months of bombardment and advanced Western-supplied technologies have failed to destroy it. Hamas continues to hide captives, shelter fighters, and monitor Israeli forces underground.
Israel’s inability to dominate this subterranean battlefield underscores the asymmetry of the conflict: advanced Western weaponry versus local ingenuity — tunnels, ambushes, and improvised explosives.
Fearing new captures, the Israeli army invoked the Hannibal Directive in July — a doctrine allowing lethal force to prevent soldiers from being taken alive, even at the risk of killing them. Out of 205 captives released since the war began, only eight were freed through Israeli-U.S. operations — none from tunnels.
Israel’s Counter-Strategy: Divide Gaza
Facing persistent resistance, Israel has doubled down on brutal tactics: targeting displacement camps, schools, and hospitals since October 2023 to turn civilians against Hamas.
Since March 2025, Israel imposed an 11-week total blockade on aid, then created the so-called Gaza Humanitarian Foundation to control distribution. This resulted in massacres at food distribution points, with an Israeli soldier describing them to Haaretz as “killing fields.”
In parallel, Israel armed a militia in Rafah led by Yasser Abu Shabab, a drug trafficker who escaped Hamas’ prison in 2023. Backed by Fatah links, his militia looted aid convoys, fueling chaos. Netanyahu defended the move, saying: “What’s wrong with this? It saves Israeli soldiers’ lives.”
But in Gaza, the militia is widely despised, with even Abu Shabab’s family disowning him. Far from weakening Hamas, these actions have reportedly driven new waves of young Palestinians into al-Qassam ranks, many with no prior military training.
Hamas’ Endurance Despite Losses
Israel has eliminated top leaders — including Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Deif, and Marwan Issa — yet Stewart notes Hamas’ capacity to fight remains intact. Its hallmark ability to regenerate manpower continues, rooted in deep integration within Palestinian society.
For many Gazans, the war is seen as an extension of 1948, when 250,000 Palestinians were expelled into Gaza during Israel’s creation. That legacy of dispossession remains central: Gaza is not just a homeland, but a refuge.
As Hamas leaders emphasise sacrifice, they frame Gaza as the beating heart of the Palestinian cause. Former political bureau chief Khaled Meshaal compared Gaza to Algeria’s liberation struggle, where independence came only after a million martyrs.
Western media always sided with the apartheid zionist occupiers of Palestine manufacturing consent for them following their masters instructions