The Economist magazine emphasized that the Israeli occupation army has adopted a risky strategy of territorial expansion, which is evident in Syria, Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, and the occupied West Bank.
The magazine’s report noted that the second phase of the ceasefire in Gaza, which was meant to officially end the war between Israel and Hamas, was supposed to begin on March 2. However, Israel refused to start the talks it had committed to in the January agreement. Instead, Israel is demanding an extension of the first phase of the ceasefire, asking Hamas to release the remaining 59 prisoners. To exert more pressure on Hamas and to force acceptance of the modified agreement, the Israeli state has blocked humanitarian aid from entering the war-torn Gaza Strip.
The magazine views the disruption of the ceasefire as part of a broader strategic shift, with the Israeli army seeking to maintain extensive territorial presence, including in areas outside Israel’s control. Israel has begun creating what it intends to be “undefined buffer zones” on four fronts: in Gaza, along the borders with Lebanon and Syria, and in the West Bank.
The magazine points out that this move is driven by the chaos in these areas, as well as the ongoing shock from the Hamas attack in October 2023, and the pressures from the right-wing parties within Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition. The expansion is further fueled by the confidence Netanyahu derives from the administration of Donald Trump, which has shown no signs of restraining Israel’s territorial expansion.
The magazine also notes that the Gaza ceasefire is not the only agreement with Israel that has collapsed. According to the U.S.-brokered ceasefire terms between Israel and Hezbollah, which had controlled parts of Lebanon until its war with Israel last year, Israeli forces were supposed to leave Lebanese territory by the end of January. However, Israel requested an extension until the Lebanese army could secure the area. Even after the February 18 deadline passed, Israel remained stationed at five fortified positions in southern Lebanon.
Israel justifies this delay by claiming the need to protect Israeli settlements near the border with Lebanon. The return of Hezbollah fighters to the south could easily pose a threat again. The Israeli government states that the army will vacate these positions once it is certain that the Lebanese army can secure the borders and prevent Hezbollah from entering, but it remains unclear whether the Lebanese forces are capable of this task.
Furthermore, in the Golan Heights, which Israel occupies in Syria, the ceasefire agreement with Syria, signed in 1974 under Hafez al-Assad’s regime, also collapsed. After opposition forces ousted Bashar al-Assad’s son in December 2024, Israeli forces crossed the border into the Golan and occupied Syrian lands. Israel initially justified this move by stating that no recognized forces were present on the border.
According to the report, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham established a government in Damascus, but it has not yet established control over all of Syria, which remains active with competing groups. The Israeli army began constructing permanent sites in Syria.
On February 23, Netanyahu stated that Israel “will not allow Hayat Tahrir al-Sham or the new Syrian army to enter the region in southern Damascus,” calling for “the complete disarmament in southern Syria in the provinces of Quneitra, Daraa, and Sweida from the new regime’s forces.”
Finally, Israeli forces have circumvented previous agreements in the Palestinian cities of Jenin and Tulkarem in the occupied West Bank, where an estimated 40,000 civilians were forced to leave their homes due to ongoing Israeli operations. The two cities are part of “Area A,” which was designated for Palestinian Authority control under the Oslo II agreement in 1995. On January 29, Israeli Minister of War Yoav Gallant stated that “once the operation is completed, Israeli forces will remain in the camp to ensure that terrorism does not return.”
Israeli security officials say that the events of the past 17 months mean that Israel is forced to adopt what is called a “different risk management strategy,” meaning that it will act not based on what its intelligence estimates its enemies plan in the short term, but on their potential capabilities.
Currently, the expansion of the Israeli army’s presence may be sustainable without violent backlash. Hezbollah and Hamas are in a state of stagnation after Israel’s devastating campaigns in Gaza and Lebanon.
The Damascus government has other priorities, focusing on avoiding the collapse of the Syrian economy and preventing the country from sliding into chaos or civil war. Gaza remains the primary concern; Hamas may not be worried about resuming the war as it reasserts civil control over the strip and rebuilds its forces weakened by the conflict, according to the report.
However, if the group continues to reject changing the terms of the agreement, Israel is preparing to launch a massive new offensive in Gaza. According to Israeli officers, as reported by the magazine, this could pave the way for the plan first announced by Donald Trump to remove the population of Gaza and build a “Middle Eastern Riviera.”
The report states that no decision is expected until Trump’s envoy, Steve Wittekov, returns to the region to seek a new agreement. However, the risks of war seem real.
The magazine concludes that expanding Israel’s presence on these fronts will be costly in the long term. On one hand, maintaining an Israeli presence gives Hezbollah a pretext to retain its military capabilities despite pressure from the new Lebanese government to disarm it.
For Israel, the burden of maintaining this broader presence will be high, both financially and in terms of keeping levels of mobilization among reservist soldiers, many of whom are on their fourth period of service since the Gaza war began.
It also depends on continued support from the Trump administration, which has a reputation for volatility. Expanding Israel’s footprint and occupying more Arab lands opens a range of exceptional opportunities for Israel but also exposes it to significant risks.
Since signing its first treaty with an Arab state, Egypt, in 1978, Israel has worked to balance military deterrence with diplomatic maneuvering. This treaty, along with one with Jordan, has endured through regional events.
The new governments in Syria and Lebanon are eager to engage with the West and prove that they are no longer safe havens for Iranian-backed proxy groups. Thus, continued occupation of their lands may not be a good starting point for improving these relations, according to the magazine.
