The martyrdom of the head of the Hamas Political Bureau, Yahya Sinwar, was a monumental moment that solidified his name as a legend and symbol of Palestinian resistance. It undoubtedly marked a new phase in the “Al-Aqsa Flood” battle, yet the pressing question remains: will his absence lead to an end to the war on Gaza soon?
This assertion, or rather this interpretation, suggesting that the war might cease due to the absence of the “engineer of the flood,” as he was called, rests on three main hypotheses. The first hypothesis posits that Sinwar was leading the hardline faction within Hamas, particularly when it came to negotiations and ceasefire conditions. Thus, his absence might pave the way for a more flexible leadership that could potentially reach an agreement to halt the war.
The First Hypothesis: A More Flexible Leadership?
This hypothesis deliberately overlooks the fact that Sinwar was part of the leadership that engaged in indirect negotiations with the Israeli occupation through mediators from the beginning of the aggression on Gaza. He was a key figure in these negotiations, first as the leader of the Gaza Strip and later as the head of the movement. The leadership, which he was a part of, had twice agreed to ceasefire and prisoner exchange initiatives, both of which were rejected by the occupation. Additionally, this hypothesis neglects that there was no change in Hamas’s stance following the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh and Sinwar’s subsequent appointment as head of the political bureau. The conditions Hamas demanded for an agreement were minimal: a ceasefire, withdrawal from the Strip, the entry of humanitarian aid, reconstruction, and a prisoner exchange.
It is notable that this claim is being promoted by American (and European) officials who support the occupation’s genocidal war on the Strip. By placing the blame for the failure to reach an agreement on Hamas and Sinwar specifically, while ignoring Israel’s refusal, they continue to provide political cover for Israel to proceed with its crimes. Additionally, these are messages directed at the American public, hinting at a possible agreement — an achievement that could precede the presidential elections. Overall, the statements from Netanyahu and other occupation officials do not support this hypothesis, nor do they suggest any negotiation track to begin with.
The Second Hypothesis: A Weaker Leadership Ready for Concessions?
The second hypothesis, which is linked to the first, claims that Sinwar’s departure will usher in a leadership with a lower ceiling, more willing to make concessions to the occupation — not just in negotiations but even on the ground. In other words, proponents of this hypothesis believe that Hamas’s new leader will perceive Sinwar’s killing as the final link in a chain of assassinations targeting the political and military leadership of the resistance. Combined with the disproportionate losses suffered over a year of asymmetric warfare, and the catastrophic humanitarian situation for civilians in Gaza, this could lead to a “rational” decision from the resistance to end the war, effectively surrendering, regardless of how such a decision is marketed.
This hypothesis overlooks that Sinwar’s stance was not different from the current Hamas leadership. The movement unanimously elected him after Haniyeh’s assassination, which was understood as political backing for the battle and full alignment with him and his stance. Moreover, it ignores the immense difficulty of retreating and surrendering after all the sacrifices made by the people and the resistance in Gaza, which would render those sacrifices in vain, without any gains or victories. Despite the heavy blows, the field position of the resistance remains far from failure or nihilism.
Revolutionary movements and resistance groups generally tend to stand firm and resist more when their leaders are targeted, especially given Sinwar’s iconic final moments, which make it almost impossible to back down from his stances and ceiling in the battle. How can there be a retreat when the ceiling remains the same, as previously detailed? New leaderships often face the responsibility of proving themselves through steadfastness and achievement, not retreat and surrender. They bear the duty of upholding their stance, the responsibility of avenging the previous leader, and the duty to honor all those who sacrificed from among their people. This was echoed in the eulogies delivered by Hamas leaders for their fallen commander.
The Third Hypothesis: Ending the War as a Result of a “Victory”
The third hypothesis that predicts an end to the war after Sinwar’s martyrdom suggests that eliminating him was a major goal, which Netanyahu can present as a victory, allowing him to step back from the war by claiming to have achieved his objectives, primarily weakening Hamas through a series of “accomplishments,” the latest of which was killing Sinwar, whose name had become synonymous with the “flood.”
This hypothesis was repeatedly proposed following the assassinations of Saleh al-Arouri, Hamas’s Deputy Political Bureau Chief, Ismail Haniyeh, the head of the Bureau, and even the Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah. In each instance, the occupation demonstrated that it would not suffice with this “valuable catch,” as they call it, to end the war.
It is true that Sinwar’s case is different, given his symbolic, moral, and actual role as the leader of the “flood” operation — both in concept and execution. As the head of Hamas in Gaza and the general leader of the movement, his killing might be seen as a closing chapter in a series of leadership assassinations. However, the occupation’s statements do not reflect this. The statements that emerged following the announcement of his death did not imply the achievement of the objective or the end of the war. Instead, they underscored the effectiveness of force and assassination in targeting Hamas leadership, “bringing us closer to freeing the prisoners,” as Netanyahu claimed.
Additionally, the occupation continues to threaten a major strike against Iran, even announcing that the decision has been made, merely awaiting the zero hour. They remain entangled on the Lebanese front without the ability to advance widely or return settlers to the north. Thus, the likelihood is for escalation rather than an end in the foreseeable future, based on the occupation’s statements, actions, and the prevailing field and political realities.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it does not appear that Sinwar’s martyrdom will bring an end to the war on Gaza or the wider region. While it marks a significant milestone and turning point, the trend seems to be towards an expansion of the conflict during this period, awaiting a new U.S. administration. Netanyahu is likely to exploit President Biden’s weakness — as he is certain to be leaving the Oval Office — to pressure him, avoiding any potential criticism from Harris or Trump as the presidential elections approach. Moreover, Netanyahu sees the escalation in the region as bolstering Trump’s chances, whom he prefers as president.
Therefore, Netanyahu is determined to continue and expand the war as much as possible, as he does not believe that halting it at this stage will allow him to claim victory, achieve his goals, or ensure the “security of Israel” despite the absence or targeting of his primary adversary and the leader of the resistance, Yahya Sinwar.
