What Has Israel Done in Sudan?

In his memoirs, Joseph Lagu—a founding leader of the South Sudanese rebellion—recounts a striking event:

“At the Israeli embassy in Kampala, a message was handed to Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, congratulating him, his government, the ‘Chosen People’, and the children of Israel on their victory over the Arabs in the 1967 war.”

This quote is not simply a footnote in history. It is a window into a long-standing and deliberate Israeli policy in Sudan—one that spans decades, from the eve of Sudan’s independence in 1956 to the bloody conflicts still plaguing the country today.

Strategy Over Conspiracy: Understanding the Political Ecosystem

In political affairs, leadership demands a deep strategic awareness—one that grasps the complexities of domestic and international environments and is capable of shaping pragmatic responses. As German philosopher Ernst Haeckel once said, “Politics is applied biology.” Just as biology studies the environment to understand the growth of organisms, understanding the political environment is essential to navigating real-world power dynamics.

Yet the Arab world has for decades been trapped in a dangerous oversimplification: the “conspiracy mindset” that blames all internal failures on foreign plots. As Dr. Muhammad Al-Mukhtar Al-Shanqeeti warns, this mentality distracts from self-accountability and distorts rational analysis. In this article, we seek to move beyond conspiracy, without denying the real and documented role Israel has played, often as the “invisible hand” stoking conflict and division in Sudan.

The Hidden Hand: Israel’s Role in Sudan’s Endless Wars

Sudan has been locked in internal wars since 1955, even before it formally gained independence. Among the foreign powers involved, Israel has consistently played a central role, acting as the mastermind and instigator behind the scenes, driven by both strategic calculations and ancient religious myths.

Israel’s early interest in Sudan was not random. It was shaped by a mix of:

• Security concerns about Egypt’s southern flank;
• And mythological beliefs, including claims that the Ark of the Covenant was buried in Ethiopia, that Ethiopian rulers had Jewish ancestry from the line of Prophet Solomon, and that a lost Israelite tribe resided in South Sudan.

But beneath the mythology lies cold, calculated strategy. Israel’s founding Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, outlined the doctrine succinctly:

“We are a small people with limited resources. We must neutralise Arab power by identifying and exacerbating internal divisions—ethnic, tribal, and sectarian—so they become unsolvable crises.”

This doctrine became the backbone of Israel’s infamous strategy of “Peripheral Destabilisation”—an approach aimed at tearing apart the edges of Arab states. If a state like Sudan could be bled through ethnic and regional conflict, then it would be too weakened to support resistance movements against Israel.

From Doctrine to Operation: The Sudan Case Study

In a 1959 Mossad graduation speech, Director Meir Amit declared:

“To neutralise the threat posed by Arab nationalism, we must stir the psychological drives of non-Arab groups within Arab countries—especially in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Sudan.”

This philosophy would go on to guide Israeli operations in Sudan for decades. Consider the following:

1. The “Kivunim” Document (1983)

This classified Israeli policy paper presented to NATO outlined Israel’s view of Sudan as the most internally fragmented Arab country—home to Arabs, Christians, pagans, and various African ethnicities. It concluded:

“Countries like Libya and Sudan should not remain in their current form.”

2. Speech by Avi Dichter (2008)

The former Israeli Minister of Internal Security said:

“Sudan provided strategic depth to Egypt during the War of Attrition. We had to undermine it and prevent it from becoming a unified, strong state. This was essential to Israeli national security.”

3. Testimonies from Mossad Operatives

In books such as Mission of the Mossad in South Sudan by agent David Ben Uziel (“General John”) and Israel and the Liberation Movement in South Sudan by retired Mossad officer Moshe Verjee, detailed accounts confirm:

• Israel sent weapons, explosives, and military advisors to Southern rebels;
• It trained tens of thousands of fighters;
• It disrupted major infrastructure projects like the Jonglei Canal, which would have provided Sudan and Egypt with 5 billion cubic meters of Nile water;
• It encouraged secessionist nationalism, leading ultimately to the split of South Sudan in 2011.

Fragment Sudan to Neutralise Its Power

From these documents and actions, one conclusion emerges: Israel has long viewed Sudan as a strategic enemy. The objective has been to ensure that Sudan never rises as a centralised, powerful state capable of supporting anti-Israel resistance or contributing to Arab unity.

As Avi Dichter summarised:

“A fragile, fragmented Sudan is better than a strong, unified one.”

The goals of this policy include:

• Undermining Egypt by destabilising its southern neighbour;
• Igniting internal Sudanese conflicts—ethnic, tribal, and regional;
• Preventing Sudan from developing its vast natural resources;
• Exerting diplomatic pressure, especially through international institutions and Jewish NGOs that promoted the “genocide” narrative in Darfur, which led to Sudan being referred to the International Criminal Court.

The Abraham Accords and the New War

Following Sudan’s 2020 normalisation with Israel under the Abraham Accords, Israeli activity in Khartoum increased. Officially, the goal was to “help Sudan avoid Iranian infiltration” and gather intelligence on its defence industries. In reality, it was part of a deeper plan to divide Sudan even further.

When the war broke out between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Israel quickly offered mediation—then disappeared. Foreign Minister Eli Cohen stated that Israel was working to facilitate a ceasefire, yet no follow-up ever materialised.

According to Middle East Eye, Israel saw an opportunity in backing RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), who had already worked with Israel in Libya to suppress Islamic movements and had pledged to “dismantle Islamists within Sudan’s army.” Mossad delegations reportedly met with Hemedti in Khartoum as early as 2021.

Now, with the Sudanese army gaining the upper hand, Israeli media has shifted tactics—accusing the army of being “Africa’s Hamas” and warning of growing Iranian influence in Khartoum. This is a classic case of manufacturing justification for intervention, as described in the Zionist academic Edward Luttwak’s doctrine:

“Give war a chance.”

What Should Sudan Do?

Sudan’s leadership must radically reshape its foreign policy to expose and neutralise these subversive strategies before they destroy what remains of the state.

The Sudanese people—and their allies in the Muslim world—must rally behind legitimate national institutions, especially the army and the civilian government led by Dr. Kamal Idris. Internal unity and external clarity are essential to thwarting these designs.