On the evening of January 16, 2024, as the sun set over the quiet Pakistani village of Koh-e Sabz in southwestern Balochistan, residents felt violent tremors. They saw unfamiliar objects streaking through what was usually a calm sky. Moments later, a modest mud-brick home lay in ruins — its owner mourning the loss of his two children, while his wife and three daughters were injured. A nearby mosque was set ablaze.
The next morning, Iran admitted responsibility, announcing that it had launched cross-border missiles into Pakistan’s Balochistan province, claiming it was targeting hideouts of Jaish al-Adl — an armed Iranian opposition group.
Within 48 hours, Islamabad retaliated with its missile and airstrikes on Iran’s Sistan-Balochistan province, saying it was targeting insurgents from the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Baloch Republican Army (BRA) — both armed separatist groups hostile to Pakistan.
It was the first time since the Iran–Iraq war that Iranian territory had been struck. While both sides insisted they were not aiming at each other directly — as all three targeted groups are considered “terrorist organisations” by both Tehran and Islamabad — crossing the other’s borders was seen as an extraordinary breach of red lines. The incident also reignited Pakistani attention on Zeinabiyoun Brigade — a militia formed by Iran’s IRGC from Pakistani Shia fighters for combat in Syria — which Islamabad formally designated a terrorist organisation in April 2024.
Ironically, the separatist movements at the heart of the clash draw from the same well of grievances: the marginalisation of the Sunni Baloch population split between Iran and Pakistan.
Balochistan: A Shared and Troubled Frontier
Balochistan spans both countries — Pakistan’s Balochistan province and Iran’s Sistan-Balochistan province — with a history shaped by Mughal rule, British colonialism, and eventual partition between Tehran and London during the colonial era. The Pakistani portion joined the state after independence from British India in 1947.
For decades, the Baloch have accused both governments of systemic discrimination, despite official denials. In Iran, grievances are fuelled by perceived sectarian marginalisation under Tehran’s rule, with Jaish al-Adl leading calls for autonomy. Tehran has long accused the United States of backing the group.
In Pakistan, Baloch grievances revolve around economic exploitation — accusing Islamabad of reaping wealth from the province’s resources and strategic location without fair benefit to its people. Groups like the BLA and BRA have attacked economic projects, particularly Chinese-led developments at Gwadar Port, a key hub in the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
From Border Clashes to Strategic Rapprochement
By early 2024, Balochistan seemed poised for disaster. Yet diplomacy moved quickly. In April, the late Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi visited Islamabad, meeting Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif to address border issues. They pledged to turn the frontier into a “market, not a battlefield.”
Raisi would not live to see the fruits of his visit — dying in a helicopter crash a month later — but the trip marked the start of serious cooperation. By July, Pakistan handed over a Jaish al-Adl member to Iran, and Tehran reciprocated by extraditing a Pakistani Baloch separatist. In November, the two countries jointly conducted an operation in Balochistan, killing 12 Jaish al-Adl fighters, according to the group’s statement.
Analysts noted that both sides had “moved past a major hurdle” in their relations, deepening cooperation despite historic mistrust.
Historical Highs and Lows in Iran–Pakistan Ties
The relationship has oscillated between alliance and suspicion. Under the Shah, Iran was the first country to recognise Pakistan in 1947, and the two were close U.S. allies during the Cold War, even collaborating to suppress Baloch separatism.
Tensions grew after Pakistan’s 1977 military coup and the 1979 Iranian Revolution, as Islamabad’s Sunni-oriented Islamisation clashed with Tehran’s revolutionary Shia model. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan widened differences — Pakistan backed Sunni mujahideen while Iran supported Shia militias.
Yet Islamabad maintained neutrality in the Iran–Iraq war, refusing U.S. and Gulf pressure to back Saddam Hussein. In the 1990s, ties improved under civilian governments, with notable gestures like Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warmly receiving Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.
Cooperation extended into the nuclear sphere, with Iran voicing support for Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 1998 and hinting at shared opposition to Israel’s undeclared nuclear arsenal. Allegations that Iran sought assistance from Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan were officially denied.
U.S. Wars, Separatist Resurgence, and the Jundallah Factor
After 9/11, U.S. “War on Terror” alignments placed Pakistan firmly with Washington, while Iran faced U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Baloch insurgency re-emerged in both countries.
During this period, Jundallah — a Sunni militant group operating in Iranian Balochistan — carried out deadly attacks. Investigations, including a 2012 Foreign Policy report, linked Israeli Mossad operatives posing as CIA agents to covert contact with Jundallah. After Iran executed its leader, Abdul Malik Rig, in 2010, the group faded, giving rise to Jaish al-Adl, which built ties with Kurdish separatists and ISIS.
Between 2019–2024, Jaish al-Adl attacks in Iran killed at least 70 security personnel, while the BLA killed over 100 in Pakistan, including Chinese workers, and the BRA killed dozens more.
Shifts in Global Alliances: China, the U.S., and the Opportunity for Iran
Pakistan’s once-reliable U.S. military aid has collapsed — from $1 billion annually in the early 2000s to just $140 million in 2024. Trump cut military assistance in 2018, accusing Islamabad of “lies and deceit.” Under Biden, Pakistan’s strategic relevance fell further, even as CPEC deepened Pakistan’s economic reliance on China, now its largest investor and arms supplier.
Iran, with its own strong China ties, has sought to capitalise on Pakistan’s reduced U.S. dependency, especially as India’s alignment with both the U.S. and Israel has deepened.
The Israel Factor and a New Regional Calculus
In June 2025, as U.S. President Donald Trump weighed joining Israel’s war on Iran, Pakistan’s Army Chief Asim Munir visited Washington — the first such trip in decades. He warned Trump that toppling Iran’s government could unleash armed chaos in Balochistan, empowering groups like Jaish al-Adl. He also cautioned against setting a precedent for nuclear strikes.
Simultaneously, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif told parliament:
“Israel has targeted Iran, Yemen, and Palestine. If the Muslim states do not unite now, each will face the same fate.”
At the UN, Pakistan’s envoy declared “firm solidarity with the brotherly people of Iran”, condemning Israeli aggression as a threat to the entire region.
Balancing Alliances and Preparing for Every Scenario
Islamabad remains interested in preserving channels with Washington, but also sees value in a stronger Iran partnership — especially to counter India and secure its CPEC lifeline. The shared cultural, religious, and political ties between Iran and Pakistan act as both a constraint against open hostility and a foundation for cooperation.
While a full strategic and military alliance remains unlikely without a major geopolitical shift, the shadow of Israel’s regional actions and the turbulence of U.S. policy have undeniably pushed Tehran and Islamabad closer — perhaps closer than at any point in recent history.
