In the early hours of 22 June 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump announced the execution of a “very successful strike” on three major Iranian nuclear sites, claiming these facilities were completely destroyed and that Iran’s nuclear programme had been set back by years.
This was followed by a coordinated Iranian strike on Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, then a U.S.-brokered ceasefire between Tehran and Tel Aviv, with each side claiming victory.
Yet, just a week later, U.S. intelligence leaks began to reveal a very different picture: the strike had failed to achieve its strategic objectives, and Iran’s nuclear programme was not destroyed as Washington and Tel Aviv had claimed.
Regardless of how much weight one places on these leaks — which Trump and his administration worked hard to dismiss — there are undeniable facts:
Fact 1: Iran possesses around 408 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%, enough for about 12 nuclear bombs if enriched to 90%. Even at the current level, it could produce a “dirty bomb.”
Fact 2: Iran has tens of thousands of centrifuges capable of completing the enrichment process within weeks. These centrifuges are entirely Iranian-made, proving that Tehran has the technical knowledge and capacity to complete the full cycle of nuclear weapons production.
Fact 3: Iran has publicly acknowledged the development of eight (new) sites at various stages for enrichment or nuclear fuel production, keeping their locations secret — confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and later by President Masoud Pezeshkian, who stated, “There are alternative underground facilities that will become operational.”
Fact 4: An IAEA official revealed that months ago, Iranian officials led inspectors to a secret location beneath the heavily fortified Fordow reactor, located 800 metres underground. Inspectors could not precisely locate it due to the maze of tunnels — meaning the American bombs dropped had little impact beyond damaging surface entrances or some protective layers, without affecting the reactor core or the underground zones extending nearly a kilometre deep where Iran likely relocated uranium, centrifuges, and other critical parts.
Fact 5: Iran’s missile force — by the lowest intelligence estimates — includes around 3,000 ballistic missiles and, at the high end, tens of thousands of various rockets. According to the Israeli army’s own statements, about 400 missiles were fired at Israel during the conflict, indicating that Iran’s missile capability remains fully intact.
This is the reality that both the U.S. administration and the Zionist government know well, which explains the growing international scepticism about the success of the U.S.–Israeli strike — a scepticism grounded in facts that Trump’s team cannot spin away, no matter how they try to deflect.
Of course, Iran suffered losses too, and its nuclear programme was affected to some degree — but the declared goal of the Americans and Israelis was not achieved, and everyone knows it.
Why Was the War Stopped if Objectives Weren’t Met?
The immediate reason: Israel’s missile interceptor system was on the verge of depletion, which would have given Iran aerial dominance over occupied Palestinian airspace. Israel retained its own air superiority over Iranian skies via its fighter jets, but the Zionist home front’s capacity to withstand sustained Iranian strikes was rapidly eroding.
When the Israeli strike on Iran began, polls showed public support at 70–85%. In the final days, as material and human losses mounted, 65% of Israelis demanded a ceasefire, according to internal polls.
One can imagine what support levels would have looked like if Israel’s Iron Dome system ran out, leaving its skies wide open to Iranian missiles. The reality: Iran still can produce a nuclear bomb, and Israel faces an existential threat from both Iran’s missile arsenal and a potential surprise nuclear weapon.
This was reinforced by statements from the IAEA Director, ministers in Netanyahu’s government, and U.S. officials, all acknowledging that Iran could restore its nuclear project within a few months. That leaves Washington and Tel Aviv with two possibilities: either Iran can produce a bomb now and is just waiting for a political decision, or it will regain full capacity within months.
In both scenarios, according to U.S. and Zionist national security calculations, Israel faces a real existential threat.
Understanding the Players’ Behaviour
The failure to destroy or neutralise Iran’s nuclear programme is further complicated by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s deepening legal troubles, which could end his political career.
Netanyahu is currently on trial in three serious corruption cases involving bribery, breach of trust, and fraud, and has already begun giving testimony in court.
On 27 June 2025, Israel’s Central Court rejected his request to delay the trial for the second time. Then, on 29 June, it agreed to his request to postpone hearings, cancelling the sessions set for 30 June and 2 July.
To understand the personal dimension, consider that Trump has publicly said multiple times — most recently on 29 June — that Netanyahu’s trial “should be cancelled immediately, or he should be pardoned as a great hero who did much for the state.” Trump even threatened repercussions if Israel’s judiciary did not drop the case, saying, “The United States will not tolerate continuing to prosecute Prime Minister Netanyahu for corruption.”
Such blatant public pressure by Trump on Israel’s judiciary is unusual by any diplomatic norm, highlighting how Netanyahu’s legal battles directly influence the course of the wars in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran. Analyses pointing to the significant impact of Netanyahu’s legal file on these wars are no exaggeration.
Another crucial point is the exposure of Israel’s spy network inside Iran during the Iran–Israel conflict — a network built over years and now under intense pursuit by Iranian security services. This means Israel may have to act fast before its local agents are dismantled, which gave it its initial strong strike in the first place.
From a security perspective, both Zionist and U.S. national security are now facing a real Iranian threat. Netanyahu personally benefits from prolonging conflict to postpone his trial, using the ongoing war as a pretext to delay court sessions, citing “security priorities” — a tactic he has already used.
The war helps Netanyahu hold together his fragile coalition, which could collapse in peacetime, triggering early elections that he might lose.
More importantly, the war enables Netanyahu to project himself as a “war leader” defending Israel against existential threats, boosting his public image and reducing the impact of corruption charges — a classic “rally around the flag” strategy he has used successfully before.
A Renewed War Scenario is Likely
Given all this, a new Iran–Israel war is the most likely scenario in the coming months, possibly as soon as this summer.
Israel, having launched a major strike on a UN member state in violation of international law, faced no accountability — the attack was justified under U.S. cover, emboldening Israel to pursue further escalation. Impunity invites further aggression.
This next war may not start as the last one did — it could begin with covert Israeli operations inside Iran: assassinations or explosions in sensitive sites. Iran’s response will then determine the scale of escalation and whether a new regional conflict snowballs quickly.
