The war on Iran ended on June 24, after Washington carried out airstrikes on key Iranian nuclear facilities: Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow.
Following the conclusion of this twelve-day battle, a wide debate emerged in both the United States and Israel regarding whether the operation achieved its objectives. President Trump, notably, asserted on multiple occasions that Iran’s nuclear project had been destroyed, responding to security and media reports that questioned the impact of the American strike.
If a war is measured by its goals, Benjamin Netanyahu defined those as the elimination of Iran’s nuclear program, the dismantling of its missile capabilities, regime change as an outcome of the war, and a redrawing of the Middle East map.
None of these goals have been fully achieved. It remains difficult to definitively claim that Iran’s nuclear project was destroyed and rendered inoperable, let alone resolve the fate of 400 kilograms of enriched uranium.
In this context, Rafael Grossi, Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), noted that it is challenging to assess the extent of the damage to the nuclear facilities without physically inspecting them.
For its part, Iran pre-empted the IAEA by suspending its cooperation, accusing the agency and its director, Rafael Grossi, of colluding with Israel and paving the way for the attack on Iran.
This reality has made it difficult to accurately gauge the true level of damage to the nuclear program. At the same time, Tehran insists that it has secured its stockpile of enriched uranium, that it “will not abandon nuclear technology,” and that it can resume uranium enrichment swiftly if it chooses, according to Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi.
Propaganda Does Not Override Reality
Israel may declare victory and boast about it, but reality will override any claims if they are proven false.
Speaking before his cabinet on July 1, Netanyahu stated that Iran had sought to develop three strategies to confront Israel: building its nuclear program, establishing a missile system, and creating a regional axis of allies opposed to Israel.
This suggests that Israel, from this perspective, remains in the heart of the confrontation — not its end. It has not eliminated Iran’s nuclear program, nor has it dismantled its missile network, nor neutralised Iran’s allies and partners in the region.
While it is true that Israel has weakened Hezbollah in Lebanon, the group still exists and can rebuild itself structurally and militarily. Hamas, meanwhile, continues to fight with exceptional resilience despite the humanitarian catastrophe caused by the occupation’s ongoing assault on Gaza for the past 21 months.
In Iraq, the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) remain unharmed, and in Yemen, Ansar Allah continues to demonstrate its ability to influence global trade routes through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, pressuring Israel and supporting Gaza despite American and Israeli strikes.
The reality is that while Israel has scored significant gains against Iran, Tehran has not raised the white flag nor surrendered. It is expected that Iran will attempt to recover strongly from the Israeli assault, recognising the extent of threats to its national interests.
Path to Recovery
Israel’s airstrikes, which failed to decisively defeat Iran, will push Tehran to reassess its posture and build its strategic deterrent capacity against Israel along several expected tracks:
First: Fortifying its domestic front against external threats, relying on the solidarity and unity of the Iranian people — both opposition and loyalists — during the recent battle. This includes purging its institutions of spy networks and enhancing cybersecurity across its political and institutional structures.
Second: Maintaining its nuclear project and advancing its missile systems, which proved their effectiveness in the latest confrontation. Iran will also work to rebuild its air defence systems to counter Israeli air raids — a significant challenge given the complex calculations of its ally Russia, which is reluctant to anger Washington and Israel. This may compel Tehran to seek alternative sources.
Third: Strengthening its regional alliance network opposed to Israel, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the PMF in Iraq, and Ansar Allah in Yemen. The recent conflict demonstrated the vital role of Hezbollah’s strength; Israel might not have dared to strike Tehran had Hezbollah been as robust as before.
This direction is reinforced by Israel’s expansion toward Iran’s borders through normalisation deals and Washington’s efforts to reposition Israel within the Arab region by broadening the circle of normalisation with additional Arab states.
Fourth: Deepening ties with neighbouring countries, especially Pakistan and Turkey, which supported Iran’s right to defend itself, sensing the dangers posed by Israel’s ambitions to reshape the region’s balance of power and political geography.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s remarks about Ankara seeking robust defensive capabilities against any potential provocations reflect Turkey’s concern about the consequences of the war on Iran and the possibility of its interests being targeted in the future, especially amid eroding trust and political tension between Turkey and Israel due to Ankara’s support for Palestine and its growing influence in Syria.
Preparing for Another War
Given that Israel launched its attack on Iran for reasons that still exist — and to achieve political and military goals that remain unmet — a second Israeli assault on Iran is possible and expected.
Netanyahu’s claim of victory over Iran does not necessarily reflect the actual Israeli position or its security assessments regarding the achievement of its objectives.
In its political doctrine, Israel does not accept Iran — or any Arab or Islamic country — possessing a nuclear project or a military capability that could rival its own in the region.
This is reminiscent of what happened with Iraq, which was invaded and destroyed under the pretext of possessing weapons of mass destruction. The real objective was to eliminate Iraq’s power as an Arab state opposing Israel.
Israel may view the current situation as an opportunity to launch another strike against Iran before Tehran can rebuild its capabilities and readiness for any future conflict. This depends on two factors:
First: Israel’s internal and military readiness.
The pause in the war on Iran gives Israel a chance to address weaknesses exposed during the previous battle, replenish suitable weapons, and restock its ammunition supplies.
In this regard, it is notable that Washington recently approved a $510 million deal to supply Israel with additional munitions. Moreover, Netanyahu may capitalise on the current level of public support for him in Israel, boosted by the recent strikes on Iran, to justify another assault.
Second: President Trump’s approval.
According to a Quinnipiac University poll conducted after the war on Iran, a vast majority of Republicans supported the United States joining Israel in military strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites — with 68% of those aged 18 to 49 and 87% of those aged 50 and older in favour.
This majority reassures President Trump, who had previously worried about alienating his base, which elected him under the banner “Make America Great Again” — focusing on economic growth and avoiding costly wars.
Whether Netanyahu and his team can convince Trump that another operation against Iran will not threaten Gulf energy sources — which account for 20% of global supply — and that it will be swift and decisive enough to bring Iran to the negotiating table without major repercussions for the region or the global economy, remains to be seen.
It is not far-fetched to consider that reviving negotiations with Hamas and the Palestinian resistance in Gaza — and seeking a 60-day truce with the hope of reaching a permanent ceasefire — may be intended to ease international pressure on Israel for its crimes in Gaza, while allowing it to refocus its military operations on Iran.
Netanyahu’s decision to move up his visit to Washington from the end of July to the beginning of its second week suggests an urgent high-level meeting.
This rushed visit is likely less about discussions over Gaza and more connected to talks on Iran, its nuclear and missile programs, regional alliances, and Israel’s political relationships in the region — including the possibility of expanding normalisation with more Arab states.
Netanyahu’s trip will carry regional implications related to completing the tasks of redrawing the Middle East, within a context where Washington plays the “peacemaker” while Israel, the “iron fist,” enjoys the backing of a superpower whose president believes he is fulfilling divine prophecy in support of a “Greater Israel.”
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