Details of the Game Between Washington and Israel with Hezbollah

The 1st of August 2025 marks a turning point for Lebanon and Hezbollah. During his first official visit to Beirut on 19 June 2025, amidst the Israeli war on Iran, U.S. envoy Thomas Barak formally requested that the Lebanese state develop a plan to disarm Hezbollah within four months, starting from 1 August and concluding at the end of November 2025.

In response, the Lebanese government is expected to convene a special session to deliberate the issue, amid significant internal division and diverging political views.

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President Aoun Reaffirms Military Sovereignty as Hezbollah Warns

In a speech delivered at the end of July, President Joseph Aoun reiterated that arms should be exclusively in the hands of the army and security forces, urging Lebanese political factions to “seize the opportunity and hand over their weapons sooner rather than later.” He also declared Lebanon’s intention to seek $1 billion annually over ten years to support its military and security institutions.

He affirmed that the Lebanese army had successfully extended its control over areas south of the Litani River—with the exception of territories still under Israeli occupation—and had begun collecting and destroying unusable weapons.

This statement contains several key messages:

• Hezbollah had already fulfilled its obligations south of the Litani by surrendering its weapons to the Lebanese state, in accordance with UN Resolution 1701 and the November 2024 ceasefire agreement with Israel following the war in support of Gaza.
• The Lebanese state is now pursuing full nationwide disarmament of Hezbollah, not as part of a ceasefire requirement, but as a direct response to U.S. demands issued by Thomas Barak in June.
• The U.S. demand was accompanied by both threats and incentives: a green light for Israeli military action if Lebanon fails to comply within the timeline, and economic promises—including the $1 billion in aid—as well as potential U.S.-facilitated support for post-war reconstruction.

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Hezbollah Rejects Disarmament Under U.S.-Israeli Pressure

In a firm response on 30 July, Sheikh Naim Qassem, Deputy Secretary-General of Hezbollah, made the party’s position clear during a speech marking the first anniversary of the assassination of its chief of staff Fuad Shukur, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike.

He stated:

“Anyone—whether local, regional, Arab, or international—calling for us to surrender our weapons today is serving the Israeli agenda.”

Sheikh Qassem accused U.S. envoy Barak of using threats to serve Israeli military interests, stressing that “the real and immediate danger is the Israeli aggression,” and that the priority should be halting this aggression, not aiding it by surrendering resistance arms. He described Israel’s continued occupation of five southern Lebanese positions as a precursor to expansion, not mere bargaining chips.

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Hezbollah’s Strategic Stance

This declaration reaffirmed Hezbollah’s complete rejection of the new U.S.-Israeli disarmament terms, even though the party had previously engaged in multiple dialogues with the Lebanese presidency about the so-called “national defence strategy.” That strategy proposed integrating the resistance’s capabilities into the national army structure—but only under clear conditions:

• Full Israeli withdrawal from all remaining occupied southern Lebanese points
• Release of all Lebanese detainees
• Cessation of all Israeli aggression on Lebanese territory

Israel has refused all of the above.

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Talks Collapse Amid Escalating U.S. Pressure

While earlier discussions between the presidency and Hezbollah were constructive, based on a mutual recognition that only internal dialogue—not foreign diktats—could safeguard national unity, recent U.S. pressure has soured the atmosphere.

In the most recent meeting with MP Mohammad Raad, head of Hezbollah’s parliamentary bloc, negotiations reached a dead end. Raad rejected any phased or gradual handover of Hezbollah’s heavy or strategic weaponry.

From Hezbollah’s perspective, the distrust of Israel stems from:

1. Israel’s non-compliance with the November 2024 ceasefire, despite Hezbollah’s one-sided implementation under U.S.-led monitoring.
2. Continued Israeli occupation of five southern positions and near-daily airstrikes across Lebanon.
3. Israel’s rejection of Lebanese calls for a southern withdrawal or a halt to aggression—core prerequisites for dialogue.
4. American obstruction of Lebanon’s use of Hezbollah’s defensive assets—like drones and advanced anti-tank missiles such as Kornet and Almas—even when surrendered. These weapons are destroyed rather than repurposed for state defence.
5. Washington’s conditional reconstruction aid, offered in exchange for compliance with Israeli terms—an arrogant proposition that renders Israel judge over Lebanon’s right to rebuild.
6. Hezbollah’s conviction that this disarmament demand is linked to Iran, and tied to broader efforts to reshape the Middle East under U.S.-Israeli design. Disarming Hezbollah would thus dismantle a core pillar of the regional resistance axis.

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The Worst-Case Scenario

Attention is now fixed on the Lebanese government’s imminent session dedicated to addressing U.S.-Israeli demands.

But Lebanon faces a no-win situation:

• Option 1: Agreeing to forcibly disarm Hezbollah would almost certainly ignite internal conflict and threaten the collapse of Lebanon’s fragile power-sharing system.
• Option 2: Opting for internal dialogue and gradual consensus may preserve domestic peace, but it risks angering the U.S. and Israel, who are demanding full disarmament by November 2025. Barak has already warned that Israel will act “as it deems necessary” if Lebanon fails to comply.

This crisis places Lebanon at a crossroads between internal strife and open Israeli aggression, both of which carry catastrophic risks.

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A Broader Geopolitical Game

The disarmament of Hezbollah is part of a wider regional effort involving:

• The neutralisation of Hamas
• The normalisation of ties with a “new Syria”
• Containment of Iran, which continues to resist pressures to alter its defence and foreign policy postures.

The United States appears increasingly determined to install Israel as the regional enforcer—a strategy rooted in the Abraham Accords and intended to free up American capacity to confront China and Russia.

In this context, Hezbollah’s weapons are not just a local matter. They represent a strategic obstacle to a vision of the Middle East tailored by Tel Aviv and Washington, where resistance is criminalised, and submission is rewarded with conditional reconstruction and false peace.