The American magazine “Newlines” published a report discussing the Gulf countries’ efforts to enhance their influence in Africa, with a focus on economic dimensions rather than ideological ones. The report highlighted the growing special partnership between Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv in the African Sahel region.
The magazine, in this report translated by “Arabi21,” mentioned that the history of conflict in the Middle East since the early 20th century has gone through three main phases, each shaping the internal and regional Arab policies for decades. The third phase is still emerging but is no less important than the previous ones, as it extends beyond the traditional lines of conflict in Arab countries to increasingly include Africa and Afghanistan.
The first phase was driven by national liberation movements, initially fighting against colonial powers and Israel, later calling for regional unity under the banner of Arabism. The post-colonial conflicts focused on specific parts of the region, particularly in West Asia, starting with the campaigns of Gamal Abdel Nasser, who advocated Arab nationalism outside Egypt in the Levant and Yemen, through Saddam Hussein’s wars against both Iran and Kuwait, and Hafez al-Assad’s interventions in Lebanon.
This was followed by a second phase, which could be considered a natural extension of the first, marked by the rise of Islamic forces and those trying to counter them. Arabism had faded, replaced by the rise of Islamic nationalist movements, with Turkey and Iran becoming more assertive in traditional conflict arenas. However, while the players changed, the battlefields largely remained the same. For decades, Arab politics were shaped by the tug-of-war between Arab nationalism and Islamic ideologies.
The region has now entered a new phase characterized by a shift away from both Arabism and Islamism, defined instead by the political and economic interests of the Gulf states. The Arab uprisings of 2011 were a turning point, as regimes in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, and Syria began to collapse, retreating from regional leadership. As the center of regional power shifted to the Gulf states, the primary drivers of regional conflict also changed.
The magazine explained that these conflicts are no longer confined to traditional hot spots or ideological fault lines but have expanded to regions outside the Arab world, including Africa and Afghanistan. There are historical precedents for major Arab powers providing support to African nations as part of anti-colonial policies and Cold War strategies.
In the early 1960s, Gamal Abdel Nasser sent Egyptian forces to Congo to support Patrice Lumumba’s government, and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya sought to assert his influence in Africa through economic and political cooperation. Similarly, the Gulf states have pursued their interests in the region, as Saudi Arabia did through the secret Safari Club alliance led by the United States in the 1970s, and the UAE did in Seychelles over the past two decades.
However, these economic and diplomatic relationships were not part of a strategy to impose control or compete with other regional powers, as is the case in Africa today. This new dynamic helps explain many of the recent developments in the region. For example, analysts view Houthi attacks along the Red Sea in the context of Israel’s war on Gaza and the confrontations between Israel and the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance.” Yet, this overlooks a more significant dynamic: it may be more accurate to view these attacks as connected to developments in the Horn of Africa.
Similarly, the rising tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia over water rights, along with last week’s reconciliation between Cairo and Ankara, can be better understood through this lens, as can the wars in Sudan and Somalia. As the Gulf countries continue to assert their influence and international powers like Russia and China increase their involvement in Africa and Afghanistan, these patterns are likely to intensify and shape the future of Arab politics. One of the consequences of this is the growing divisions in conflict-torn countries involving these powers, which focus on achieving specific economic objectives through carving out areas of limited interest.
Egypt and Ethiopia’s Conflict
The magazine pointed to the ongoing conflict between Ethiopia and Egypt over water rights in the Nile River. Ethiopia completed the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on August 26, at a cost of $4.7 billion.
Construction of the dam began in 2011 despite objections from Egypt and Sudan, the two downstream countries that heavily rely on the Nile’s waters. Numerous mediation efforts, including those by the United States, the World Bank, and various Gulf and international entities, have failed to secure an agreement that protects Egypt’s and Sudan’s water rights. The Nile River is crucial to Egypt, providing more than 14 trillion gallons of water annually, which accounts for 79% of the country’s total water resources and meets 95% of its water needs.
While Addis Ababa celebrated the dam’s completion as a historic achievement, Cairo responded swiftly by deploying two military aircraft loaded with soldiers, weapons, and equipment to Mogadishu, Somalia. This was part of a larger deployment of 10,000 Egyptian soldiers under a defense agreement between the two countries. Ethiopia quickly responded by moving additional military forces to its border with Somalia. A spokesman for Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned that the country would not stand idly by while foreign forces destabilize the region and threaten Ethiopia’s national security.
The magazine reported that Egypt’s deployment had two objectives: increasing Egypt’s participation in African peacekeeping missions in Somalia and thwarting Ethiopia’s ambitions to secure a permanent outlet on the Red Sea. More importantly, this step ensured a military presence near Somalia’s border with Ethiopia. These developments have heightened tensions between two regional powers in Africa, raising the risk of military confrontation and drawing in other countries from the region and beyond.
In early 2024, Ethiopia signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland, a self-declared independent republic that Somalia considers part of its sovereign territory. Under this agreement, Ethiopia will lease 12 miles of coastline along the Red Sea for 50 years, allowing it to build a military base. In return, Ethiopia recognizes Somaliland’s independence and offers it a share of Ethiopian Airlines’ profits. In August, Ethiopia sent a high-level envoy to Somaliland, marking the first such diplomatic move by any country.
