On March 10, 2025, an agreement was signed between Syrian President Ahmad al-Shar’a and the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Mazloum Abdi, marking the beginning of an initiative to integrate Kurdish forces into the Syrian state.
A second meeting followed on July 9 in Damascus, attended by U.S. Ambassador to Ankara and Special Envoy to Syria, Tom Barak. This came after Kurdish factions publicly declared in June their demand for a “decentralised democratic state.”
While the Damascus–SDF negotiations faced increasing hurdles, a parallel crisis erupted in southern Syria, where Israeli-backed Druze militias, led by Hikmat al-Hijri, clashed with Arab Bedouin tribes in Sweida. These developments negatively impacted the Kurdish–Syrian talks and raised questions about Israel’s escalating interference in Syria’s internal affairs.
Israeli Airstrikes Fuel Kurdish Hesitation
As fighting intensified in Sweida and Israel launched airstrikes targeting Syrian army positions and the General Staff HQ in Damascus, SDF factions in eastern Syria began re-evaluating their stance. Some reconsidered their alignment with Damascus and moved closer toward Israel’s decentralisation agenda, which calls for the partition of Syria through regional autonomy projects such as the so-called “David’s Corridor.”
Although Turkey had prepared for a military operation against SDF forces after the fall of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, Ankara agreed to pause its offensive following assurances from Damascus. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan affirmed that Turkey would pursue diplomacy but warned:
“If negotiations fail, military action will be our only remaining option.”
March Agreement Satisfied Turkey—But July Meeting Collapsed
Turkey welcomed the March agreement between al-Shar’a and Abdi, as it aligned with Ankara’s stance that no armed non-state actor should operate along its borders unless fully integrated into the Syrian government.
However, the July meeting collapsed. Mazloum Abdi insisted on a decentralised political model, which Damascus rejected as a thinly veiled move toward partition. U.S. Envoy Tom Barak confirmed that serious disagreements over reintegration and territorial control remained unresolved.
The core divide lies in competing visions:
- Turkey, the U.S., and Syria advocate for a unified Syrian state.
- The SDF and Israel, however, favour a fragmented Syria with autonomous regions under indirect Israeli protection.
🇮🇱 Israel’s Role in Sweida: Destabilisation Through Proxy
The Sweida crisis, where Israel supports Hikmat al-Hijri’s Druze militia, has emerged as a flashpoint in Syria’s broader fragmentation. Armed clashes between Druze forces and Arab Bedouin tribes are being manipulated to implement Israel’s long-term project of a destabilised, divided Syria.
Media reports revealed that Syrian security forces withdrew from Sweida under a U.S.-brokered deal between Damascus and Israel. This emboldened the SDF to deviate from the March agreement.
While Israeli warplanes struck Damascus, SDF forces in Raqqa began military mobilisation, further eroding trust in the negotiation process. Although the SDF–U.S. alliance spans over 15 years, it is now evident that the SDF is drifting closer to Israel due to overlapping ambitions in Sweida and eastern Syria.
Israel–SDF Coordination: A Growing Threat
In a revelation reported by Israel Hayom, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar held a phone call with senior SDF official Ilham Ahmed on January 3, assuring her of Israeli support for Kurdish autonomy.
This growing alignment between SDF, Israel, and Hikmat al-Hijri’s militias is creating a strategic threat to Syrian unity and regional stability. It also undermines Turkey’s national security, which views any attempt to carve out autonomous Kurdish or Druze zones as a direct red line.
Turkey’s New National Security Doctrine
Turkey is now treating all partitionist movements in Syria, not just in the eastern Euphrates, as national security threats.
Foreign Minister Fidan declared on July 22:
“We are open to dialogue with all groups. But if you cross the line into partition and armed destabilisation, we will consider it a direct threat and intervene. Speak of your demands—but do not speak of division.”
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, returning from Northern Cyprus, echoed the message:
“Israel constantly tries to ignite the region. President Ahmad al-Shar’a showed strength in Sweida. We will not leave him alone. We do not support Syria’s partition.”
Turkey’s new doctrine means that any federal or semi-autonomous arrangement—in Sweida or the Kurdish northeast—will face Turkish opposition, including military intervention if necessary. This policy also poses a direct obstacle to Israel’s “David’s Corridor” and the SDF’s delaying tactics in merging with Damascus.
U.S. Policy: Aligning with Turkey and Damascus
Despite historical tensions, the United States is currently aligning more closely with Turkey and Damascus regarding Syria’s territorial integrity.
In a CNN Türk interview, U.S. envoy Tom Barak stated:
“The SDF is essentially the YPG and PKK. We have no commitment to support a separate Kurdish state.”
This marked a notable shift. While the U.S. had previously rejected Turkey’s view that the SDF is the PKK’s Syrian arm, Barak’s remarks suggest a change in tone, consistent with Turkey’s long-standing position.
He reiterated in a press conference in Washington last week:
“SDF has no option but to reach an agreement with Damascus. We do not support a divided Syria.”
