The Assad regime in Syria has collapsed – a denouement as inevitable as it is instructive.
After 11 years of armed Syrian opposition against the regime, the government fell in just 11 days.
This fall, however, was not a solitary event. It signified the unravelling of a broader network of actors who had anchored their interests to the regime, only to find themselves ensnared in its collapse.
Undoubtedly, there will be attempts by certain actors to erode this hard-won victory, to sow discord and undermine the new political order in Damascus.
A decade ago, from the outset of the Arab uprisings, Assad’s regime resembled a junk bond – an overvalued, high-risk liability.
Those who invested in this toxic political asset sought short-term gratification through pyrrhic victories against defenceless civilians and fragmented, weak opposition.
Profound miscalculations
By 2015, the Syrian opposition, despite setbacks, began to regroup. In northern Syria, fragile stability emerged from the rubble of chaos, paving the way for a tentative order.
The Astana Process in 2017, despite repeated violations by Russia and Iran, established a precarious ceasefire that afforded the opposition critical time and space to reorganise. With administrative capacity and know-how transfer from Turkey, the opposition constructed rudimentary governance structures.
Meanwhile, the United States, Russia and Iran miscalculated profoundly by failing to transform Astana and other deals from a de-escalation mechanism into a platform for political resolution.
This oversight not only depleted Bashar al-Assad’s remaining resources, but also allowed the opposition to refine its strategies and grow in strength.
The forces propping up Assad – each pursuing divergent interests – unintentionally facilitated his downfall.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Israel’s massacres in Gaza and escalated bombardments in Lebanon, the United States’ entanglement in northeastern Syria with the PKK and its political instability at home, and Iran’s missteps following the assassination of Qassem Soleimani collectively disrupted the equilibrium that sustained Assad’s machinery of repression.
By 2024, the Syrian opposition capitalised on these geopolitical shifts, launching its first significant advance toward Damascus after years. Worn down by decades of autocracy, Syrians rallied behind the opposition, exposing the regime’s hollowness and irrelevance.
The collapse of Assad’s government not only dismantled the actors who had invested in its survival but also struck a blow against the very foundation of minority rule in Syria and the region.
Role of PKK
Yet not all external powers appear to have internalised this reality.
The US, for example, has sought to replicate elements of Assad’s minority rule model in northeastern Syria, partnering with the Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK) – a group designated by Washington itself as a terrorist organisation.
Under the guise of countering the now-defunct Islamic State (IS) group threat, the US has supported an untenable governance structure in a region inhabited by fewer than 20 percent of Syria’s already small Kurdish population.
This project, encompassing nearly a third of Syria’s territory and its energy resources, is as unsustainable as Assad’s own state. Whether this approach shifts under a Trump administration remains uncertain, but the prospects for legitimacy are dim, given the exclusion of millions of Arabs, Kurds and Turks from its framework.
A US withdrawal from Syria under a Trump administration could lead to a less violent resolution, though this hinges on unpredictable variables, particularly the PKK’s behaviour.
Alternatively, continued US support for a PKK autonomous zone would prolong any conflict.
However, this conflict would not resemble the preceding decade. Sustaining an unpopular administration through force would invite fierce resistance from the local population.
The existence of the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) further complicates matters. The “Syria” in the abbreviation SDF has effectively ceased to exist, and its “democratic” character was always imputation. With Arab factions systematically withdrawing, the group’s viability as a “force” is now entirely undermined.
Israel perpetuating instability
Israel, meanwhile, has viewed the possibility of a democratic Syria with mounting trepidation. For Tel Aviv, the emergence of a democratic wave within or around Palestine threatens to expose the nature of Israel’s apartheid and ethnocratic state.
In a region defined by democratic norms, Israel’s military dominance and its unparalleled western support risk becoming untenable. This fear – not any credible threat from Assad’s dysfunctional military capacity – has driven Israel’s latest intensifying military campaigns in Syria.
By perpetuating instability, Tel Aviv seeks to delay the emergence of a stable and democratic Syrian state, calculating that chaos aligns with its strategic interests like in the past.
Russia, consumed by its confrontation with the West in Ukraine, has shifted its attention away from Syria, leaving behind the wreckage of years of misguided investments.
For Moscow to recover, it must craft a coherent strategy for the Middle East, one that includes a pragmatic approach to Syria in alignment with Turkey. Without such recalibration, the naval base-centric vision that has guided Russia’s Syria policy will yield little more than diminishing returns.
Iran faces an even more profound reckoning. By tying its presence in Syria to Assad’s survival, Tehran has incurred enormous strategic costs. Its complicity in Assad’s repressive apparatus stands as a historic miscalculation.
Had Tehran embraced the wave of change that swept the region in 2011 rather than aligning itself with reactionary forces, the Middle East – and Iran’s role within it – might have evolved dramatically.
This short-term strategy has evolved into a long-term liability, draining Iran’s economic and diplomatic capital.
Proactive engagement
For Turkey, restoring stability and addressing security threats remain paramount after a decade of immense costs.
No regional relationship rivals the depth of Turkish-Syrian ties, which have shaped Ankara’s response to the conflict.
Over the past decade, Turkey provided education, healthcare, humanitarian aid, banking, trade, and other services, to a number of Syrians, rivalling those under Assad’s control.
While these efforts alone cannot rebuild Syria, they provide a critical foundation for reconstruction.
Ankara believes that dismantling the PKK’s autonomous zone is equally critical. The geographic, demographic and security conditions necessary to sustain such a zone simply do not exist.
Turkey’s proactive engagement is indispensable in charting a path toward a stable and peaceful order in Syria.
For more than a decade, the perception in Ankara was that regional actors had sought to counterbalance its influence, imposing costs that have tested its resilience.
Yet Turkey’s capacity to rapidly mobilise expertise and resources stands out as the most pragmatic route to restoring stability.
This approach not only aligns with Turkey’s geopolitical imperatives but also serves the broader goal of fostering regional peace.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Sunna Files Website.
