The twelve-day war between Iran and Israel lifted the curtain on a new chapter of the ongoing “shadow war” between Israel’s Mossad and Iran’s intelligence agencies.
Before 13 July 2025, the battleground between Tehran and Tel Aviv was mostly defined within the “grey zone,” where each side tried to exploit its strengths and target its enemy’s weaknesses to tip the conflict in its favour.
The Mossad — one of the world’s most formidable intelligence services, with a long history of assassinations, sabotage, and targeting sensitive sites across the Middle East and beyond — has been Israel’s main tool to weaken, contain, and disrupt Iran’s nuclear, missile, and regional capabilities.
In contrast, Iran’s security services — particularly the Ministry of Intelligence (VAJA) and the Revolutionary Guard’s intelligence arm — have formed a comprehensive defensive front to counter Mossad operations inside the country.
And while the military hostilities between Iran and Israel have temporarily subsided due to U.S. and Qatari mediation, the intelligence battle shows no sign of ending.
Iran’s Security Services: Dancing with Wolves
A week before Israel launched its “Rising Lion” operation against Iran, Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence issued an unprecedented statement announcing it had obtained “thousands of secret Israeli documents” through a complex operation.
According to Iranian state television, citing “well-informed regional sources,” Tehran acquired a huge cache of sensitive information and documents, including thousands of files related to Israeli nuclear facilities.
The statement clarified that the operation had been carried out some time ago, but that the authorities remained silent to ensure the safe transfer of the documents into Iran. Hebrew sources indicate the operation was executed in mid-2024.
According to Rafael Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran’s agencies gained information during this operation about the “Soreq” research reactor.
Israeli channel Kan reported that during the 20 months of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” battle, Iran’s security services used the dark web and social media networks to recruit a significant number of residents in the occupied territories, exploiting financial incentives and identity fraud.
In 2024 alone, the Shin Bet interrogated 650 people on charges of collaborating with Iranian intelligence. According to Hebrew sources, these recruits received training in gathering information, photographing sensitive sites, tracking key figures, locating them, and carrying out indirect security tasks, with full funding for these operations.
As for assassination attempts, although details remain scarce, security sources close to Tel Aviv indicated that Iran came close during the war to assassinating Israeli Defence Minister Yisrael Katz — but the Shin Bet managed to foil the attempt at the last moment.
Despite its failure, the indicators suggest that Iranian infiltration and security operations inside occupied Palestine have noticeably increased, contributing to a relative balance against Israel’s security apparatus.
Mossad: Get Up and Strike First!
Selling contaminated electronic parts to Iran or the joint Mossad–CIA cyberattack on the Natanz facility under the “Stuxnet” codename were not the last complex operations carried out inside Iranian territory.
Over the past two decades, Mossad, in coordination with allied intelligence services, has planted a vast network of operatives within Iran’s security and military infrastructure — collecting large volumes of sensitive information that allowed Israel to refine its strategic policies, disrupt forbidden equipment supply chains, and set the stage for potential direct operations inside Iran.
Yet, as Benjamin Netanyahu or David Barnea acknowledge, these operations are not always Hollywood “James Bond” stories. Mossad often exploits economic and security loopholes inside Iran.
For example, in the assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh — a top nuclear scientist at the SPND Centre under the Ministry of Defence — Mossad managed to smuggle advanced AI-enabled weapon components through a liquor smuggling network along Iran’s western borders.
After gathering information on his movements via an embedded agent, an ambush was set up in the Absard area where he was assassinated, on accusations of leading Iran’s nuclear weapons programme.
Other major Mossad operations inside Iran include stealing nuclear programme documents from a warehouse in the Turqozabad area. Mossad agents entered the country through a human smuggling network. After the theft, they created “artificial unrest” using local gangs to distract security forces, then successfully smuggled the documents through the northwestern borders.
Coinciding with the latest war, Time magazine published a report on Israel’s infiltration of Iran.
According to the report, since 2010, Mossad has targeted Iran’s nuclear facilities, missile sites, and drone factories — gathering precise intelligence that proved critical during sensitive political moments, such as negotiations under Presidents Rouhani and Raisi with the Biden administration to revive the nuclear deal, or when preparing a “military strike option against Iran.”
A Campaign Amid the Wars
On the other front, while Tehran focused on a “ring of fire” strategy encircling occupied Palestine, it was forced — due to Mossad’s persistent threats — to establish parallel units within state and military institutions to handle “countering Israeli espionage” internally and abroad.
Mossad’s activities during the latest military assault included: supplying tainted components for drone production inside Iran, sabotaging air defence system batteries, leveraging organised crime networks to insert fighters and weapons, using banned communication devices (such as Spike anti-tank missiles), recruiting agents to monitor political and military leaders’ headquarters, launching cyberattacks on banks (like Sepah Bank), targeted bombings against scientific figures, and recruiting foreigners for intelligence gathering and covert missions.
Despite the shock of the “Bloody Wedding” operation against military commanders and “Narnia” against nuclear scientists, Iran’s security agencies quickly identified weaknesses in their counterintelligence framework and launched an extensive crackdown on Mossad activities.
This counter-campaign included mobilising “popular defence” units to disrupt enemy operations, setting up expanded checkpoints nationwide, tracking suspicious drone manufacturing workshops, thwarting bombing plots in civilian areas, and reviewing VIP protection protocols.
This led to a significant drop in assassinations and sabotage during the war, signalling an evolution in Iran’s security performance against Mossad’s constant threats.
Who Is the Dark Knight?
The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union shows that a “shadow war” can be just as influential — if not more so — than conventional warfare. Since the fall of Saddam Hussein and the start of the “securitisation” of the Iranian file after the nuclear programme was exposed, the confrontation between Tehran and Mossad has steadily escalated.
From the assassination of Masoud Ali Mohammadi to the killing of Mohammad Mehdi Tehranchi, Mossad has proven that despite its adoption of modern methods, it remains loyal to its policy of targeting key figures.
The biggest challenge for Iran’s security services is whether they can penetrate occupied territories and establish a deterrent balance, while staying prepared for Mossad’s evolving tactics and innovations in eliminating Iranian scientists and commanders.
Whoever succeeds in deciding the “shadow war” will be the one to lay the foundations for the “new Middle East.”
