An analysis published by the Hebrew-language newspaper Makor Rishon, authored by Eli Klotshtain from the Misgav Institute for National Security, raises serious questions about Israel’s ongoing failure in Gaza. Over a year and a half into its war, the occupation has yet to achieve its primary objective: the elimination of Hamas. This failure stands in stark contrast to its recent strikes on Hezbollah in Lebanon, which the author views as comparatively more successful.
In the study, translated by Arabi21, Klotshtain highlights the strategic, geographic, and political differences between Israel’s northern front with Lebanon and its southern front with Gaza. He particularly emphasises the contrasting dynamics in terms of objectives, terrain, internal politics, and the issue of prisoners of war.
A War Against Time
According to Klotshtain, Israel’s drawn-out campaign in Gaza has now entered its twentieth month, and time is no longer on its side. The war is exhausting Israel’s home front, depleting its reserve forces, eroding public morale, damaging the economy, and undermining the credibility of its political leadership. With each passing day, the Israeli public’s capacity for endurance weakens—raising the question: How did the army reach this impasse while time slips away?
Lebanon vs. Gaza: Similar Beginnings, Diverging Outcomes
The question becomes sharper when one compares the prolonged fighting in Gaza with the relatively brief engagement in Lebanon. “How could the Israeli army quickly neutralise Hezbollah, considered the most powerful non-state actor in the Middle East, yet remain mired in Gaza, facing a supposedly weaker adversary like Hamas?”
Both fronts erupted on October 7 and 8, 2023. In each case, Israel was confronted by Iran-backed Islamic resistance movements. In both cases, it sought to decapitate their political and military leaderships.
Yet, significant differences exist between the two theatres—ranging from Israel’s military preparedness to the very objectives set by the occupation. Notably, Israel had long anticipated a conflict with Hezbollah and spent years preparing for it, learning from the failures of the 2006 Lebanon war. It developed detailed scenarios, intelligence networks, and operational plans.
In contrast, Hamas was consistently treated as a problem to be managed through short-term operations, temporary understandings, and economic incentives. The goal was not outright defeat, but rather containment.
Operational Disparities and Tactical Misjudgments
This is not to say that Israeli intelligence ignored Hamas altogether. In May 2021, the occupation launched a high-profile strike on Hamas’s underground tunnel network—dubbed the “Metro.” However, Israel largely relied on maintaining calm in Gaza through economic concessions and “prosperity incentives.”
Operationally, the two resistance movements present very different challenges. Hezbollah, in recent years, has adopted many features of a conventional army—making its strategic assets and command structures more identifiable. In contrast, Hamas operates through flexible brigades and underground networks, making its fighters far more elusive.
Geographically, Gaza is a narrow, sealed-off strip. To the south, it borders Egypt—whose government has been reluctant to open the Rafah crossing. To the west lies the Mediterranean Sea, while Israeli control surrounds it to the north and east. Palestinians have nowhere to flee. No state allows them to leave.
In Lebanon, by contrast, civilians in the south were able to evacuate to safer regions during the conflict, avoiding the brunt of Israeli bombardment and ground incursions.
Different Wars, Different Goals
Another key distinction lies in the objectives of the respective campaigns. In Lebanon, Israel did not seek to eliminate Hezbollah but merely to push its forces away from the border, re-establish deterrence, and allow northern settlers to return home. Even after the ceasefire, Israel limited its presence to five strategic points near the border.
In Gaza, however, the declared goal is far more ambitious—what Israel calls “complete victory.” This includes dismantling Hamas as a military force, disarming its fighters, eliminating its leadership, or forcing them into exile. So far, none of these objectives have been achieved.
Hamas Weakened, But Far From Defeated
The political fallout also differs between the two arenas. In Lebanon, the 2023 war destabilised the existing political balance, prompting the reassertion of state institutions in Beirut. But in Gaza, there is no viable political alternative to Hamas. The Palestinian Authority is viewed by Israel as an inadequate replacement. And in the absence of an international administration, there is no serious contender for governance in the Strip.
There is also a divergence in international perception. The war in Lebanon did not capture global legal or media attention. In contrast, the Palestinian struggle has gained international legitimacy, especially as the world witnesses the brutality of the Israeli occupation in real time. Protests, court filings, and diplomatic pressure have intensified. Global sympathy now leans heavily in favour of Gaza—undermining Israel’s initial public support at the war’s outset.
Klotshtain warns that war cannot be measured in binary terms—victory or defeat. Israel’s leadership, he argues, erred by framing its objectives in Gaza as an all-or-nothing scenario. The attempt to define “victory” solely in terms of Hamas’s annihilation has backfired. In truth, victory is an elusive concept—more complex than a simple yes or no.
