It is no longer surprising that Bashar al-Assad’s regime remains silent in the face of repeated Israeli attacks, bombings, and targeting across Syrian territories. This has been the norm whenever the occupation army deems a target along the coast, in the heart of the country, or on international borders with Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey to be destroyed, time and again. The standard here is both simple and broad: neutralizing Iranian military influence, equating the “Revolutionary Guard” with Hezbollah fighters and dozens of sectarian militias loyal to Tehran’s Supreme Leader.
However, this long-standing and sustained silence from the regime, now familiar to its sponsors and allies before its adversaries and opponents, took on a scandalous nature after October 7, 2023, following the “Al-Aqsa Flood” and the beginning of Israel’s genocidal war against the Gaza Strip.
This silence also raised questions, doubts, and even some expressions of discontent, especially as Israeli assassinations of high-ranking members of the “Revolutionary Guard” on Syrian soil increased. It seemed as though Israeli intelligence was relying on precise support from agents within the regime’s institutions. After the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah and senior leaders of Hezbollah, it became justifiable for some factions within the “Axis of Resistance” to express, either implicitly or explicitly, a tone of reproach or blame, hinting that Assad was ungrateful, having forgotten the blood of the Iranian and allied militias that was spilled defending his regime.
This scandalous aspect of the regime’s conduct evolved further when the Israeli occupation army began operations in the occupied Golan, including demining activities extending 700 meters into Syrian territory, on the slopes of Mount Hermon. They also bulldozed agricultural lands, completing what is known as “Sufa Road 53,” which stretches 60 km from the northern Quneitra area to Syria’s border with Jordan, with some parts extending as deep as 1,000 meters.
The occupation forces’ bulldozers dug trenches and erected earthen barriers of varying lengths, expanding towards areas west of Daraa Province and around the Yarmouk basin bordering the occupied Syrian Golan.
It may be premature to definitively ascertain the goals of these Israeli penetrations into deep Syrian territory, though the associated engineering projects do not suggest temporary or tactical measures. This points towards a far-reaching expansionist strategy, characteristic of Israel’s policies, and the Golan has never been an exception, especially after former U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the occupied parts of the plateau.
In other words, despite the accuracy of linking the changes after the “Al-Aqsa Flood” with the current ongoing clashes on various fronts with Israel, what has recently been witnessed in the Golan is not separate from a broader, more comprehensive logic. This logic extends over time and is wider in scope.
One could recall the last round of negotiations between the Syrian regime and Israel in the summer of 2008, under Turkish mediation, involving indirect meetings between Riyad Daoudi, a legal advisor to the Syrian Foreign Ministry, and two advisers to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.
Leaks from that time indicated that the issue, which had remained unresolved following the failure of the Geneva Conference in late March 2000 between Hafez al-Assad and former U.S. President Bill Clinton, continued to dominate the Turkish mediation table. This issue pertained to the understanding of the international borders between Syria and Israel, comparing the pre-1967 lines with the pre-1948 lines, and the northeastern shores of Lake Tiberias.
Another earlier round of secret negotiations, this time under Swiss mediation, was held in 2004. This involved Syrian-American businessman Ibrahim Suleiman representing the regime, alongside Alon Liel, the Israeli Foreign Ministry’s Director-General, and American diplomat Jeffrey Aaronson, who had conducted previous “exploratory rounds” with Suleiman. This round was notable for at least one aspect, foreseeing an unusual normalization between the Syrian regime and Israel. The negotiators had reached an understanding about the disputed area, which would later be frozen in Geneva, by transforming it into a tourist resort resembling a demilitarized zone, dubbed the “Peace Park,” where Syrian and Israeli citizens could enter without a special visa.
Given that the Golan is an attractive investment area for tourism, especially for its ski resorts, and that it is believed to be rich in vast groundwater resources, and the settlement projects there are not as burdensome as those in the West Bank, Trump’s recognition of Israeli sovereignty was both a reassurance and encouragement. Therefore, a government as extreme, racist, and fascist as the one led by Benjamin Netanyahu today would not find it difficult to place these considerations within a military and security framework aimed at curtailing Iranian influence in the Golan, its surroundings, and southern Syria. Reports indicate that Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah detachments are deployed in more than 40 locations between the Golan, Daraa, and As-Suwayda.
So, has the Golan’s turn arrived on the list of Israel’s current and upcoming wars? Most likely, yes, with a crucial distinction: any Israeli war will not aim to harm the regime but rather focus on undermining as much of Iran’s military presence on Syrian soil as possible, particularly in the Golan and southern Syria. Not long ago, Netanyahu articulated Israel’s core strategy in its relations with the Syrian regime: “We have had no problem with the Assad family regime; for 40 years, not a single shot was fired in the Golan Heights. The important thing is to maintain our freedom to act against anyone who works against us,” Netanyahu said in the summer of 2018, concluding a significant visit to Moscow.
Avigdor Lieberman, Israel’s defense minister at the time, predicted that “the Syrian front will remain quiet” with Assad regaining “full control” of Syria.
The truth is, this spans not just 40 years as Netanyahu mentioned, but 57 years since 1967. During this time, the balance of power between Syria under the Baath Party and the Israeli state has been characterized by verbal hostility and rhetoric, juxtaposed against actual surrender on the ground.
This was not a case of “neither peace nor war,” as widely believed, but rather a state of de facto peace, hindered by complex internal factors related to the “Corrective Movement” regime from reaching formal agreements. Another fact is that the Golan is Syrian land, lost by Assad the father on two occasions: first as defense minister in 1967, and then as a dictatorial president in 1973. It seems unlikely that any miracle will provide his son, Assad the junior, with the chance to reclaim it through peace, given the absence of elements necessary for a military recovery.
Therefore, if Netanyahu believes the time has come for the Golan to take its place on his list of wars, Assad will not only maintain his silent stance militarily, nor will he confine himself to rhetorical bombast on his state media. Rather, he is more likely to seek the protection of his secondary patron, Russian President Vladimir Putin, even if it comes at the expense of his primary benefactor, Ali Khamenei, always hoping to reconnect the severed lines of bargaining, concession, and compliance.
