In a politically sensitive moment in Lebanon’s modern history, the Lebanese government has taken an unprecedented step since the Taif Agreement: instructing the Lebanese Army to prepare an operational plan to confine all arms to the state, with a deadline set for the end of this year.
This decision, discussed in the latest cabinet session, was not a symbolic gesture or routine statement. It reflected a genuine shift in the official approach to the weapons issue, particularly in light of regional strategic changes and shifts in the balance of power both regionally and internationally. Most importantly, it directly aligns with the very mission for which the current government was formed.
Between Pressure and Guarantees
The government’s move followed sustained international and Arab pressure—led by Washington through its envoy, Tom Barrack—accompanied by a comprehensive 120-day, phased roadmap. This plan begins north of the Litani River. It ends only after weapons are collected from the Bekaa Valley and Beirut, in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal from occupied border territories and the launch of negotiations to demarcate borders with both Israel and Syria.
Notably, this approach—blending pressure with guarantees—elicited internal political engagement, even from figures historically aligned with what is known as the “Axis of Resistance.”
A major factor reinforcing this shift was the active role of Saudi Arabia, through special envoy Prince Faisal bin Farhan, who engaged directly with Hezbollah’s allies, including Gebran Bassil, Sleiman Frangieh, Talal Arslan, and the Tashnag Party.
These contacts were neither ceremonial nor diplomatic formalities. They carried a clear message: call publicly for weapons to be confined to the state and support the government’s decision. Early signs of this alignment are now emerging in statements from some of these leaders and MPs.
Hezbollah’s Calculated Response
Hezbollah understood that the state’s approach to the weapons question had entered a new phase. Yet its reaction was neither direct confrontation nor outright rejection. Instead, Deputy Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem delivered a speech positioning the resistance within the framework of the state. He stressed that its arms are not separate from Lebanon’s legitimate institutions and that both the Taif Agreement and the Lebanese constitution recognise the role of the resistance.
Crucially, his tone avoided escalation. He left the door open for dialogue, signalling willingness to agree on a national defensive strategy under presidential sponsorship, according to a domestic timetable rather than an externally imposed one.
Regional Shifts Redefining the Landscape
This internal Lebanese development cannot be separated from wider regional transformations that have reshaped the very structure of the axis on which Hezbollah relied for decades.
Iran is preoccupied with internal matters, recalibrating priorities after a prolonged war that drained economic and military resources.
Syria—once Hezbollah’s strategic depth—has entered a transitional phase, rebuilding ties with its Arab and international surroundings, focusing less on supporting armed factions and more on consolidating state authority and reconstruction.
As a result, the environment in which Hezbollah operated has fundamentally changed—and so has Lebanon.
Within this shifting reality, Hezbollah voices growing concern over the trajectory of the “new Syria” and its potential strategic threats. The collapse of old balances—particularly in the coastal and Sweida regions—and the rise of forces historically opposed to the “Axis of Resistance” raise pressing questions about the security of sectarian components in the Levant.
From this perspective, Hezbollah presents its arms not only as a resistance tool but also as a means of protecting minorities from projects of exclusion or domination. In its view, any Lebanese internal security or defence settlement must be tied to the regional context and to guarantees for these communities in the power structures of both Lebanon and Syria.
A Possible Strategic Repositioning
Some political circles quietly ask: is Hezbollah considering seizing this historic opportunity to redefine its place within the Lebanese state? Could it undertake a quiet strategic transformation—becoming a purely Lebanese political force drawing legitimacy from its popularity and history rather than its arms?
If realised, such a shift would not be retreat or surrender, but a realistic choice to preserve the party’s structure and ensure its continuity as a major political player.
The move from armed resistance movement to institutional political partner is not simple, given decades of sacrifice and regional entanglements. Yet today’s pressures and changes may render a “return to Lebanon” a matter of existential necessity rather than a political option.
Importantly, such a transformation would not exclude Hezbollah from influence—it could secure it a more entrenched role in Lebanon’s political system, through national partnership built on consensus rather than forced balances.
Dialogue as a Path to Integration
Hezbollah is aware that the international climate is moving toward closing open conflict files, and that the region is witnessing a systematic restructuring of the roles of non-state actors.
Its call for dialogue on a defensive strategy, and emphasis on consensus, could be an entry point to a broad settlement—gradually integrating Hezbollah’s arms into legitimate state institutions, in return for internal security and political guarantees, and perhaps even constitutional discussions to safeguard post-Taif balances.
However, there are real challenges. The Lebanese Army, tasked with drafting the disarmament plan, faces shortages in resources and equipment, requiring substantial international support to carry out the mission.
The absence of full national consensus could weaken the plan, especially if Hezbollah feels the process is one-sided or aimed solely at it. Any workable approach must address Hezbollah’s concerns and keep the door open for a settlement that preserves its role inside the state, not outside it.
The Arab Role as a Stabilising Factor
In this context, the Arab role re-emerges as a guarantor of stability. The current Saudi and Gulf stance is not aimed at escalation but at encouraging a unified national solution—ensuring state sovereignty while preserving Lebanon’s internal balances.
Recent Saudi efforts have shown the Kingdom’s continuing capacity to bridge gaps between Lebanese factions and bolster domestic consensus on sovereign priorities.
Lebanon stands before a historic opportunity to redefine the relationship between the state and the resistance within a national framework that protects institutions and adapts to changing realities. The road will not be easy—negotiations will be complex, involving internal and external compromises—but for the first time, it seems possible.
The goal is not to strip weapons by force or impose unilateral equations, but to build a gradual path toward integrating all state components, including armed ones, on the basis of partnership, dialogue, and shared responsibility.
In Lebanon, no one wins by knockout. Real victories are built through understanding, not confrontation. This moment—despite its sensitivity—may be a rare chance to consolidate the logic of the state without exclusion, and to reopen doors for a long-awaited national project that unites rather than divides.
