Israeli officials, still engulfed in the aftermath of their involvement in the Gaza war, continue to search for the “next day” answer to this conflict. Instead of stability, uncertainty prevails, especially with the recognition that the main phase of fighting in Gaza has ended. Despite this, after eight months of conflict, the occupation still finds Hamas standing predominantly on two fronts: civil and military, despite the damages and losses it has suffered.
Former deputy to the head of the Palestinian arena in the planning department of the Israeli army, a senior officer in naval intelligence, Ami Yagur, said, “The Israeli question will not address the reason for the Israeli inability, despite its failed attempts to dismantle the governmental capabilities of Hamas, at the same time that it is making military efforts against its military capabilities, particularly after its attempts to work with local clans failed, then to introduce elements of the Palestinian Authority. These efforts have utterly failed.”
He added in an article published by Ma’ariv, and translated by “Arabi21,” that “Although it is theoretically possible to achieve this, the occupation army, through the coordinator of government operations in the Palestinian territories, has made no significant effort to date, evidenced by its attempts to control the humanitarian aid entering Gaza and distribute it to Hamas instead, which has registered a major failure.”
He alleged that “the Philadelphia Axis that was revealed to be the true oxygen pipe for Hamas coincides with everyone’s realization that Hamas is in charge of delivering humanitarian aid from UN warehouses and distributing it among Palestinians. Therefore, Hamas maintains its crucial elements and succeeds in preserving its capabilities and governing position in the sector. If this is true, how will it help to enter the new stage?”
He confirmed that “there is one clear thing about the next day, which is that a large-scale reconstruction plan for the Gaza Strip is a reality and a condition for its survival. At the very least, the war rubble will be removed and perhaps also the reconstruction of the sector, making it suitable for its residents’ lives. This important element, everyone agrees, will happen in one way or another because it is necessary, and Hamas cannot achieve it by itself without the help of international and regional arenas, and with the presence of a clear Israeli.”
He pointed out that “it is certain that many Israelis will question their need to deal with the reconstruction of Gaza even before talking about the reconstruction of the south and north of the occupying state. The answer is that, in addition to the simple truth that we need to start talking about the parallel management of several efforts, not just a long consecutive process, unlike the required reconstruction in the occupying state, which is a goal in itself, claiming that the reconstruction of Gaza is actually an excellent process and a tool to overthrow Hamas from authority in Gaza, dismantle its governmental capabilities, and establish an alternative.”
He pointed out that “if Hamas regains control of the sector, even if it is not the declared governing body, but only acts in the field, it will be where it provides ‘activated’ legitimacy for its renewed rule. This is exactly what the occupation must learn from the past because at the end of World War II, the United States launched the ‘Marshall Plan’ for Europe, named after US Secretary of State George Marshall, which took four years to implement at a cost of $173 billion today. The money was distributed by committees of government officials and businessmen.”
He mentioned that “after each war, including previous wars against Hamas in Gaza, the movement led the reconstruction of the sector according to its interests, used funds and materials to pave the way for the next fighting operation, while the occupation preferred to bury its head in the sand, necessitating a reconsideration of its policies this time and learning from the past, and declaring an initiative upon the cessation of fighting in Rafah about the ‘Israeli Marshall Plan’ for the reconstruction of the sector, to be implemented by the international community with the assistance of regional countries, under the auspices of the United Nations, claiming it will secure its interests, including full security control in the sector.”
The Israeli general does not guarantee achieving the occupation’s goals from his own reconstruction plan for the sector on the next day after the end of the war, admitting the lack of ability to quickly create alternatives for Hamas’s government in Gaza, in line with its interests, but content with the discussion that such a plan will transform the Gaza Strip from a base for disputes into a foundation for cooperation and establishing a regional and international alliance with the occupation, despite this meaning Hamas’s absence from action in the sector: ,
