For many years, the conflict between Iran and the Israeli occupation has extended beyond the military, political, or diplomatic arenas. It has delved deep into what is known as the “hidden war” or “intelligence war,” where both Iran and “Israel” have engaged in recruiting agents and infiltrating military and civilian institutions. This ongoing battle has seen attempts to gain access to sensitive information that can be used against each other in their long-standing rivalry.
In recent months, especially during the “Al-Aqsa Flood” confrontation, Iran’s efforts to penetrate “Israel” have notably intensified. Tel Aviv has repeatedly announced that it thwarted several attempts by Iran to recruit Israeli agents and spies for various purposes. These include photographing sensitive installations, sending coordinates, tracking political and military figures for possible assassinations, and more, as stated by the occupation authorities.
In this report, we will highlight Iran’s historical attempts to recruit spies within “Israel,” focusing on recent events, particularly in light of the escalating military tensions between the two sides. Since early October 2024, Tehran has been anticipating a possible attack from “Israel” after it launched around 200 rockets at the occupation state on the first of the same month. This was a response to the assassination of Hamas’ political bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, along with Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and an IRGC general in southern Beirut.
Iran’s Long History of Recruiting Spies Inside “Israel”
1. Recruitment of an Agent to Assassinate an “Israeli Scientist” – 2024
On October 16, 2024, the occupation police, in coordination with the Shin Bet, arrested a man recruited by Iran to assassinate a prominent Israeli scientist in exchange for $100,000.
According to Yedioth Ahronoth, the authorities apprehended a Tel Aviv resident suspected of performing tasks for Iranian intelligence, including graffiti, distributing flyers, and gathering information on Israeli targets.
Officials revealed that Vladimir Varkhovsky (35) agreed to assassinate an Israeli scientist for $100,000 and had acquired a weapon to carry out the mission. Communication with his handlers was conducted in English, as per Shin Bet sources.
2. Recruitment of an Agent to Assassinate Israeli Officials – 2024
On October 14, 2024, the Israeli police and Shin Bet announced they had thwarted an Iranian attempt to assassinate Israeli officials by recruiting locals. A joint statement disclosed the arrest of Vladislav Viktorson (30), who had been in contact with a female agent named Mary Housy via social media since August 2024.
The statement added, “Vladislav, under the direction of the Iranian entity and with full knowledge of its identity, performed tasks including graffiti, hanging banners, and arson in Yarkon Park, Tel Aviv. Later, he was instructed to sabotage telecommunications infrastructure, ATMs, and set fires in forests. Some of these activities were documented, and he was paid over $5,000.”
Further investigations revealed that Vladislav had agreed to assassinate an unnamed figure in “Israel” and planned to throw a grenade at a residence. He subsequently sought to procure weapons, including sniper rifles, pistols, and grenades. He also recruited others, including his partner Anna Bernstein (18), from Ramat Gan, who participated in some tasks. Indictments have been filed against them.
3. The “Maiman Network” – 2024
On September 20, 2024, “Israel” revealed a complex espionage case known as the “Maiman Case.” Businessman Moti Maiman (72) from Ashkelon was arrested, accused of collaborating with the IRGC and Iranian intelligence to plan assassinations targeting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar, in retaliation for the assassination of Hamas political bureau head Ismail Haniyeh on Iranian soil in July 2024.
According to the indictment, Maiman, who frequently traveled between Turkey and Iran, met with intelligence officials in Tehran and the IRGC. Investigations revealed that he had been tasked with assassinations, intelligence gathering, and facilitating the transfer of weapons and funds within “Israel.” Authorities charged him with espionage, communicating with foreign agents during wartime, and unauthorized entry into enemy states, and are seeking his detention until legal proceedings are complete.
4. Promoting a Coup in “Israel” – 2024
In August 2024, the Israeli public prosecutor’s office revealed espionage charges in what it described as a “serious” case, alleging that Iran had attempted to promote a “military coup” in “Israel.”
Shin Bet investigations showed that Iranian agents had recruited an Israeli student, Eidan Davis (30) from Ramat Gan, to advance Iranian objectives in “Israel.” The indictment indicated that Iran sought to exploit protests to destabilize Israeli society.
5. Security Activities Threatening “Israel’s” Security – 2024
In July 2024, the Shin Bet and the National Unit for International Investigations announced the arrest of three Israeli Haredi Jews on suspicion of carrying out security-related activities that threatened “Israel’s” security under Iranian intelligence direction.
Investigations revealed one suspect, Elimelech Stern (21) from Beit Shemesh, had been communicating via Telegram using a profile named “Anna Elena,” carrying out various tasks in “Israel” like depositing funds and delivering parcels with threatening notes. He recruited others for these missions, receiving payments in cryptocurrency.
6. Disbanding a Spy Network – 2023
In December 2023, Israeli security forces uncovered an Iranian espionage network that recruited agents within “Israel” through online platforms, offering payments in exchange for espionage and targeting information. The Shin Bet stated that Iranian operatives posed as real estate brokers, drone marketers, or even dating service users to connect with potential recruits.
7. Using Social Media for Various Purposes – 2022
In 2022, a complex case came to light involving Iranian attempts to recruit spies through a fake Facebook account named Rambod Namdar, posing as an Iranian Jew interested in migrating to “Israel.” He built trust with his targets through prolonged conversations, eventually asking them to photograph strategic sites and send funds. Five suspects were arrested in November 2021, shocking the Persian-Israeli community.
8. Recruitment of a Former Israeli Minister – 2018
One of the most shocking incidents occurred in 2018 when former Israeli Energy Minister Gonen Segev was arrested on suspicion of spying for Iran. Recruited by the Iranian embassy in Nigeria, he was convicted of “serious espionage” and sentenced to 11 years after providing sensitive information on strategic and security institutions in “Israel.”
9. Selling Secrets of Nerve Gas Production – 1997
In 1997, Israeli businessman Nahum Manbar was arrested for allegedly selling secrets of nerve gas and mustard gas production to Iran, claiming it was for business purposes. However, the court found his actions to be a grave security risk, sentencing him to 16 years in prison.
How Does Iran Recruit Spies in “Israel”?
1. Online Targeting
According to Israeli reports, social media has become a key tool for Iran’s recruitment efforts. Fake accounts, appearing to be of Israelis, initiate conversations with potential targets, often presenting lucrative offers to gather information or carry out espionage.
2. Blackmail and Threats
In some cases, Iran resorts to blackmail, targeting individuals with secrets or vulnerabilities to pressure them into cooperation.
3. Utilizing Foreign Agents
Iran also recruits non-Israelis residing within “Israel,” particularly from communities with Middle Eastern connections, using them for intelligence gathering or logistical support.
What Do Iran’s Continuous Recruitment Efforts Mean?
Iran’s persistent attempts to infiltrate Israel’s security and military structures pose a major challenge to the occupation state. Despite several exposed networks, the threat remains, with concerns over undiscovered cells or agents continuing their covert operations. This intelligence war reflects a high-stakes, ongoing battle, marking a significant dimension of the broader conflict between Tehran and Tel Aviv.
