Jordanian official media published minimal news about the recent visit of Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa to Amman.
King Abdullah subsequently issued a statement condemning Israeli air strikes in Syria and expressing support for Syria’s territorial integrity in the face of Israeli occupation. He also backed the voluntary return of Syrian refugees to their country.
But Jordanian media did not highlight the key discussions and crucial issues regarding southern Syria that were presumably the main focus of Sharaa’s visit, including Israel’s occupation of large areas of Syria’s south, the unique military and political conditions in that area, and relations with the Druze.
Sharaa’s visit to Jordan was likely prompted by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent assertion that Israel would not allow his ruling group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), to establish a presence in southern Syria.
Statements from other Israeli officials have indicated that Israel would work to guarantee the rights and safety of Druze communities, and even Alawites on the coast. This points to a dangerous Israeli agenda concerning Syria’s future, alongside the possibility of sectarian statelets – an outcome favoured by the Israeli right.
Sharaa’s visit to Amman came in this sensitive and critical context of shaping Syria’s future. According to Jordanian diplomatic sources, the issue of southern Syria had been raised in several key meetings between Jordanian and Turkish officials after the fall of the Assad regime.
Jordanian Crown Prince Hussein bin Abdullah met Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan shortly before Sharaa’s visit to Amman. It is likely that the Turks advised Sharaa to visit Jordan and coordinate on arrangements for southern Syria, particularly concerning Sweida province, the Druze community, and Israel’s broader agenda in the region.
Maintaining stability
This raises a critical question: to what extent is Jordan willing to play an active role in southern Syria if requested by HTS? This could involve influencing the Druze, maintaining stability in Daraa, or – most crucially – establishing a military and security presence in the south along the Syria-Israel border.
This would counter Israel’s justification that it does not trust HTS and is concerned about Hamas or Islamic Jihad activity in the region, fearing a replication of the Gaza model. If Jordanian forces were to ensure border security at the request of HTS, this could serve as a significant counterweight to Israeli propaganda and regional and international agendas, while also reinforcing Syria’s territorial integrity and security.
At various points in history, Jordan has declined to take any military or security role in Syria – but the situation today is different. Such a role, if requested by HTS, could be essential for protecting Jordan’s strategic interests and national security.
This issue is closely tied to Syria’s territorial unity, the presence of a friendly administration in Damascus, facilitating the return of Syrian refugees to the south, and ensuring Israel’s withdrawal, which would also secure Jordan’s access to crucial water sources in the Yarmouk basin and Unity Dam.
Jordan enjoys strong and warm relations with many communities in southern Syria, particularly the Druze and Arab tribes. This trust can be leveraged in coordination with Damascus to counter Israel’s dangerous project in the south.
While Jordan might have a longstanding principle of avoiding conflicts beyond its borders and a hesitancy to deploy forces abroad, its future involvement in Syria could be legitimised if an agreement were to be reached with Damascus, and supported by Turkey and other regional states.
Time is a critical factor. If King Abdullah and Sharaa did not discuss Jordan’s potential role in southern Syria during their recent meeting, then such talks should be expedited, even if this happens indirectly through Turkey.
This is vital to counter the political narrative promoted by the Israeli right in the US, and shared by the Trumpists, that portrays HTS as an extension of al-Qaeda and suggests that minority groups in Syria are at risk. If Jordan remains passive or slow to respond, there could be severe consequences – not just for Syria, but also for Jordan’s national security.
