The New York Times has revealed a set of documents allegedly found by the Israeli occupation forces in one of the tunnels. These documents outline Hamas’ two-year planning process leading to the October 7, 2023 attacks.
Hamas’ Strategic Patience: According to the New York Times report, translated by Arabi21, the documents show that Hamas deliberately avoided escalation for two years to maximize the element of surprise. The group sought to convince both Hezbollah and Iran to support the operation. A delegation, led by Khalil al-Hayya, met with a leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Lebanon, requesting assistance in targeting sensitive sites at the start of the attack.
The documents reportedly include minutes from ten secret meetings of top Hamas officials. These files were allegedly seized from a computer found by the Israeli army in January at an underground command center belonging to Hamas in Khan Yunis, southern Gaza.
Key Figures in the Plan: Among those present at these meetings were the General Commander of the Qassam Brigades, Muhammad Deif, his deputy Marwan Issa, and the head of Hamas, Yahya Sinwar.
The New York Times emphasized that the plan was initially set to take place during the current Yom Kippur holiday. However, it was accelerated due to Tel Aviv’s development of a laser weapon capable of intercepting missiles, alongside the exploitation of internal Israeli divisions. The plan also aimed to derail normalization efforts between Tel Aviv and Arab states.
The “Big Project” Plan: The operation, dubbed “The Big Project,” was originally scheduled for the fall of 2022. It was delayed in an effort to persuade Iran and Hezbollah to join. The report highlighted that, according to the documents, Sinwar and Hamas leadership had been avoiding major confrontations with Israel since 2021 to maintain the element of surprise and to convince the occupation that Hamas in Gaza was seeking calm.
In May 2023, Sinwar and Hamas leadership discussed whether the attack should take place on September 25, during Yom Kippur, or on October 7. The importance of avoiding any major escalation that could disrupt final preparations was stressed during this meeting.
Why the Attack Was Rushed: The May meeting revealed that senior Hamas officials wanted the attack executed by the end of 2023, citing Israel’s development of a laser defense system more effective than the current Iron Dome system, as reported by the New York Times.
The documents also show how Hamas sought to exploit the political turmoil in Israel for their benefit. They contradicted earlier reports of disagreements between Sinwar and the Hamas leadership in Gaza and Ismail Haniyeh, the political bureau chief of the movement.
Hamas’ Broader Goals: The report highlighted that Sinwar and Hamas leaders in Gaza shared sensitive information with Haniyeh, including details of the “Big Project.” The decision to launch the attack was also driven by a desire to disrupt efforts to normalize relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, hinder the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and prevent Jewish presence in Al-Aqsa Mosque.
Intelligence Failure: The New York Times noted that the discovery of these documents raises questions about the failure of Israeli intelligence to detect Hamas’ intentions before the attack. An internal Israeli military report criticized intelligence officials for not obtaining these documents or failing to comprehend the strategy outlined in them prior to the assault.
An Israeli intelligence memo, dated October 7, 2023, at 3:17 AM—just hours before the attack—stated that Hamas was not interested in escalation or conflict at that time.
The Israeli military refused to comment on the publication of these documents, while neither Hamas nor Hezbollah provided a response. Meanwhile, Iran’s delegation to the United Nations denied the authenticity of these documents, asserting that all planning, decision-making, and execution were solely directed by Hamas’ military wing in Gaza.
