The “12-Day War” dealt a deep structural shock to Iranian decision-makers, experts, and the public alike. It exposed both the strengths and vulnerabilities of the Islamic Republic’s military, security, political, and economic systems in the face of what Tehran views as “existential threats.”
With the flames of conflict temporarily subsiding, Iran’s political leadership has chosen to implement structural and personnel reforms in its highest decision-making, operational, and executive institutions, citing the “new circumstances” and “imminent threats.”
In other words, the ruling elite in Tehran recognised the shortcomings of the existing structure—both in institutions and individuals—and moved swiftly to identify the points of failure and introduce changes aimed at confronting the next wave of potential attacks from Israel or the United States.
This course of action has particular weight given the assassination of numerous senior Iranian military commanders and nuclear scientists during the operations known as “Bloody Wedding” and “Narnia.”
A seven-point statement issued by the Leader of the Islamic Revolution on the 40-day commemoration of the “12-Day War” victims provided the first strong official signal of this direction. It addressed the people, the armed forces, the scientific elite, preachers and writers, the executive branch, the scholarly class, and the youth.
This article outlines the key transformations currently underway in Iran’s military, security, and political arenas.
1. New Faces in Military Leadership
The Israeli use of “surprise” in the “12-Day War” was a decisive factor in the killing of several top Iranian commanders in the opening hours of the confrontation.
According to preliminary assessments by Iranian security services and international relations experts, Israel’s terrorist operation combined satellite surveillance, electronic eavesdropping, human intelligence penetration, and artificial intelligence-based analysis.
Remarkably, in the lead-up to the 13 June attack, Israel’s Mossad contacted more than 100 senior Iranian officials and figures, threatening to leak information on their residences and family members—a bid that ultimately failed.
Ali Larijani, senior adviser to the Leader and a leading contender for the post of Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), confirmed this in a televised interview.
During the “Bloody Wedding” ambush, a number of Iran’s most senior commanders were killed, including:
- Mohammad Bagheri, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
- Hossein Salami, Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
- Gholam Ali Rashid, Commander of Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters (in charge of defence planning and implementation)
- Amir Ali Hajizadeh, Commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force
According to Israel’s Channel 12, a high-level IRGC Aerospace Force meeting held in an underground bunker in the first hours of the war was hit with precision strikes, killing most of those present.
In the wake of this disaster, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Ayatollah Khamenei issued a wave of new appointments:
- Abdolrahim Mousavi – Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
- Ali Shademani – Commander of Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters
- Mohammad Pakpour – IRGC Commander
- Amir Hatami – Army Commander
- Majid Mousavi – Commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force
However, Ali Shademani was killed by Israeli special forces only days after his appointment.
2. The Supreme Defence Council
On 10 May 1980, following the failed U.S. “Eagle Claw” raid on Tabas Desert, Iran formally established the Supreme Defence Council. Forty-five years later, and under Article 176 of Iran’s constitution, speculation has grown over reviving the council.
Media reports indicate that the council will be chaired by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and include:
- The Speaker of Parliament
- The Head of the Judiciary
- Representatives of the Leader in the SNSC
- The Minister of Intelligence
- The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
- The Commanders of the Army and IRGC
- The Commander of Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters
Noor News, close to former SNSC Secretary Ali Shamkhani, stated that the council’s creation is “a response to complex threats and the special conditions in the region” to strengthen focus and coordination in national defence policy.
The main challenge facing this new body lies in its structural relationship with the SNSC. Some Iranian elites worry about potential decision-making complications, lack of coordination, and even conflicting resolutions.
To address this, Tehran has decided the Supreme Defence Council will function as a sub-unit of the SNSC, with its decisions first reviewed by the SNSC and then submitted to the Leader for final approval.
3. The Return of Ali Larijani
After Iran’s Guardian Council disqualified former parliament speaker Ali Larijani from running in the presidential election, some political rivals considered his career finished, assuming he had exited the Islamic Republic’s power structure.
However, the resumption of indirect negotiations between Tehran and Washington—mediated by Oman—followed by the outbreak of the “12-Day War” paved the way for Larijani’s return, this time as a “voice of the system.”
Fifty days into direct military confrontation between Tehran and Tel Aviv, expectations are growing that Larijani will be appointed Secretary of the SNSC.
Such an appointment would signal the special trust the system places in Larijani and its intent to improve performance in managing any future conflict with Israel. Larijani’s track record in handling critical files such as the nuclear agreement and the strategic cooperation pact with China reflects the blend of diplomacy and pragmatic experience Tehran appears keen to utilise in the next phase.
Preparing for a Decisive Confrontation
The new appointments and structural reforms—both military and political—indicate that the Islamic Republic is positioning itself for a more effective and capable response to regional developments.
The formation of the Supreme Defence Council, combined with Larijani’s expected appointment to the SNSC after 670 days since 7 October 2023, points to a shift in Iran’s governance model towards prioritising military-security perspectives in countering Israel’s expansionist policies.
Against this backdrop, Tehran’s traditional allies, such as China and Russia, appear increasingly optimistic about playing decisive roles in the future of West Asia. Meanwhile, Gulf Arab states may find greater room to manoeuvre in mediating tensions between Tehran and Washington and in restraining the hard-right Israeli government led by Netanyahu.
It is a shame that the west has successfully kept islam divided into Sunni – Shi’a & thereby fragmenting our response. We are supposed to be one united Ummah which is what Prophet Muhammed (PBUH) established. The Qur’an does not mention anywhere sunni – shi’a & if we are to follow the teachings of the Quran, we hv to be a united front tackling a common enemy .